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International recognition of the health problems being faced by developing countries have 
resulted in significant increases in external development assistance for health since the late 
1980s. However, it has been established that this aid has not been effective due to poor 
coordination, harmonization and alignment. As part of the aid development architecture, 
donors and recipient countries have defined approaches, modalities and methods of working 
aimed at improving harmonization, alignment and management of aid for results. One such 
approach is the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) which involves ensuring that "all significant 
funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure programme, under 
government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing 
towards relying on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds." (Foster et 
ai, 2000a, p.6). 
In Zambia, the health SWAp has been in existence since 1993. The adoption of the health 
SWAp was necessitated by a desire to optimize the use of domestic and externally mobilised 
financial and in-kind development assistance through the integration of all vertical 
programmes into a sectoral framework that would meet common national goals and 
objectives. This was after it was realised that the health system was inefficient in its provision 
of health services due to the existence of fragmented, multiple donor-assisted projects which 
the Ministry of Health could not effectively coordinate and manage. 
This paper explores the contribution of the health SWAp to the provision of effective health 
care in Zambia since its inception in 1993. The study considered the SWAp as both an aid 
instrument and as a process and the evaluation is made by looking at both the individual 
elements of a SWAp and the SWAp mechanism as a whole. The study assesses the 
contribution of the SWAp to fostering working relationships, accountability for finances and 
progress, efficient allocation and use of resources, financial sustainability and promotion of 
geographical equity of access to health care resources. 
The study was exploratory and a retrospective approach was used to track and associate 
changes before the introduction of the health SWAp and after the SWAp implementation 
period 1993 - 2005. In order to take account of certain contextual factors in the broad health 
reform continuum, a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques were 
used. This includes 21 in-depth key informant interviews, a Focus Group Discussion (FGD), 
non-participant observation at 4 different SWAp coordination meetings and a comprehensive 
document review. Study participants were senior members of the Health Sector AdviSOry 
Committee that were drawn from 6 provinces (including the capital city Lusaka). The actual 
selection of interviewees was done purposively based on the possession of requisite 












The Sector Policy and Management Review Toolkit (SPMRT) was one of the tools that was 
used to analyse the data from the FGD. Responses from all the qualitative instruments were 
condensed, inductively analysed and subsequently combined with quantitative data from the 
document review. 
Some of the major findings of the research were: 
• 	 The Zambian health SWAp can be regarded as a full SWAp whose implementation 
has developed gradually and consultatively. However, varying degrees of successes 
and failures had been achieved when it came to the implementation of each element 
of the SWAp. Specifically, the implementation of the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) budget and use of harmonised implementation mechanisms and 
procedures were found to be problematic. Apparently, three (3) financing mechanisms 
were in existence most of which were not aligned to the budget and National Health 
Strategic Plan (NHSP). The health SWAp was also found to be sector narrow in 
terms of stakeholder and consumer involvement as well as the range of 
programmes/activities that were being supported. 
• 	 CPs that were contributing to the basket were to a greater extent found to be more 
committed to the SWAp process than those that were not. Concerning ownership of 
the SWAp process by the government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ), GRZ was not 
completely in control even though it provided leadership in the SWAp process. 
• 	 The adoption of the health SWAp has significantly contributed to improvements in 
financial management and accountability even though more had to be done in the 
area of procurement and accountability for performance. The implication was that the 
health system was not entirely performance oriented. 
• 	 The SWAp mechanism as a whole had not really made any notable contributions to 
improving administrative, technical and allocative efficiencies in that transaction costs 
were still high; there were a number of Cooperating Partners (CPs) using separate 
systems; the productivity of district hospitals was below par; and the distribution of 
GRZ resources among competing users was sub-optimal both in terms of budgeting 
and execution. It was also noted that GRZ funding was unpredictable as compared to 
CPs' funding and that there were fewer negative variations in budgeted amounts 
against the actual releases for basket funding in comparison to vertical programmes. 
• 	 There was inadequate support for drugs and human resources during the SWAp 
implementation period making it difficult to provide quality health care. 
• 	 Financial sustainability appeared not to have been attained as the growth of CPs 












domestic sources during the SWAp implementation period. In addition, instabilities in 
the growth of funds from all sources were prevalent and that basket funds were 
growing at a slower rate than funding for vertical programmes despite the expansion 
of the basket. There were also inadequate funds to meet the requirements of the 
Basic Health Care Package while GRZ was unable to meet regional targets for 
funding the health sector as envisioned in the Abuja Declaration. 
• 	 It was noted that supporting a set of common activities as envisioned through the 
SWAp can increase sustainability in programme funding owing to the fact that GRZ 
did take up the task of funding the programmes in the health sector when the CPs 
reduced their support in times of partnership problems. 
• 	 The six-month buffer as a system meant to sustain operations in the health sector in 
the advent of short-term variations in funding couldn't take care of sudden but drastic 
changes in funding emanating from international exchange rate fluctuations. 
• 	 The SWAp had relatively promoted equity in the allocation of resources to districts 
through the use of a needs-based resource allocation formula but that formulae had to 
be developed for the other levels. 
• 	 There was a problem of physical access to health facilities despite the commitment of 
GRZ and its CPs to providing basic health services through the rehabilitation and 
construction of more health centres and health posts in rural areas. This was 
because the emphasis of the Zambian health SWAp is more on financing recurrent 
operational costs (especially the districts) than capital development. 
• 	 Lastly, it was noted that the SWAp had not adequately contributed to the correction of 
geographical (urban/rural) inequities in the targeting of resources towards the 
attainment of universal fully immunised children and institutional deliveries among 
women. Underlying/contextual factors that negated the attainment of geographical 
equity of access include the lack of human resources, lack of physical proximity to 
health facilities, and shortage of vaccines for child immunisation to mention but a few. 
Realising that effective implementation of a health SWAp still remains a challenge to the 
Zambian government, a comprehensive list of policy recommendations have been suggested 
based on the study findings and conclusions. The idea is to allow the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) to decide on what to implement, through prioritisation in the interim to long term 
although suggested priorities are presented. Some of the key recommendations include the 
aligning of all financing sources to the NHSP and MTEF; strengthening stakeholder and GRZ 












system; streamlining of the number of SWAp coordination meetings; and improving the 
budgeting and execution processes. 
Research gaps were also identified and suggestions for future work have been made. It is 
my sincere hope that this paper will be used as a tool for developing credible strategies for 












CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES AND 

ORGANISATION OF THE DOCUMENT 

1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter brings the perspective of the study in focus by presenting the problem statement 
and its context, the rationale and significance of the study, and the general and specific 
objectives. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to the World Health Organisation (2000), every health system should provide 
better health to all its people, respond to their expectations and offer financial protection 
against the costs of ill-health. The World Health Organisation further suggests that the 
attainment of these goals depends on how well a health system executes four functions 
namely: stewardship, creating resources, financing (collecting, pooling and purchasing) and 
provision of services demanded by the population. In line with the minimum standards 
prescribed by WHO, several authors relate to some or all of the above functions when 
gauging the performance of a health system (IHSO, 2001b; Travis et ai, 2004; Gottret and 
Schieber, 2006; Schieber et aI2006). 
To date, not all the countries around the world have fully met all the goals outlined above, 
more especially the Least Developed Countries (LOCs). A myriad of reasons have been 
given for the poor health service delivery in LOCs and prominent among the reasons is the 
inadequate resources at the disposal of most LOCs that several scholars believe cannot 
bring about meaningful improvements in the health status of the people (Task Force on 
Health Systems Research, 2005; Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Schieber et al 2006). The 
understanding is that most LOCs have experienced several years of poor economic 
performance leading to decreased government revenues and a rising demand for health 
care. In addition to budgetary constraints, it has also been established that most health 
systems in LOCs are poorly organized and could thus not provide efficient and equitable 
health care (Travis et ai, 2002; Task Force on Health Systems Research, 2005). 
The international community has been in agreement for a long time on what needs to be 
done to meet the minimum standards for a health system in LOCs. The common perception 
is that major improvements in the health status of people in LOCs can only be attained 
through large-scale provision of funding to LOCs by international development agencies 
(Task Force on Health Systems Research, 2005; Gottret and Schieber, 2006; Schieber et al 
2006). Secondly, reforming the organization of health services is a key solution to the 
inefficient and inequitable delivery of health care (Travis et ai, 2002; Task Force on Health 












number of LOCs in the early 1990's commenced health sector reforms. Fundamentally, the 
line of argument was set on the 'New Public Management' thinking which advocates that 
governments should "move from a concern to do and towards a concern to ensure that 
things are done" (Travis et ai, 2002). The 'New Public Management' approach meant 
"separating the functions of purchasers and providers; creating internal or quasi markets 
within the public sector; creating executive agencies to manage the health sector; 
decentralizing health-service management to local health administrations or to local 
government; increasing the autonomy of hospitals; and making greater use of the private 
sector" (Task Force on Health Systems Research, 2005; p.40). 
Given limited budgets, efforts to mobilise sufficient financing in an equitable and affordable 
manner and to secure value for the money generated has been a common feature of the 
health reforms. In order to support the cause, many international agencies increased 
provision of resources to LOCs in support of a range of discrete projects and programmes. 
For example, Gottret and Schieber (2006, page xiv) note that, "international recognition of 
these global health inequities by the Group of Eight, the European Commission, and the 
United Nations, as well as global public health threats and support for countries to reach the 
MOGs, have resulted in significant increases in development assistance overall and 
development assistance for health in particular after almost a decade of decline in the 1990s. 
Zambia is not an exception in the failure to meet WHO standards with regard to the health 
system. The economic stagnation experienced in the country since mid-1970 resulted in the 
decline of resources available for use in the public sector, including to the health sector. 
Consequently, health service delivery was adversely affected. This prompted the country to 
follow in the footsteps of LOCs and health reforms started in 1992. The intention of the health 
reforms was to realize a vision of "providing Zambians with equity of access to cost effective, 
quality health care as close to the family as possible" and to attain the overall national health 
goal of having "a society in which Zambians create environments conducive to health, learn 
the art of being well and provide basic level health care for all" (Ministry of Health, 1992 p.2). 
An interesting feature of the implementation of the reforms in Zambia was the pace at which 
they were carried out. Mogedal et al cited by Lake and Musumali (1999) observed that 
Zambia's health reforms were the most radical and far-reaching in Africa, both in terms of the 
scope of change and the speed of implementation. This view was shared by other 
independent reviewers of the health reform process in Zambia who added that the build up of 
the reform process had centred on strong intellectual leadership, fortunate timing and 
generous donor support (Ministry of Health, 1997a). Thus, the reform process has since 
inception been owned by the government and the vision encompasses in-country 











The Ministry of Health was determined to transform the health care delivery system from one 
that focused on sole government participation (funding and decision making) to one founded 
on strategic partnerships between the government and all the stakeholders in the health 
sector, including local and international development partners. The idea was to stimulate a 
national sense of ownership of the public health system and social responsibility. The health 
reforms also came with new means of financing the health sector through a mix of user-fees, 
pre-payment and social insurance schemes. The need to improve the efficiency with which 
resources are utilised also necessitated changes in resource allocation at various levels of 
the health care delivery system. 
Several international development agencies hailed the health reform process and injected 
substantial financial and technical support into the health sector (Ministry of Health 1997a; 
Ministry of Health 2000a). Regrettably, it is argued that most of this aid did not lead to 
significant improvements in the health sector as it was not effectively managed to meet the 
national reform policies and objectives (Kalumba and Musowe; 1996). The problem was that 
most of the aid was channelled through a variety of vertical programmes and multiple donor­
assisted projects which caused duplication of programmes and thus inefficiencies in the use 
of resources (Kalumba and Musowe; 1996; Lake and Musumali 1999). In addition, there was 
an increase in the workload of health workers due to the need to meet specific parallel 
reporting and financing requirements of donors, which was compounded by geographical 
inequalities as a result of targeted assistance (Buse &Walt, 1996). 
In order to redress the trend, the MoH and its Co-operating Partners (CPs) made a shift from 
vertical programmes to a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) so that all available financial 
resources could be effectively managed and utilised in an equitable and sustainable manner 
(Lake and Musumali, 1999). The SWAp emerged as part of the health reforms and one of its 
key features was pooled funding through a "Basket" arrangement. The term "basket funding" 
is an innovation of the MoH and it entails the pooling of financial resources from all sources 
(government and CPs) towards the implementation of programmes and activities contained in 
the national health sector strategic plan (Lake and Musumali, 1999). Thus, the 
operationalisation of "Basket funding" in 1993 was the first stage in the implementation of a 
health SWAp in Zambia. At the time that basket funding was initiated, common planning, 
budgeting and accounting procedures were not yet in place and the MoH and its CPs had to 
put in place various joint systems and mechanisms that would enable the introduction of a full 












1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
Since 1993, the MoH has made considerable progress in the implementation of the SWAp. 
While the mode of support has not entirely changed, the government has somewhat 
managed to harmonize and align support towards priority health programmes as enshrined in 
the National Health Strategic Plan using a single set of programming, implementation and 
reporting procedures. As a result, the share of external resources channeled through the 
public health sector accounting system has increased over the years. Firstly, the number of 
CPs contributing to the basket increased from five in 1993 to nine in 2003 and in turn. 
financial disbursements to the basket also increased from an annual average of US$ 6.7 
million in 1995 to about US$ 33.8 million in 2003 (Daura and Mulikelela, 1998; Central 
Board of Health FAMS Unit). Secondly, between 2001 and 2005. an average of US$ 100 
million was estimated to be flowing into the health sector from CPs each year out of which 
close to 45% of these resources were administered through the public health care accounting 
system (Ministry of Health, 2003). The government for its part also increased the share of its 
expenditure on the health sector from 5.7% in 1991 to 13.4% in 1994 but this figure later 
dropped to 11% between 1997 and 2000. Put differently, the overall total per capita 
expenditure on health rose from an estimated US$ 8 in 1993/1994 to an average of US$ 23 
per year between 1995 and 2005 (Ministry of Health, 2002b; Ministry of Health 2003; Ministry 
of Health 2005b). 
Several government policy memoranda and independent reviewers of the Zambian health 
reforms have explicitly stated that the ad ption of the health SWAp has consistently 
encouraged stronger partnerships between the government and all the major stakeholders in 
the health sector (Ministry of Health, 1997a; Lake and Musumali, 1999; Kandimaa and 
Mattson, 2001; Frantz et ai, 2004). Further, it is agreed by almost all the CPs operating in the 
health sector in Zambia that the health SWAp has the potential to make development 
assistance more effective and that the SWAp serves as an opportunity for Zambia to realise 
its health reforms (Health Reforms at Work: Experiences with the Sector Wide Approach in 
Zambia, 2004. DVD Recording). The key point is that the earlier vertical programmes had 
only impacted on specific targeted areas and not on the overall health system (ibid). As a 
consequence, more and more CPs have embraced the health SWAp as evidenced through 
the pooling of financial resources, use of the National Health Strategic Plan (NHSP) as the 
implementation framework, and joint monitoring and reporting procedures. It is envisaged 
that this move has led to efficient allocation of scarce resources. 
However, even though it has been widely acclaimed that the paradigm shift from 
projecUprogramme support to a Sector Wide Approach has transformed working 











term review and the performance audit report of the National Health Strategic Plan (2001­
2005) showed contrary results (Ministry of Health, 2003; Ministry of Health, 2004b). Apart 
from these reviews. it has been pointed out during several SWAp coordination meetings that 
the performance of the health care delivery system has generally been poor with the major 
concern being the declining service delivery and health status indicators. For example, the 
Maternal Morality Rate (MMR) increased from 649 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1996 to 
729 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2002 while the percentage of supervised deliveries has 
remained stagnant at less than 50% since 1998 (Central Statistical Office, 1996; Central 
Statistical Office, 2002; Central Board of Health 2005). Furthermore, although the Infant 
Mortality Rate (IMR) decreased from 107 deaths per 1.000 live births in 1992 to 95 deaths per 
1,000 live births in 2002, other child related morbidity indicators, such as Malaria, Respiratory 
infection: non-pneumonia, Diarrhoea: non-bloody have remained unacceptably high (Central 
Statistical Office, 1996; Central Statistical Office, 2002; Central Board of Health 2005). In 
addition, morbidity indicators amongst the general Zambian population are high relative to 
many other countries in Africa with the country's statistics bureau. the Central Statistical 
Office (2004), revealing that 13% of Zambians surveyed two weeks prior to the Living 
Conditions and Monitoring Survey (LCMS) III reported an episode of illness. 
Owing to the above. critics have pOinted out that the current health care delivery system has 
not been responsive to the needs of the people and they doubt the effectiveness of the SWAp 
as an aid instrument as well as a method of working (process). Thus, for a while now, the 
biggest question has been why after so much good-will and increased allocation of resources 
to the health sector by external Cooperating Partners (CPs), the Zambian health care delivery 
system has not performed according to expectation. Notwithstanding that the health SWAp 
cannot be equated to the broader health sector reform process and that it is not entirely 
accountable for development outcomes, a well-functioning SWAp mechanism (greater 
harmonization, alignment, transparency, improved policy development and joint monitoring of 
performance) should serve as a link to overall health sector development outcomes (Walford. 
2003). 
Thus, though it might be true that the implementation of the Zambian health SWAp has led to 
systems development, strengthened leadership and improved transparency and 
communication, some believe that it has made little or no contribution to improved service 
delivery. However, this impression could be due to the limited amount of sound research that 
has been done on the Zambian health SWAp and it suffices to say that most of the critics 
inadvertently base their arguments on unsubstantiated claims. Incidentally, when the SWAp 
implementation process commenced in Zambia 12 years ago, the world knew very little about 
health sector SWAps and no implementation guide and evaluation framework were present. 












SWAp and its implementation was and still is a 'Iearning-by-doing' process (Lake and 
Musumali. 1999). Further, given an implementation span of 12 years, this is almost certainly 
the right time conduct an evaluation on the health SWAp as having done it earlier could have 
been inappropriate owing to inadequate lead-time to track changes. 
In the absence of a comprehensive review, it has not been possible for the MoH to ascertain 
the extent to which the health SWAp has met its objectives let alone the root cause of some 
of the concerns that have been raised of late. For this reason, a study that is entirely devoted 
to ascertaining the contribution of the health SWAp on the delivery of health care in Zambia is 
of paramount importance and as such, this study intends to fill this information gap. 
The motivation for undertaking this study hinges on two fronts. Firstly, it has been recognized 
the world over that research addressing health systems' constraints can substantially 
contribute to delivering effective interventions and that lack of health systems research will 
render the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) impossible (Task Force 
on Health Systems Research, 2005). Secondly, it is a well-known fact that implementation of 
a SWAp is not a clear-cut process and that its performance needs to be closely evaluated in 
order to find out if it is meeting its primary aims. A critical assessment of both the individual 
SWAp elements and the SWAp mechanism as a whole could, therefore, unveil certain factors 
that strongly influence the implementation of health SWAps. This can provide stakeholders 
with evidence-based information on how to refine the SWAp process itself leading to 
maximized impact of aid, to the benefit of the Zambian government and its people as well as 
the donors in terms of obtaining value for their investments. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
1.3.1 General Objective 
To explore the contribution of the health SWAp to the provision of effective health services in 
Zambia 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
i. To provide an understanding of the content and scope of th
in Zambia 
e SWAp in the health sector 
ii. To review the effectiveness of the SWAp coordination 
improved ownership, transparency and accountability 
mechanisms in relation to 
iii. To explore the extent to which the SWAp has contributed t
use of resources in Zambia 
o the efficient allocation and 
iv. To review the extent to which the SWAp has influenced the mode of support and 












v. To review the contribution of the SWAp towards the improvement of geographical 
(urban/rural) equity of access to health care resources. 
vi. To inform policy on how to further develop the SWAp in the health sector in Zambia 
1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
This paper explores the contribution of the health SWAp to the provision of effective health 
services in Zambia. Whilst this chapter presents the problem statement, rationale and 
objectives of the study, the other chapters are organized as follows: 
Chapter two presents a country profile of the main political, economic and demographic 
issues as well as the key features related to the Zambian health system. 
Chapter three provides a review of the available literature on health sector SWAps from 
around the world and Zambia including the conceptual framework that was used to explore 
the contribution of the Zambian health SWAp. 
Chapter four outlines the study design, methodology, data collection tools and analytical 
techniques that were used during the study. An account of some of the main limitations that 
were encountered during the study is also provided. 
Chapter five presents the findings of the research study as it relates to the objectives and 
conceptual framework that were laid down in order to explore the impact of the Zambian 
health SWAp. Detailed discussions are provided alongside the results vis-a-vis the 
implications on the provision of health services in Zambia. 
Chapter six provides a summary of the main lessons learnt, policy recommendations and 












CHAPTER TWO: COUNTRY AND HEALTH SYSTEM PROFILE 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief account of Zambia pertaining to political and macro-economic 
issues, demographic and social factors, and the health system profile. This includes the main 
features of the Zambian health system, major actors and service delivery. The overall aim of 
the chapter is to elicit a situational analysis of the Zambian economy and the factors that have 
been critical to the successful implementation of the core business of the MoH. 
2.1 POLITICAL AND MACRO-ECONOMIC ISSUES 
Zambia is a landlocked country located in the Southern-Central part of Africa and covers an 
area of about 752,614 square kilometres of land which is approximately 2.5% of the total area 
of Africa (Central Statistics Office, 2001). Zambia neighbours eight (8) countries namely 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Angola and Namibia. The country is one of the most urbanised countries in Africa and is 
administered through nine provinces representing 72 districts (Central Statistics Office, 2001). 
Zambia's economy is predominantly dependant on copper production, which accounts for 95 
percent of its export earnings and 45 percent of government revenue (ibid). Overdependence 
on the mining industry has over the years reverberated badly on the Zambian economy and 
as a result, the country's average annual economic growth rate has been one of the lowest in 
the Southern African Development Community (Government of Zambia, 2002). This can be 
attributed to a fall in the price of copper on the international market coupled with an increase 
in the price of oil that had been experienced in the mid 1970's. Between 1999 and 2003, it 
was estimated that on average, real economic output grew by 2.9 percent per annum while 
the GDP per capita was a meager US $359 (Government of Zambia, 2002; Seshamani et ai, 
2005). 
The lack of real economic growth has transformed Zambia into a highly aid-dependant 
country and dependence on development assistance is said to have taken a major leap in the 
mid-1970s and later again in 1991 (Rakner et ai, 2001). Aid is very important to Zambia and 
it has been shown that dependence on aid has increased both on a per capita basis as well 
as a percentage of the GOP (Rakner et ai, 2001). In 1992 alone, Rakner et al (2001) 
estimate that the disbursements from external sources stood at 67% of export earnings and 
77% of total public expenditure. Frantz et al (2004) estimated that in 2002, aid accounted for 
18% of the GOP and was financing a large share of public expenditure. The high 
dependence on foreign assistance can also be evidenced from the large donor community of 












2001). An indication of the flow of external financial resources for the period 1980 to 1996 is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Zambia: Total Externally Sourced Grants 1980-96 















Source: (Rakner et ai, 2001) 
Unlike most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia had during the 1970s and 1980s 
received substantial amounts of foreign aid in the form of structural adjustment loans over 
and above what was received in the form of grants (Rakner et ai, 2001). As a result, by 2004, . 
Zambia's external debt stock stood at US$7.1 billion and was one of the highest on a per 
capita basis in Sub-Saharan Africa (AfDB/OECD, 2004; International Monetary Fund, 2006). 
The total government indebtedness was estimated to be 61.2% of the GDP (Seshamani et ai, 
2005). Multilateral aid constituted the bulk of Zambia's external debt at 55%, bilateral aid at 
39% and suppliers and other at 6% (International Monetary Fund, 2006). 
International development partners have over the years attempted to reduce Zambia's debt 
but most of these efforts have centred on debt rescheduling and not actual cancellation (debt 
forgiveness) resulting into a debt overhang for years. For example, though Zambia qualified 
for debt relief through the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative in 2001, 
the antiCipated writing off of US$ 3.8 billion at completion point in 2003 didn't materialize in 
full. Since the HIPC completion point, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has only been 
providing interim relief with the Paris Club creditors providing most of the debt relief. Thus, 
according to the 2006 national budget, Zambia's total external debt stock only reduced to 
US$ 4.5 billion in 2005 from US$ 7.1 billion in 2004 due to the interim debt write-offs by the 
IMF and some Paris Club members. It should also be mentioned that the pronouncement at 
the July 2005 Group of Eight (8) countries meeting that debt to the poorest eighteen (18) 












However, as a result of the G8 pronouncement, the three (3) core multilateral institutions 
(IMF, International Development Association and the African Development Fund) were also 
prompted to extend 100% debt relief to Zambia and a group of other low-income countries 
under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). If the MDRI is effected, Zambia's total 
external debt will reduce from US$ 4.5 billion in 2005 to US$ 581 million (IMF, 2006). 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that due to high indebtedness, resources meant for poverty 
reduction programmes have been used for debt servicing which on average accounts for 10% 
of the GOP (Government of Zambia, 2002). This leaves the government with only 3% of the 
GOP to allocate to the health sector for the provision of health services through the public 
health system (United Nations Development Programme, 2004). Marginal economic growth 
and the huge debt burden have made external funding a necessity and by 2001, 53% of the 
national budget was being funded from outside with the health and education sectors being 
heavily donor financed (Government of Zambia, 2002). 
As a result of macroeconomic decline and high indebtedness, the national poverty level was 
estimated at 67% in 2002 with the highest incidence being in rural areas (Central Statistical 
Office,2004). Specifically, while 74% of the rural residents were found to be poor, only 52% 
of the urban residents were poor (ibid). The picture above is further worsened by a high 
income inequality whereby the gini coefficient stood at 0.50 in 2002 (Government of Zambia, 
2002). 
2.2 DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Zambia's population was estimated at 10.8 million in the year 2002 out of which 65% of the 
people were living in rural areas and 35% in urban areas (Central Statistical Office, 2004). 
During the period 1990-2000, Zambia's population grew at an average annual rate of 2.4% 
(ibid). In addition, the country's average population density was estimated at 13 persons per 
square kilometre, though Lusaka province (hosting the capital city Lusaka) had the highest 
concentration of people at 64 persons per square kilometre (ibid). 
• 
Zambia has a relatively young population with the median age being 17 years in 2000 and 
45% of the population below the age of 15. Unemployment is very high in Zambia and the 
overall dependency ratio was estimated at 96.2 in 2000. High unemployment coupled with a 
high dependency ratio present significant challenges to health care delivery (ibid). 
2.2.1 Disease Burden 
Being centrally located, Zambia is a transit point and distribution hub of the Southern African 
region and its locality has made the country a victim of diseases originating from its 












provider of humanitarian assistance to refugees (over 200,000 in total from DR Congo, 
Mozambique and Angola) and this has put more demands on the meager public resources 
available for health (Ministry of Health, 2001). The prevailing situation is one whereby there 
is a huge and escalating disease burden, inadequate drugs and medical supplies, dilapidated 
infrastructure and equipment and severely understaffed health facilities - a situation which 
has been accepted as a disaster (Ministry of Health, 2003). In order to overcome these 
challenges, the Zambian government is supposed to provide more resources to the health 
sector but is in all fairness financially handicapped to meet the feat. 
Zambia's huge disease burden is also as a result of its location in a tropical region where 
climatic conditions are very favourable for malaria and diarrheoal diseases. A deeper 
understanding of the disease pattern also reveals that the disease burden varies by seasons 
with the most prevalent diseases being malaria, diarrheoa, acute respiratory infections, 
HIV/AIDS, peri-natal causes, tuberculosis, malnutrition, gastro-intestinal causes, maternal 
conditions and anemia. As of 2002, the life expectancy at birth had dropped from 54 years 
during the 1980's to 43 years (Central Statistical Office, 2002). Besides other contributing 
factors, the drop in the life expectancy is largely due to a high sero-prevalence of HIVIAIDS 
among adults aged 15 to 49 which was estimated at 16.8% in 2002 (ibid). This figure was 
initially at 20% in 1994 and had reduced by 4% by 2002 mainly due to the putting in place of 
several national HIV/AIDS prevention and control programmes (ibid). 
2.2.2 Key Health Indicators 
Zambia has some of the worst health indicators in Sub-Sahara Africa particularly the infant 
mortality rate, HIVIAIDS and TB prevalence rate. Table 1 below, shows some of the key 
health indicators in Zambia. 
Table 1: Key Health Indicators: Zambia Vs. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
Zambia SSA** 
Life expectancy at birth 43 years* 46.1 years 
Infant Mortality Rate 95/1,000 live births* 108/1,000 live births 
Child Mortality Rate 168/1,000 live births* 178/1,000 live births 
~Mortality Rate 729/100,000 live births* -
w Birth Weight 
laria related mortality ~ooo cases'" --
HIV/AIDS Prevalence (15-49yrs) 16%* 7.6% 
TB Prevalence Rate 588/100,000** 495/100,000 
Immunization Coverage 74%* -
Births attended by skilled personnel 43 %** 42% 
Population with access to an improved water source 64%** 57% 
Population with access to improved sanitation 78%** 53% 












2.3 HEALTH SYSTEM PROFILE 
Background 
Upon attainment of independence in 1964, health facilities were uneven inequitably 
distributed in favour of urban populations and the emphasis was on care (Ministry of 
Health, 1997a). government responded to challenge providing care 
expanding rural health facilities including district hospitals (ibid). At 
care was introduced, the population Zambia was at 3 million 
country's foreign exchange reserves were second only to Africa in the region 
(Musowe, 1992). situation in 1993 was the exact opposite of the in 1964 as the 
population grew to million the country was regarded as one of the in 
Southern Africa (ibid). 
Thus, the 1964 wind of change could not be sustained as the price of copper on the world 
market fell dramatically while price of oil increased. By the end of the 1980's, health 
care system disintegrated due to the fact that the government simply had no money to buy 
drugs as well as to maintain infrastructure, equipment and to retain health personnel. 
state of affairs degenerated to a chronic shortage of drugs, run down infrastructure and 
equipment and migration of health personnel to foreign countries. This in a in the 
quality of health care provided and a rise in morbidity and mortality indicators. 
The defining feature of the health care delivery system at that time was centralized planning 
and decision making. Primary health care programmes were to a large extent neglected. As 
a consequence, planning for and consequently service delivery were not linked to the 
of the Poor accountability, and inopportune partnerships 
with both local and external stakeholders were some of the other bottlenecks that rendered 
the health system ineffective. Kalumba and Musowe (1996; 159) describe the situation in 
a parable as follows: 
system been likened to a Cadillac maintained for a relatively 
wealthy family. family's economic situation and it can no afford to 
maintain this expensive vehicle without seeking assistance from cousins and relatives to help 
repair, and maintain the gas-guzzling vehicle. alternative is to design and construct 
a more efficient vehicle that can meet the family's changing health care needs given its 
limited means. " 
a result of the problems highlighted a new government was ushered into 












2.3.2 Main features related to the 
The Zambian health reform 
effective quality health care as 
implementation of the health 
Partnership and Sustainability 
participation in the governance of 
the vision commenced with the 
Health System 
a desire to improve "equity of access to 
family as possible" (Ministry of Health, 1992). 
are guided by principles of Leadership, 
this was designed to enrich open and 
system (ibid). The process towards 
of authority and responsibility from the centre 
to districts. A movement a primary health care approach was initiated and 
made the district basic unit 
in Zambia (Ministry of Health, 1 
Hospital/Statutory were 
delivery of health 
The health .........+,~,."" 

management and reference point for health 
As a result, a total of 72 District Health and 
in order to ensure community participation in 
a split through a re-definition of role 
of the Ministry remained that of policy development, forward 
strategic planning, resource mobilization, external relations, and monitoring and 
evaluating (Ministry On the other hand, the Central Board of Health 
(CBoH) was as an autonomous responsible the delivery of 
which included (ibid). 
The main changes come with the health reforms are summarised in 
of health services to district and 
"'''',.....:;''''' in the Zambian Health Care Delivery 
Resource Shifts 
Shift in & 
budgeting 
of Care 




• From the centre to the operational levels 




• From central planning to locally developed district annual action 
• From central budgeting to decentralised budgeting in the 
direct disbursement of funds to the districts 
• From Project/Program to Sector-wide support 
• Professional and Managerial Autonomy 
• Quality assurance and Accreditation ....\"~TOlrn 
• Capacity Building through the training of Staff 
• Infrastructure Development and Rehabilitation 
..............------------------~ 

Health Posts in communities were 

,.,th.""i,.,,., the referral system through 

of the MoH and to limit its functions to formulation 
and resource mobilization and external relations 
• Creation of the Central Board of Health and autonomous Health 
Management Boards to implement the health programme 
Community • Establishment of popular participatory structures 
Participation 












2.3.3 Major Actors in Zambian Health System 
The operation of the Zambian health care delivery system has since the commencement of 
health reforms transformed from one fully centred on the MoH as a provider, to one 
based on strategic partnerships with all stakeholders in the health sector. A lot of 
partnerships have been formed and major actors in the Zambian health system are: 
" The Government (GRZ) through the MoH 
" Line and Public Providers directly involved in health 
.. Co-operating and Multi-lateral) 
Households 
II Private Employers and Providers (firms, hospitals, clinics, 
other related facilities) 
and 
" Others (including for-profit not-for-profit NGOs) 
2.3.4 Health Care Financing 
major sources of health care financing in Zambia include government tax and non-tax 
revenues, grants other forms of assistance external co-operating partners, private 
companies, households and other sources which include NGOs and religious organisations. 
These sources include a of eight (8) market-driven private insurance companies which 
are generally by rich as well as employees in the sector. Since the 
attainment of independence in 1 GRZ been the major single source of health 
financing but over years, external co-operating partners and households have become 
very important sources of health care financing in Zambia. For the of 
G expenditure on the Health Expenditure was 41 % in 1995 but figure 
to 38% in On other hand, contributions to 
THE from 12% in 1 to 26% in 2002 (MoH, Phiri and Tien, 2004)."-V\J"-U 
However, contribution of households' to THE reduced from in 1995 to 21 % in 2002 
but still remained an important source of health care financing. 
Interestingly, all other financing sources contribute more than if summed 
Thus, G decisions in health must take into account other sources financing. 
Regrettably, a comprehensive policy to inform stakeholders on health care financing is still 
non-existent. 
2.3.5 Human Resource Staffing 
The human resources situation in has described as a disaster (Ministry of 
2003). Most of the health facilities in the country are severely understaffed in terms of 
skills mix and geographical distribution. The current health sector human resource 












and most of the health in the rural areas are said to be by Classified Daily 
Employees (casual workers with no formal training in health). 
2.4 	 SUMMARY 
chapter presented a description of Zambian specifically an 
of both the internal and external environment in which Ministry has 
operating since the attainment of independence in 1 It was leant the performance of 
the sector has unsatisfactory owing to inadequate resources, a huge 
burden due to the location of seasonality of emergence 
new and due to a 
of external an external debt were other I"nr,t,.,h 
It was that the government (GRZ) could not afford to adequately finance the 
operations of the health without external In a where the poverty 
are estimated (Central 2004) and .1\If'........ 18% of the is 
from funding et ai, 2004) the only way out is to use resources 
in health sector (both domestic and effectively. implication is that 
should concentrate on provision of interventions while striking a 

















This chapter presents a the available literature on health sector from around 
world as well as Zambia. review is structured in six areas that are to the 
topic, the problem, and context. The major areas that will be are: (1) 
the definition and concept of a SWAp, (2) the evolution rationale adopting 
sector SWAps the world over, (3) benefits of a SWAp, (4) conditions for 
implementing SWAp, (5) principle risks and learnt so and (6) the genesis, 
evolution and with the health SWAp in Zambia. Concluding remarks are also 
on what the literature tells us about the methodologies and findings of previous 
studies on the impact of SWAps globe and in particular. 
Operational definitions of the key concepts used in studies are later presented and the 
chapter ends by drawing out the conceptual framework that is used during the evaluation .. 
3.1 DEFINITION AND OF A SWAp 
is no generally accepted of the of a SWAp in the The 
World Health (WHO; 2000) defines a SWAp as a of working oe[weel 
recipient and (herein called Cooperating - CPs), 
consumers all key stakeholders that are directly involved in the health sector. Although 
generally useful, WHO definition is not as comprehensive encompassing as that 
formulated by Foster al (2000a, p.6) who suggested that the of SWAps involves 
ensuring that "all significant funding for the sector "''-'I<-'VVI a single sector policy 
expenditure programme, government common approaches across 
sector, and progressing towards relying on government procedures to disburse and 
account for all funds. " 
Despite of numerous definitions, there is consensus, however, on the key 
characteristics a well-functioning SWAp. Walford (2003; p.3) summarises 
characteristics as follows: 
• 	 Government stewardship in a sustained partnership with all stakeholders 
II All significant funding support a shared, wide policy and strategy 
II A medium expenditure framework or which this policy 













It Shared and approaches implementing and managing the sector 
strategy and work programme 
The foregoing the concept a SWAp involves identification of policies across 
the sector, agreement on resource allocation and a framework for ensuring and 
accountability in the use of resources. A good definition of a SWAp should nOlno,'!;1 
all these factors into consideration. importance of taking on board all these 
characteristics is brought to the fore when an analysis of the rationale for having SWAps is 
undertaken. 
3.2 EVOLUTION AND RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING HEALTH SECTOR SWAps 
SWAps in general represent an to development aid that emerged in the mid 
due to lack of progress in human development in ...,...." .... r,.. developing countries despite huge 
amounts of aid (Seco & Martinez, 2001). Literature that the introduction of SWAps 
as a mechanism for aid delivery was driven by three main reasons. 
Firstly, and Martinez (2001) reveal that SWAps are an evolution of Sector Investment 
Programmes (SIPs) promoted by the World Bank late 1980s. distinguish the 
SWAps from by that SWAps were nationally-led development 
which also have the advantage of providing with an opportunity to 
engage in policy and institutional dialogue with recipient governments towards greater 
efficiency and effectiveness of aid. Given this added feature, SWAps have received a lot of 
support and interest from several bilateral and multilateral donors. 
The second view is held by World Organisation (1999) and the Institute for Health 
,=>8(;mr Development (2001). These two institutions indicate that the evolution of health 
SWAps was instigated by the need to implement a second generation of 
failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes. According to them, the idea of adopting health 
SWAps was to the effectiveness development assistance and rational use of 
scarce resources by "improving the budget capturing all sources of financing and all 
expenditures, and placing health sector plans within a rolling term budget 
allocation decisions can be made in line with national priorities" (WHO, 1999 p.3; IHSD, 2001 
p.5). 
The third commonly held view over the evolution of health SWAps, however, stems from 
traditional project (vertical programmes) of the 1980's and 
early 1990's. The underlying view is that Health SWAps emerged as the preferred way of 
providing to developing countries after numerous concerns were raised about the 
of vertical in fostering sustainable improvements in health 












Walford, 2003; IHSD, 2004). performance of vertical programmes was found to 
ineffective and some of problems that are commonly cited include: 
• 	 Narrow in scope. Though isolated projects may be at sub-sector level their 
performance at sector level are often limited. Further, vertical programmes concentrate 
scarce human and financial resources on a limited of problems, and <.... ".r....'-" 
hinder the development of comprehensive health 1 Brown, 2001). 
• 	 Fragmentation and sustainability. Multiple projects implemented by different donors tend 
to follow the priority of a donor and in process they split the along 
geographic, programme, and disease lines. Aid governments often felt 
neglected and these projects are usually not sustained at the end of their tenure to 
lack of commitment by aid-recipient countries to programmes that are seen to entirely 
donor driven (Jones, 1997; Garner ai, 2000; and Martinez, 2001). 
• 	 Duplication. Vertical programmes lead to a proliferation of poorly coordinated projects 
each with separate management systems (e.g. staffing, infrastructure, logistical and 
procurement systems). The common view is that donors would go as far as ignoring an 
already established integrated system put in place their own vertical 
programmes (Jones 1 Garner ai, 2000; Brown 2001; Seco and Martinez, 2001). 
• 	 Transaction Costs. a result of duplicated implementation and management 
arrangements, the of delivery donor contracts 
MoH personnel a volume of on behalf of 
each donor through separate reports (Peters and Chao, 1998; Brown, 2001; Nokkala, 
2003; IHSD, 2004). 
• 	 Undermine government capacity. Vertical programmes rarely use of government 
structures implementation of public delivery 
through the use of donor-led institutional arrangements that bypass government 
systems. This reduces overall government involvement and control (Brown, 2001; IHSD, 
2004). 
• 	 May to in care. Disjointed projects it very difficult for patients to !'",r'""",,,, 
care from different uncoordinated service providers that are run by different donor 
projects. it becomes difficult to patients from one provider to another 
(Brown, 2001). 
• 	 Over-reliance on Vertical nrnnr<:l have a tendency of r""-'flnn 
on external technical assistance and this proved unhelpful to the development of 










a of the of programmes, SWAps were identified as an 
important approach to enhancing aid effectiveness. The shift to a approach to 
development assistance in the form of a SWAp was a to improve the from aid 
and more importantly, to address sector specific needs of recipient country. The common 
thinking has been that health would the shortcomings of vertical 
if there is a commitment to change towards harmonised procedures built on strong 
partnerships and collaboration (I 2001). The understanding is that aid is more " ....,.'''~" 
if more focus is on developing and strengthening sector policies and institutional 
arrangements (WHO, 1999; 2001). 
Since the was developed, about 80 SWAps have implemented across all 
sectors around world out of which 85% are based in Sub Africa and being 
implemented in the Agriculture, Education and Health Sectors 2000). Around the 
world, mapping of health sector SWAps reveal that the longest running health sector 
programme is the Social Action Programme in Pakistan, which was established in 1 (Seco 
and Martinez, 2001). In Africa, the country to have implemented a health sector SWAp is 
Zambia. date, countries around the world have implemented or are in the nrn"oc'C' 
of adopting health SWAps. includes Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Papa New Sierra-Leone, Tajikistan, Uganda, Vietnam and 
Yemen and Martinez, 2001; Swiss Tropical Institute, 2006). 
3.3 PRINCIPAL BENEFITS OF A SWAp 
As mentioned the motivation for SWAps was by the for 
governments in developing countries to improve the effectiveness of development 
and rational use of scarce resources (Walford, 1 WHO, 1 Foster et ai, 2000b; Seco 
and 2001). SWAps in health have merited attention because emphasis on 
partnerships """"AI"'''' governments and all key operating in the health 
sector 1997; IHSD 2001; and Martinez, 2001). SWAps are seen as an 
opportunity recipient governments to control over their fragmented health sectors 
and test over time is strengthened governments' ability to oversee the health 
sector, of policies and plans, sound management of scarce 
resources (Seco Martfnez, 2001; Izard and Dugue, 2003). The assumed core 
advantages a sector-wide approach are as therefore: 
II Greater efficiency and equity 
II transaction costs 










3.3.1 Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
It established that vertical programmes lead to duplication of and that they 
generally fragment along priorities that are by CPs. On other hand, SWAps 
endeavour to harmonize and align all available development to a single 
policy and the desire is to have all the supporting the entire in a 
comprehensive and coordinated manner (Cassels, 1 Peters and Chao, 1998; Hutton and 
2004). Provided that the full resource envelope is captured, allocation of resources 
to different levels of the health care delivery system can be objectively determined and 
resources channeled to areas of the nro""toC't need to meet priority national programmes 
(Cassels, 1997; ..... ""..... r'" and Chao, 1998; and Martinez, 2001). In this sense, it is 
argued that SWAps promote allocative efficiency by unifying from all sources and 
improving transparency in resource use. 
The justification for assuming sector-wide targeting of is to achieving 
health outcomes is presented by the World Bank (cited by Nokkala 2003) which postulates 
that SWAps, in general, are based on supply-side economics. The assumption is that paying 
attention to supply-side like common management arrangements can maximise 
participation leading to the identification and implementation of good policies, 
plans and priority health interventions. All in health aware of 
the common priorities for health and they to ensure that adequate attention 
and resources are provided to these interventions (Brown, 2001). Apparently, research 
findings by Dollar and Collier (cited by the IHSD, 2001) show that was more effective in 
addressing poverty if sound policies were put in Since SWAps allow all players to 
have a say and to influence policies in the health sector, donors are comfortable with such an 
arrangement. 
3.3.2 Reduced Transaction Costs (Administrative efficiency) 

Vertical programmes are unpopular because they outstrip the administrative capacity of aid 

countries by staff and/or overuse staff due to multiple reporting 
requirements. In contrast, it is argued that SWAps reduce transaction costs due to their focus 
on partnerships and harmonization. Emphasis on the use of common planning, 
implementation reporting makes it to all the programmes 
in the health sector universally and to rationally time 1997; Brown, 
2001; and Martinez, 2001). 
3.3.3 Improved Equity in for Need 
There is a widely view that SWAps are actually pro-poor by design and that they 
augment to provision of health through a primary health care 












that this depends so much on delivering a health care package 
on which SWAps should be based. In this case, allocating scarce resources to priority 
and areas of greatest need through an essential health care can create 
more vulnerable members of society and to improved 
geographical equity in access (urban/rural) to health care resources.. Promotion of pro-poor 
strategies can empower the people in of health which in turn to a greater 
utilization of health and social and financial protection and Martinez, 
2001; Nokkala, 2003). 
3.3.4 Sustainability of Policy Development and Implementation 
In a SWAp, the government and jointly plan and agree to implement programmes drawn 
from a broad set of priority national and strategies using existing national 
1997). It is that implementation of in manner can 
strengthen national systems and in encourage ownership and sustainability. In 
fact, IHSD (2004) points out that sustainability, capacity building and systems development 
are an integral part of engaging in SWAps. In this regard, the use of national systems and 
common management arrangements potentially protection and security for priority 
programmes {WHO, 1999; Brown, 2001; Schleimann et ai, 2003}. 
3.4 BASIC CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING A SWAp 
As pointed out in 3.3 above, the literature suggests that a SWAp can offer an 
interesting alternative to project support. However, implementation of a SWAp is not in itself 
a panacea for the health sector as lessons from various literature show. It should be 
understood that SWAps are not entirely appropriate all countries and (Foster et ai, 
2000a; Nokkala, 2003). is because a SWAp is a which is implemented 
differently across different countries (IHSD, 2004). Furthermore, certain conditions have to 
met before adopting the SWAp. Foster al (2000a) propose that an assessment of the 
environment most for a SWAp and aid options should considered on 
basis of the country's level of capacity and its policy environment. 
Ideally, SWAps are said to be essentially appropriate in highly dependant countries where 
the government is unable sufficiently finance recurrent and capital budgets; where the 
donor contribution is large enough for to be a problem; and governments 
are willing to let donors influence sector policy and link it to resources (Foster et ai, 2000a; 
IHSD, 2001). 
3.5 PRINCIPAL RISKS AND LESSONS LEARNT 
A number of authors have questioned of SWAps they took 












no evidence that SWAps work have that only embraced 
health SWAps based on of the concept. al (2000) and Brown 
(2001) go as far as stating weakness of is no framework 
for evaluating them and can thus, potential to worse if implemented 
haphazardly. 
with their ument is that vertical did have some 
features which retained under the SWAp. example, vertical 
programmes are in delivering high quality and prevention 
programmes and to disease control (Brown, 2001). Further, a 
number of vertical were being implemented in areas that the 
general public health was not servicing, promoting access and improved 
health status of the poor. donors involved in want to see that all 
key advantages such as the technical quality, 
comprehensive predictable funding and funding of priority health 
interventions are , 2001}. In this regard, it is that SWAps should 
should complement the of vertical 
(Brown, & Martinez, 2001). 
Studies on whether SWAps built upon vertical 	 or improved health care 
have yielded The following more light on the 
potential risks of SWAps and so far. 
3.5.1 	Technical and Allocative Inefficiencies 
of the key arguments a SWAp has been that it to in resource use by 
funding setting standards of how resources in the 
sector should Nonetheless, Sundewall Sahlin-Andersson (2005) argue 
to the contrary and out that most countries implementing SWAps were still operating in 
project modes. This nTn,rl'(;,rl by the recent of global health 
like the Global HIV/AIDS, TB World Bank HIV/AI fund, 
President's Emergency for AIDS Relief 3 X 5 Initiative, Stop GAVI 
and Roll Back Malaria which are redefining modalities delivery by providing 
funding (Schleimann ai, Frantz et ai, 2004; Tanner, 2004; 
2004). The argument is global health initiatives are the existence 
because they often aid and duplicate their own reporting 
and are unsupportive of the overall national sectoral plans and common management 
structures. In reality, 	 still exist in SWAp implementing countries due to 
coherence it comes to reporting funding arrangements (Brown, 1). 











should committed to move towards joint reporting pooled funding arrangements when 
all systems are considered adequate. 
3.5.2 Reduced Government Funding 
Contrary the view that SWAps the financing for of priority 
interventions, Izard and Dugue (2003) are of the opinion that SWAps actually lead to 
reductions in or static government spending on health. The reasoning is that SWAps have 
not to increased funding the sector the countries reduce their 
spending to the sector with injections by As a expenditure 
remains the same and in some cases even even if more come on board. 
phenomenon is widely referred to as fungibility and authors including Walford 
(1998); Annan (1 Kandimaa et al (2001); Izard and Dugue (2003) and Waddington 
(2004) numerous on the matter. mitigate this problem, IHSD (2001) 
for policy dialogue and addressing issues of financial sustainability in the context 
of level and of public expenditure as a whole. 
3.5.3 High Transaction Costs (Administrative Inefficiency) 
other observation against health SWAp is that it does not really lead to reduced 
transaction costs (IHSD, 2001; Seco Martinez, 2001; et ai, 2000b). (2001) 
and et al (2000b) note that review are frequent in a 
SWAp but much and more intensive. This is new additional for 
information are placed on the recipient governments with the same CPs still maintaining 
projects and governments to provide parallel information as well and 
Martinez, 2001; et ai, 2000b). 
Johanson (cited by IHSD, 2001), provides evidence on the above and indicate 
supervision costs by the World Bank were 50% higher for SWAp implementing countries than 
for et al explore this phenomenon they explain in cases 
where relationships lack strong trust, the are forced to demand more information. 
so, IHSD (2001) sums up the argument by claiming that even if transactions costs have not 
reduced, the benefit of a SWAp is that there is a rich government/CPs partnership that is 
supporting the of government systems rather parallel project 
al (2004) a observation on above and they 
indicate that the scale of the GFATM and initiatives alone have the potential 
significantly destabilise the public health system given high of funding. and 
transaction costs from the management of these funds outside SWAp. Banerji (2004), 
however, a neutral view and suggests earmarked through 











governance structure with the full involvement of the private sector. The key was on how the 
earmarked allocations are designed to supplement the pool of other resources. 
3.5.4 Reduced pro-poor focus 
It has argued that SWAps have failed to retain and build on the positive elements of 
vertical programmes due to the reorganization of responsibilities and focus on the 
macro level (Brown, 2001). This ultimately it difficult to the of poor 
people at grass-root level and the view that improve equity of access 
(Brown, 2001; Seco and Martinez, 2001). In and Martinez (2001) observed that 
there is limited evidence to support the claim that SWAps actually priorities with the 
available monies and they disagree with the perception that resources have been shifted 
towards primary and preventive health care programmes. Walford (1998), Garner et al 
(2000), Hill (2002b) and the Royal Tropical Institute (2003) support this view and allude to the 
that SWAps had the potential to overlook priority programmes such as reproductive 
health, child health, HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
above concern can looked at from two angles. Firstly, how the SWAp should maintain 
the same level of importance and funding for key public health interventions as provided by 
vertical programmes. Secondly, how to the provision high quality as 
achieved by vertical programmes. In this was particularly in a study 
by (1998) who observed that TB control programme had been negatively 
affected as a result of the introduction of health sector reforms which placed emphasis on 
sector funding. Seco and Martinez (2001) tie up the argument by showing that in practice, 
donors and governments essentially take a midway approach by targeting certain resources 
to the poor through vertical programmes while simultaneously addressing macro-policy 
through the SWAp. 
3.5.5 Limited Government Leadership and Stakeholder Participation 
Though it is envisaged recipient governments should provide leadership and that there 
must wider national stakeholder participation in the SWAp extent to which 
SWAps has led to this is limited (Benson-von der Ohe et ai, 2000 cited by Land and Hauck, 
2003; IHSD, 2001; Royal Tropical Institute, 2003; Jeffreys et ai, 2003; Hutton and Tanner, 
2004). The argument is that the inter-sectoral aspect has not worked well because SWAps 
have only and have mainly focused on districts/primary 
level (Cassels, 1997). The underlying problem has been how to define the and 
rO\JrOIA,'orc note that the focus of a SWAp shOUld be comprehensive enough to encompass all 
public and private institutions financed, managed or regulated by the MoH (Cassels, 1997; 











Peters and Chao (1998), however, that above description might marginalize 
other programmes outside the realm of MoH call formulation of viable 
linkages with all institutions supporting major health 
(1 adds that development of common management systems for monitoring 
performance tracking funds the entire sector could be one way of integrating all 
programmes and activities in the sector. IHSD (2001, p. 12) adds "as SWAps mature, 
planning and budgeting functions of a MoH have incrementally captured .... ,.0<>'0 
fragments of action, and new investment" 
3.5.6 SWAp and Decentralisation 
researchers have studied the interrelationship between SWAps and decentralisation 
and extent to which the two complement/conflict with each other. One line of argument is 
that SWAps are a challenge to the decentralisation because they tend to privilege 
decision-making processes and control mechanisms and Martinez, 2001; 
cited by Land Hauck,2003}. main concern is SWAps re-centralise power 
by strengthening lines of accountability the reCipient government and donors while 
undermining lines accountability between the recipient and stakeholders 
(Seco and Martinez, 2001; Gould cited by Land and Hauck, 2003; Tropical Institute, 
2003; Walford, 2003). point view is (2002) who that 
the SWAp negotiation in Uganda was mainly donors the 
Ministry that districts were only involved a very limited 
However, Land and Hauck (2003) point out that the relationship between SWAps 
decentralisation is complex and that it unfolds in varying ways. They explored the 
phenomenon in and Uganda where found that SWAps were being as 
for supporting decentralisation (devolution) in a number of institutional 
contexts. A study by Kasumba Land (2003) that was conducted in Uganda found 
that SWAps were in fact not in conflict with decentralisation and that the two were actually 
strengthening the local government system through the continued usage of national 
structures. is that a SWAp benefits the (various 
and committees, meetings etc.) the lower levels in its quest to improve the 
allocation of resources, and accountability for finances and performance. On the other hand, 
on the use and strengthening of local systems/structures as envisioned in the 
SWAp, the decentralisation 
Hutton (2003) a middle that of SWAp and 
decentralisation relied on how health services were managed whether vertical, integrated, or 












for priority existed, decentralisation and the SWAp might not work in harmony. 
On the other hand, if is a of health service integration and health care delivery 
is by basic SWAp decentralisation worked well. Ultimately, Hutton 
postulates that the goals decentralisation and SWAps were compatible an extent 
whereby SWAp is greatly enhanced functioning decentralised government systems 
while is made more effective by the funds and capacity-building 
with the SWAp. 
3.5.7 Partnership Problems: Reform, Attribution Policy Influence 
The other argument against the SWAp stems from the difficulties in implementing and 
managing the itself (Garner et 2000; Brown, 2001; Seco and Martinez, 2001). For 
a SWAp be Peters and Chao (1998) suggest that both the government and CPs 
have to realign their working arrangements through structural and policy changes. 
However, while recipient governments may subscribe to change, the degree of change on the 
is often constrained by administrative, philosophical and political reasons 
and Janovsky, 1998; and Chao 1998; IHSD, 2001; Hill, 2002b). as the 
SWAp is being implemented, more is put on the government to reform planning, 
budgeting, financing and procurement arrangements while no demands are put on 
(IHSD, 2001; and Dugue; 2003). 
One of reasons that CPs to recipient governments is of 
in a SWAp. Attribution to individual sources is lost in a SWAp, 
as such, have to reform their to ensure 
and timely financial and reporting and Janovsky, 1998). This has in the 
process led to unreasonable demands on recipient governments and in event of weak 
government capacity to implement and the negotiations sometimes 
apart as governments can no longer succumb to pressure and the confidence in 
system (IHSD, 2001; Izard and Dugue, 2003). 
to the above is the argument that SWAps open up national polices by allowing CPs 
and other stakeholders in the health sector a greater in policy formulation and 
Janovsky, 1998; Seco and Martinez, 2001). The implication is the policies were 
eventually formulated are not ideally government owned but policies by CPs 
missions. 
3.5.8 No Blue-print for a SWAp 
Lastly, notwithstanding that 	 are common elements among countries implementing 












SWAps according to their own contexts (IHSD, 2004; Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2005). This makes it difficult to make sUbstantive international comparisons. 
3.6 ZAMBIAN HEALTH SECTOR SWAp 
3.6.1 Background 
Prior to the commencement the health reforms and subsequent introduction of a health 
SWAp, health sector suffered from excessive centralization, policy lack of well 
defined systems, weak partnerships and irregular availability of funds at almost all levels of 
health care (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994). A system for harmonizing external 
assistance was not in place and the health was fragmented, multiple 
donor-assisted projects to an extent whereby the Ministry was to coordinate 
and optimally the aid (Kalumba and Musowe, 1996). The for improved 
management of aid was inevitable and the Ministry had to find a way of pooling resources as 
well as to integrate all the vertical programmes into a sectoral framework that would meet 
common national goals and objectives. 
The arnon,-o of a SWAp in the health sector in Zambia came in early 1993, when DANIDA 
perceived a need to improve the institutional capacity and provision of basic health services 
at district level (Lake and Musumali, 1999). As a result, the first "common basket funding" 
was made operational in mid 1993 when DANIDA, SIDA, ODA, and UNICEF started 
pooling and channeling financial resources directly to to support recurrent at 
district and community (Danish Ministry of Affairs, 1994; Phiri, 2003). 
government bought into the and first disbursement to the district 
basket in January 1994. 
However, the evolution to a formal health SWAp did not come without difficulties. Most of the 
CPs were at that time still skeptical about likely impact of the SWAp, especially that 
were running projects that were making positive achievements (Musowe, 1992). In order to 
be sure a positive return on their investments when they joined the SWAp, CPs wanted the 
government to address the following concerns (Musowe, 1992; p.1): 
• degree which resource allocation 
II The impact of health care financing policies on the poor; 
,. The financial sustainability of the sector; 
II The effectiveness of the for procurement of goods and services; 
II The reliability of accounting auditing 
Meeting CPs' individualized reporting requirements; and 
II Agreeing on high level indicators for monitoring performance which the tended 











Zambian government endeavoured to work on donor concerns and adopted the 
SWAp ideals with development of the NHSP 1995-1 ("From Vision to Reality") which 
provided the for launching the Health Support Policy which is now called the 
SWAp. Between 1997 1 the MoH and CPs sought to formally embrace SWAp 
and a of developing a Memorandum Understanding commenced (Phiri, 2003). 
After extensive consultations, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was eventually 
signed on 24th November 1 by (1 CPs that included DAN IDA, DFID, IRELAND 
AID, SIDA, EU, NETERLANDS GOVERNMENT, USAID, UN WORLD BANK, 
UN UNDP, WFP and WHO. The signing of the MoU outlined the institutional framework 
and guidelines for cooperation between Ministry and all in SWAp whereby 
common systems for planning, disbursements. accounting, auditing and 
procurement were to used. The move a commitment by the 
government and all the to formally adopt the SWAp for support towards the national 
health strategic plan (Ministry of Health, 1999). 
MoU made it clear that the government and preferred the channeling of all 
monetary support to the basket. Common "basketing" of donor funds entails the provision of 
un-tied financial support to health sector action plans as contained in the National Health 
Strategic Plan (NHSP). The aim of "basketing" was to bring all internal and external funding 
"on-budget" and to use pooled financial resources within framework the NHSP in a 
simple, manner (Kalumba Musowe, 1997; Ministry Health, 1999; 
Ministry of Health. a way of mapping out commitments towards provision of 
monies to the basket, an indicator on the percentage of donors who were providing funds 
through the basket was used. 
Recognizing that change is not spontaneous, MoU also provided for the continuation of 
vertical approaches for endemic and contagious diseases such as HIVIAIDS, TB Malaria 
(Ministry Health, 1 It was also that 60% of the CPs funds were 
to be spent at district level while the government was to spend 50% its resources at district 
level (Ministry of Health, 1 Emphasis on providing more resources to the district through 
government's commitment to decentralisation a reality ai, 
2004). 
The Zambian Health SWAp has over also on provision of 
interventions enshrined in the Health Care Package which entails providing the most 
cost-effective interventions against Zambia's burden of at levels of the health care 
delivery system (Phiri, 2003). of Health is to ensure 












Health SWAp, priority setting and resource allocation have to in line with 
requisites of the Health Care Package. 
As a result of adopting the SWAp, Zambia has been commended for providing a model for 
partnering international with governments in support of a locally designed reform 
(Oxford Policy Management cited by and Musumali, 1999). The scope of the SWAp has 
grown rapidly and a number of are now heavily involved in the SWAp with varying 
of support towards the NHSP. Table 3 below a chronology of Zambian 
Health SWAp. 
Table 3: Road Map to Zambia's Health SWAp 




i 1994 the NHSP 1 995 ~ 1998 
Zambia to 
Management System (FAMS) and Health 
1995 
1996 
i 1999 .. 
.. 
2000 .. Joint Identification and Formulation Mission 
i 2003 
• Development of the NHSP 200 1~2::::0~0::::..5_-:------'_---;--_:-:--:-----':::::-;;;:---;-;-_-:-1 
.. Basket funding expanded to secondary and tertiary hospitals, 
i November 2003 .. 
i March 2004 .. 
2004 
i October 2004 in 
to 
.. 
. December 2005 .. 
2006 
Data Sources: MoH, 
33 
MoH head 
.. Medium Term enditure Framework introduced b overnment 










3.6.2 Emerging Issues 
Research on the Sector-Wide Approaches on delivery health in is 
insufficient mainly takes form of administrative reports memoranda. 
This is despite the range of activities that are being by the SWAp and the 
high level of support provided by CPs and the Zambian government. The is 
though Zambia was country in Africa to have implemented a health sector SWAp, 
thereby involving a great deal of "learning by doing", the country has no tangible evidence on 
the impact of SWAps. This is a matter of concern for involved in SWAp given 
that they lost the ability to independently attribute their investments to achievements when 
they with their individually-funded programmes and joined the SWAp (Hutton 
and Tanner, 2004). 
To date, of all that were """".,Ci..:•.,...... "' , only one study adequately addressed the 
contribution of SWAp in study in question was conducted by 
and Musumali (1999) who looked the role of aid in sustaining the 
health reform vision. They outlined different coordination mechanisms that the Zambian 
government and its CPs had put in place and them in terms of selected criteria of 
effectiveness. The main finding was that the health SWAp was not meeting the reform 
objectives due to ineffectual personalities and human interaction; the nature of reform 
rnC':pc::(~pc:: and the impact of broader contexts. However, this study was conducted when the 
SWAp was in infancy and it more on and relational 
and did not the SWAp mechanism as a In addition, the study was done 
when the health SWAp was still very new and was merely an informal process that needed a 
lot of refining. At that time, the MoU between the governments and its CPs had not yet even 
been signed. 
study on the Zambian health SWAp was conducted by Kandimaa Mattsson 
(2001) who analysed SIDA's Sector Programme Support to the Zambian health sector 
2005). This study was basically an assessment memorandum whose aim was to describe 
and the context of the health reforms, long-term sustainability of the reforms 
and areas for continuing SIDA support for period 2002-2005. This assessment did not 
critically look at the contribution of the SWAp and only addressed broader health sector 
reform that were holding back the attainment of the national health reform vision. 
In addition to the two Frantz al (2004) recently made an assessment of the 
of Sector Programme (SPA) in context of 
achievements of the district basket in Zambia by looking at the evolution of the health SWAp, 
support decentralisation, financial sustainability and outcome/impact indicators. They 










basket generally met and that the SWAp had improved predictability of resource 
transfers; initiated development of sound financial management and monitoring systems; 
increased accountability resource use; and developed a for health 
delivery that is more responsive to the preferences of the Zambian citizens (Frantz et ai, 
2004: p.1 Further, it was revealed that participation in the SWAp though the SPA had 
given USAID a great of influence over how the total resource envelope was being 
allocated in Zambia. 
useful, the study by et al (2004) placed a lot of emphasis on the 
of SPA in the context the achievements the district basket and no attempt was made 
to assess contribution of the overall health SWAp. A SWAp should be looked at 
as both an aid instrument and as a process, and the study by et al did examine all 
components the health SWAp as it only centred on the the 
district basket. methodology and data analysis techniques were employed 
were not stated. 
In an attempt to evaluate how the SWAp is translated as it is in different country 
settings how the elicit in practice, Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson 
(2005) conducted a three-layered comparative study of Uganda, Zambia and Bangladesh. 
The findings were that SWAp was a clear label with unclear content that it had limited 
potential to transform of management since the administrative structures in 
recipient countries were formed in project modes. conclusion was that change could only 
be brought about if the definition and content of the SWAps were worked on. 
study by Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson (2005), however, did not evaluate the 
contribution of health SWAp to improved service delivery. This is the study 
the SWAp as a reform and translation at policy in 
country with SWAp models found in the literature and daily practice. It should borne in 
mind that though the SWAp can regarded as a reform model, its implementation is country 
should as a dynamic stimulated a 
working. process is entirely country specific and the dynamism of the nrn.r>occ actually 
models the way aid should be managed. Sundewali and Sahlin-Andersson appear to be 
analysing the SWAp model itself by looking at its place in the architecture of management 
whether it to be as a developmental In this case, I take a 
different approach. The intention of my study is to the content and scope of the 












SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES IN HEALTH SWAps 
In I hold view that the available literature on the impact of health SWAps in 
enhancing delivery is based on cogent reasoning and not on hard evidence. The 
information that has thus far merely points to how SWAp concept can 
brought forward, its merits and potential Most scholars that nearly all countries 
implementing SWAps (Zambia inclusive) plans have set 
up joint systems to monitor performance and that partnerships and the role of in 
policy implementation have been strengthened. In Zambia, such systems include 
Financial Administrative Management Systems (FAMS) and Health Management Information 
System (HMIS) which have greatly assisted in enhancing transparency and accountability in 
financial and progress reporting. However, it is postulated that the expected benefit of using 
joint not materialized as transaction costs have actually increased in most SWAp 
implementing countries. 
few studies that in Zambia generally point to the 
Zambian health SWAp has led to an increase in funding and that recipient districts are able to 
predict when funds would be Nonetheless, the view that SWAps lead to increased 
funding to the health was questioned by several authors because no one knows what 
happened if there was no SWAp. What is is that there has been 
corresponding reductions in government funding with support. In addition, 
was no that health SWAps lead to financial sustainability and whether in fact 
they enhanced equity of access by the poor. so, the agreement was that though 
SWAps may not be inherently pro-poor they were also not anti-poor. to which 
they would benefit the poor depends largely on the actual policies contained and 
implemented by country. 
There is a strong indication that global health initiatives are undermining the existence of 
SWAps due to their separate planning, budgeting and reporting arrangements. This creates 
inefficiencies in resource use and the arrangement is unsustainable. It was also established 
that most health SWAps not adequately involved NGOs private sector. This is 
despite the commonly held view that SWAps complement the decentralisation process. 
Lastly, most scholars did not empirical evidence on how health SWAps could lead to 
health outcomes. The reason is simple. Almost all studies that 
on health SWAps are mainly accounts of the status of country implementation 
health SWAps rather than outcome/impact assessments. As Garner al (2000; p.3) note, 
"most evaluations lack substance because they are done by experts employed 
by CPs and reports themselves rarely a methods are usually 












SWAps are new and that the SWAp is a long term approach designed to strengthen the 
reforms a health system. Though it is that reform takes time, Hutton 
and (2004) observe that development partners to point to concrete 
if they are to continue supporting SWAps. Without of in-depth 
studies on health SWAps, it is difficult to critically evaluate the methodologies as most of 
available data mainly constitutes ideological standpoints. 
Given the above background, this study seeks to examine in more detail, the contribution of 
the health SWAp the provision of effective health services in Zambia. Assessment of 
impact will be done looking at the effectiveness of resource management, efficiency in the 
use of financial resources (pooled other funding). geographical equity in access 
to health care resources, financial sustainability. and relational collaborative 
3.8 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework as presented in Figure 2 will be used to structure the results and 
discussion. evaluation draws from the literature review and is conceived from two 
perspectives. Firstly, in relation to the SWAp a critical analysis of of the five 
a SWAp as are applied in practice in will be done. Secondly, 
the of the SWAp as a whole, impact and 
outcomes of a SWAp such as efficiency. improved transparency and 
accountability, enhanced financial and institutional sustainability and improved geographical 
equity of access to health care resources will reviewed. Given the problem of establishing 
causality, attention will paid to analysing the extent to which the SWAp might have or 
might not have contributed to a particular impact/outcome. 
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Drawing from the literature review, the overall goal implementing a SWAp is to improve 
effectiveness aid. The understanding is that implementing 	 of a SWAp as 
shown in Figure 2 would strengthen mechanisms for aid management and the 
as a whole would strengthen health system leading to health 
outcomes. In examining the impact the health SWAp as a whole the underlying 
expectations are as follows: 
L The SWAp as a whole improves transparency and accountability through 
dialogue communication, development and use of robust systems, 
synergy with the decentralisation 
ii. 	 The SWAp mechanism as a whole promotes administrative, technical and allocative 
efficiency by reducing the duplication of enhancing harmonization procedures; 
encouraging the production of maximum services at lowest and optimality in 
distribution resources among competing uses. 
The SWAp mechanism as a whole enhances sustainability by directing all forms 
of support to the NHSP. 
iv. 	 The SWAp mechanism as a whole corrects geographical inequities (urban/rural) in the 
targeting of by use of objective tools in resource allocation and 
efforts to reach the rural areas leading to lower levels of mortality and morbidity. 
The conceptual framework is used alongside a set of key performance indicators that were 
developed to assess the performance of health sector. The comparator is the pre-SWAp 
implementation period and changes from baseline right throughout the SWAp implementation 
period (1993-2005) will be tracked by using set performance indicators and qualitative 
judgement. 
It should borne in mind that analysing the impact a SWAp is complex and Walt al 
(1999a, p.207) argue that, "concern with the effectiveness of aid coordination arrangements 
must give way to a broader analysis the outputs and outcomes governing the 
use of both external domestic resources, focusing on 
distribution and nature influence the the interests which they pursue 












CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY AND STUDY LIMITATIONS 

4.0 'INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides study methodology, collection and analytical 
techniques that were used during the An of some the main limitations that 
where encountered during study are provided. 
4.1 METHODS USED BY SIMILAR STUDIES 
It is difficult to outline a cut methodology that been employed by few studies that 
have conducted on SWAps in Zambia around the world. is because 
most of literature on the subject matter is not backed by hard from 
empirical of these studies simply the countries implementing 
health SWAp and progress towards the realization of the five core elements of a SWAp as 
outlined in section . Compounding the problem been the diversity of the countries 
implementing health SWAp, the unavailability of common indicators, and lack of a generally 
agreed upon framework for evaluating SWAps. 
study made use of a framework evaluating health SWAps that was developed from 
the literature review as presented in Figure It should understood that collection of data 
that entirely bears on SWAp was not as the SWAp is a which influences 
the broader health system. Thus, when assessing the impact of a SWAp, one has to make 
use overall health sector performance as opposed to narrowly defined and easily 
measurable project and outputs. As a influences as to the SWAp 
has "''''''£.>'1<;;0" was through the use of qualitative judgement was from 
qualitative techniques analysis of quantitatively information routinely 
by health facilities through Health Management Information System (HMIS) and 
Financial Administrative Management (FAMS). 
4.2 	 STUDY DESIGN 
was exploratory and a retrospective approach was used to and aSSiOC! 
before introduction of the SWAp after period 1993 - 2005 that 
SWAp had been in implementation in the health sector in Zambia. However, the did not 
exclusively employ and comparisons as qualitative judgement was applied in 
to take account of impact of contextual factors, in the health reform 
continuum, that might have during the implementation the health SWAp. Hence, 
a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques were applied in order to 
a broad understanding of the and to make it to formulate causal links. A 
blend of key informant interviews, group discussion, non-participant of 











STUDY SITES AND PARTICIPANTS 
study was conducted in Zambia interviewees were drawn from the Health Sector 
Advisory Committee and one private hospital. The essence of using the Health Sector 
Advisory Committee is that it sector-wide participation from MoH, and multilateral 
global health statutory boards/bodies, University of civil 
and the private sector. 
f>WI"!f>SThe sel,eCtlOn of was purposively based on the possession requisite 
expertise, diversity availability. in this case means the possession of a 
considerable amount of as it to working in health 
Diversity on the other hand implies ensuring that there was from a 
cross-section of stakeholders operating in the health sector. was due to the that a 
thorough understanding of subject matter was solicited from a wide Sf'HACIIOn of 
individuals with an established know-how/institutional memory of Zambian health system. 
Interviews with current and relatively new entrants to the sector as well as those from 
the provided valuable information on the perceived contribution of the 
health SWAp. The specifically from comments from a visiting 
from Karolinska in "","'Q"'Qn who was a co-author of a three-layered 
comparative study of SWAp in Uganda, and that was 
conducted in 2005. 
Eight (8) categories of participants were formulated and representation was from 
group. The include: (contributing to basket); bilateral 
{running vertical multilateral CPs; MoH/CBoH officials (national 
and provincial levels); retired architects the Zambian health reforms; lecturers from the 
University of Zambia/Karolinska Institutet; NGOs; and the private sector. interviewees 
that were eventually from the Health Sector Advisory Committee were based in 
Lusaka (the capital city of (5) provincial centres namely: Northwestern, 
Southern, Northern, Copperbelt 
4.4 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
The collection over a of 3 months from 2005 to 
February 2006. Qualitative was collected through face-to-face interviews, focus group 
discussion and non-participant observations. During interviews, an interview schedule 
containing a of questions from seven (7) thematic areas that were drawn from the 
study was The author was the sole interviewer even though 
interview schedule was standard, questions were administered according to the appropriate 











As part of the quantitative component, a document was carried out 
and a extraction form was to extract information from national and 
international documents. 
4.4.1 Key Informant Interviews 
Specifically, a total twenty-one ) in-depth interviews were conducted with 
members the Health Advisory Committee based at central and provincial centres 
one hospital. All in all, there were 4 interviews with senior MoH officials based at 
MoH headquarters; 2 interviews with Provincial Health Directors in Western and 
Northwestern provinces; 1 interview with a bilateral health advisor/architect 
Zambian reforms; 4 interviews with CPs (contributing to basket); 1 
interview with a bilateral (running 3 interviews with multilateral CPs; 
2 interviews with senior lecturers from the University of 1 interview with a 
lecturer from the Karolinska Institutet in Sweden; 2 interviews with specialists from the Health 
Systems Programme (NGO); and 1 interview with a Consulting from 
Luanshya Mine Hospital (private sector). All the responses were recorded electronically and 
on each interview an hour. 
An interview schedule (Appendix V) was used during the interviews and the were 
designed to assess the origin and understanding of the Zambian health SWAp, 
governance and management; membership and participation; resource allocation; financial 
sustainability; financial management; monitoring evaluation; perceived quality, utilization 
and access; constraints, failures and areas of improvement. aim was to investigate 
the extent which implementation of individual of a SWAp were impacting on 
the health system and in particular, stakeholders' views on the contribution of health 
SWAp to health delivery. 
4.4.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
focus group discussion was conducted with five provincial financial specialists from 
five (5) provincial health offices namely: North-western, Southern, Northern, Copperbelt and 
Eastern provinces. group was engaged for two and half hours and Policy 
Management Review (SPMRT) was to the group so as to 
defined attributes of SWAp working and policy issues. 
The SPMRT was developed by the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) from Netherlands and 
was piloted in Zambia during the mid term review of the NHSP 2001-2005 in the year 
SPMRT is a dynamic toolkit that is adapted in different contexts (country situational 
programme or assessment etc.) its lies in ability to 
facilitate discussion and stimulation of critical appraisal and assessment through dialogue 












analysing qualitative and quantitative issues relevant and related to programme 
implementation on a multi-sectoral level. 
The process of applying the SPMRT began by introducing each individual to each of the five 
elements of a SWAp which were used as thematic areas. The group was asked to assess 
various aspects of each thematic area taking into consideration successes and failures 
towards the implementation of each thematic area. A quick scan of the Zambian health 
SWAp was generated and the fact sheets that were later produced elicited a rich discussion 
on the organisation, management and impact of the Zambian health SWAp. 
Four possible options were given in order to come up with the best fit and the respondents 
were required to score from zero as the least possible score to three (3) as the maximum 
possible score. The description of the current status were indicated as O=Not Achieved ; 
1=Partially Achieved; 2=Substantially Achieved; 3=Fully Achieved. In addition, the 
respondents were asked to provide a description of the best fit after scoring and consensus 
on the attainment of each component was then mapped out through a plenary session. The 
FGD upon debate and assessments then reached consensus based on their experience in 
respective provinces and other evidence in existence. An extract of the quick scan (with 
closed ended responses) that was used is provided in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Quick Scan on the five core elements of a SWAp 
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Using the framework, it was possible assess at which the implementation 
of the health SWAp had reached the of the five core of 
a SWAp and there was continued movement towards a full/extensive SWAp. 
4.4.3 Non-Participant Observations 
Working and relational issues were looked in more detail through non­
participant observations of the 2005 MoH/CPs Annual Consultative Meeting; January and 
February 2006 Consultative Meetings; four (4) Implementation Review Steering 
Committee four (4) Monitoring and Evaluation Steering Committee Meetings at 
national level. Specifically, attention was placed on establishing the of stakeholder 
participation and ownership by looking the quality of the consultative ofnrnr'QC'C 
commitment to the SWAp, honouring of other 
overarching issues on the management of the SWAp. 
A full description of the above is provided in Appendix 1. 
4.4.4 Document Review 
A number of documents were reviewed covering the before implementation of the 
Zambian Health SWAp (pre-1993) and after the adoption of health SWAp (1993-2005). 
The documents that were looked at included: government policy documents and legislation; 
research articles; assessment memoranda; Joint Investment (JIP); Income and 
Expenditure Reports; Economic reports; Health Management Information Systems (HMIS) 
reports; Financial and Administrative Management System (FAMS) reports; Health V""~'\.I' 
Committee basket reports; budgets; Demographic and Survey reports; Local 
Conditions Monitoring Survey reports; National Health Accounts; Joint Health Appraisal 
(JHAM); national and international Journals; of previous SWAp 
coordination meetings; and unpublished papers. 
Apart from documents reviews, a lot of was extracted from MoH CBoH data 
bases such as the FAMS, HMIS, human resources and planning departments. 
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
....O£'Tnr Policy Management Toolkit (SPMRT) as provided in 
was to the from the the were 
combined with the responses from the Key Informant Interviews (KII) through an inductive 
approach. The purpose of using an inductive approach is because it is a convenient and 
efficient way of analysing qualitative data as it allows one to condense extensive and 
raw data into brief inductive approach it to establish 











By the Inductive approach, responses from the Key Informant Interviews were 
electronically transcribed and then according to thematic themes from study 
objectives as level stakeholder participation, ownership, transparency and 
accountability, sustalnability, efficiency and geographical equity of access to health 
care resources. nrn",,,,c,,,, of coding involved identification of raw text segments with 
similar units which were catea,oni~ea to the objectives. text 
segments were added to category until all the texts as it relates to study 
objectives were exhausted. An analysis data then followed 
inclination was towards answering the research objectives. The findings from the qualitative 
research KII and non-participant observation) were subsequently combined with 
quantitative and triangulated with available literature. 
In process of analysis, CnlrT\AI!:lr",c were and this included Microsoft 
Word, Microsoft Excel and SPSS 1 The data was presented in tables and (line 
graphs, bar pie spider web) to show the trends in performance indicators. 
It is important to note that qualitative data provided insights on variables relating to human 
behaviour such as relational and governance and made it possible to potential 
causal and impact of implementing a SWAp. Conversely, quantitative 
data that was extracted from the documents was used to quantify the distribution and 
changes in performance indicators. 
Analysis the study findings also greatly benefited from the author's 3 years "'v ....."'.""'r.,...'" as 
SWAp Coordinator in SWAp coordination MoH 
4.6 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
The variables that will measured to gauge contri bution health SWAp to the 
provision of health services in Zambia are as follows: 
i. Governance Management (including level of participation and ownership) 
ii. (Administrative, and Allocative) 
iii. Sustain ability 
iv. Geographical Equity (urban/rural) 
During the course the study above were used to 
definitions below. 
4.6.1 Governance and Management 
Governance is broadly defined as "processes by which organisations are directed, controlled, 










accountability" (ECSAFA, 2004). Governance as defined above constitutes probably all the 
elements that to be looked at in a SWAp in order assess the effectiveness of the 
management structures and processes for decision making, accountability, control and 
behaviour of stakeholders. Zambian health sector SWAp places emphasis on the 
formulation implementation of robust administrative that planning 
and accounting and 
examination of the effectiveness of ownership, transparency and VIS-n-VIS 
accountability was done. 
Ownership on other hand to the to which there is commitment the SWAp 
by all stakeholders (Walford, 2003). Ownership further than mere 
participation and thus, a distinction was made between participating in a SWAp and actually 
owning the process. Ideally, behaviour of stakeholders, responsibilities and 
quality of the consultative process reflect extent to which stakeholders own the SWAp 
Key informants with sound knowledge of the Zambian health sector were 
upon to candid expressions on what they felt stakeholder ownership of SWAp 
including government's leadership role it comes to making key decisions in the SWAp 
other was to look at growth in financing for the 
sector. who consistently provided increased sums of money to health 
sector were regarded to own the process more. 
Administrative Efficiency 
Administrative efficiency is attained if the resources used in the management the health 
system are attained at the lowest possible cost. In a SWAp, administrative efficiency is 
improved if the common management arrangements Goint monitoring, reporting and funding 
procedures) lead to lower transaction costs than systems for individual 
(Brown. 2001; Walford, In evaluating if increased or not, 
number meetings, comprehensiveness/time in the and the number of 
using systems were looked at Key informants were upon to gauge what 
was before SWAp in to obtain an adequate comparator. 
4.6.3 Technical Efficiency 
Hutton (2000; p.?) indicates technically o11".I"'.o."t health system is one that produces 
outputs with inputs, or alternatively produces most outputs from given 
inputs". The essence measuring technical efficiency was to if resources were 
being used in an manner such that as many outputs as possible are produced 












Support system indicators like the hospital occupancy (measuring productivity 
district hospitals) and the health centre staff daily contact rate (measuring of productivity 
of at health were looked at. The benchmarks for the hospital bed occupancy 
the health staff daily contact were drawn from the MoH national 
requirements of 80% occupancy and 15 per staff day, respectively. 
other measure of technical efficiency that was looked at was expenditure on drugs as a 
o"""o",,·r<:>,..,o of the health (GRZ & CPs). Drugs were singularly picked upon 
they are one of the major in and the availability of essential 
drugs is to be a proxy indicator the quality health care provided. The 
comparator was annual medical for the 
public health system that at ,000,000.00 (MoH, 
2001; MoH, 2003). This calculation, nn'.OI""'.fC does not include the annual of vaccines. 
4.6.4 Allocative Efficiency 
This refers to how resources are allocated between different levels of health care delivery 
system produce health services that the impact on health (McPake and 
Kutzin, 1997). The extent to which the health SWAp has promoted allocative was 
assessed by looking at the amount of resources allocated at level, level 2 hospitals, 
level 3 (tertiary) training institutions is the 
<:!ff'l'CI""<:! stipulated in NHSP (2001 that a total resources 
coming from CPs and are towards the provision of 
district health services; 20% to major referral and 3rd level) hospitals; 10% to MoH 
headquarters and remaining 10% to Statutory boardsfTraining Institutions. In addition, an 
effort was made to look the performance of the budget and timing of disbursements. 
other task was to find out if resources were being allocated to the most priority 
interventions as contained in Health Package (BHCP). 
4.6.5 Financial Sustainability 
The operational definition of financial sustainability is adopted from and Kutzin 
(1997) who financial sustainability as "the extent to which national health expenditures 
are funded from domestic resources and the long-term stability of a mix of funding 
The was to look at the growth rate health sector financing from all sources over time 
before and after the of the health SWAp, particularly external funding which is 
supposed to grow at a slower rate than funds. Even so, the growth pooled 
funding, which is regarded to a more financing mechanism as compared to 












4.6.6 Equity in Ac'ce~iS 
The o11',D,..t"Jo.na".,. system is measured by looking to which it leads 
to improved of the people that it serves (Hutton, 2000). In measuring the 
changes and in the health status of people. equity normally come into play 
more so equity of access. 
Equity of access for equal as a distributive principle leveling the costs of health 
care consumption across patients with identical needs (Mooney. 1983). Bearing in mind that 
people in rural areas more needs than their urban and that health related 
in rural areas are generally higher than urban areas, the equity consideration would be 
to more resources to rural areas. Mooney (1 p.1 & 182) suggests that equity 
of access is a and explicitly points out the term 'equity of access' 
means 
An attempt was made to find out if the SWAp as a has corrected 
geographical (urban/rural) through resource allocation 
formulae in health care delivery system. of geographical equity 
of access was by making urbanlrural after the SWAp and the 
indicators were looked at include the Population to depicting changes in 
staffing of core human resources between 1991 (before the SWAp) and 2005 (after the SWAp). 
The WHO workloads for doctors, clinical officers, nurses and midwives were 
also as a benchmark. 
Other that were looked at include the growth in supply/distribution of health 
Immunised Coverage against the national target of 80% coverage; and the 
institutionally supervised deliveries the baseline of 50.7% 
in 1 
provides a full description of was gathered and how 














Indicators to be 
measured 
Source of Information 
1.To provide an 
understanding of 
the content and 
scope of the 
SWAp in the 
Operationalising the SWAp 
· Conceptualization and 
key features of the 
Zambian health SWAp 
· Structural changes and 
• Policies, Strategies 
& Key Objectives 
National Health 
Strategic Plans, Joint 
Review Reports, Policy 
Documents 
• Collaborative National Health 
health sector in extent to which the processes & Strategic Plans, Joint 
Zambia Zambian health SWAp management Review Reports, FGD, 
embraces the five 
common characteristics 
of a SWAp as highlighted 
in Section 3.1 
systems in place Key Informant 
Interviews, Non-
Participant 
Observations at SWAp 
Meetings 











Better value from aid 




All stakeholders influence 
policy and resource 
allocation 
Government leads donor 
coordination, policy 
development and planning 
• Number of 
stakeholders 
involved in the 
SWAp & level of 
participation 
• Quality of the 
consultative process 
• Ownership - extent 
of commitment to 




FGD, Key Informant 
Interviews, Non-
Participant 
Observations at SWAp 
Meetings, Past 
MinutesNideos, Basket 








systems in place 
Joint Review Reports, 




3.To explore the 
extent to which 




use of resources 
in Zambia 




• No. of meetings 
• Time spent in 
meetings 
• % of CPs using joint 
systems of reporting 
& financing 
Key Informant 
Interviews, FGD, MoU, 
Joint Review Reports 
Technical Efficiency 
• Hospital Bed 
Occupancy Rate 
• Health Centre Client 
Contacts 
• % spent on Drugs 
Vs Operational 
Costs 
Key I nforma nt 
Interviews, FGD, HMIS 
data base, Annual 
Health Statistical 
Bulletins, Annual MoH 
Reports, National 
Health Policies & 
Strategies 
Objectivity in Resource 
Allocation 
· GRZ and CPs have kept to the agreed expenditure 
patterns for the resources 
it controls 
· Public Expenditure patterns against key 
influencing objectives 
Allocative Efficiency 
• % spent at different 
levels of health care 
• Budget performance 
(%age of actual 
releases from 
pledged amounts) 
• Use of the BHCP 
NHA, MTEF, Health 
Reforms Selected 
Papers, Draft National 
Health Care Financing 
Policy, Annual MoH 
Reports, Joint Review 













4.To review the Commitment to move • Growth rate of NHA, Joint Review 
extent to which towards a pooled, flexible, health sector Reports, FAMS data 
the SWAp has predictable and sustainable expenditure (ali base, Health Reforms 
influenced the funding mechanism sources) Selected Papers, MoH 
mode of support · External resources • Share of external Planning data base, Key 
and financial coordinated with national assistance to Total Informant Interviews, 
sustainability in plans Health FGD 
the health sector · Existence of systems to Expenditure/pooled 
in Zambia mitigate sudden 
withdrawal of funding 
funding 
• Exist Strategy & 
Short term 
sustainability 
5.To review the 'Better' policy and resource Geographical Equity Draft National Health 
contribution of allocation for the whole in Access Care Financing Policy, 
the SWAp sector • Use of needs-based National Health Policies 
towards the • The sector policy and resource allocation & Strategies, HMIS 
improvement of strategy places emphasis formulae Reports, Annual Health 
geographical on poverty reduction and • Population-Staff Statistical Bulletins, 
(urban/rural) efforts to reach the rural ratios Joint Review Reports, 
equity of access areas • Distribution of health Annual MoH Reports, 
to health care • Are more health services facilities Demographic & Health 
resources being provided to benefit 








Surveys, Key Informant 
Interviews, FGD 
4.7 QUALITY ASSURANCE 
Several approaches were used in order to ensure internal and external validity. This 
included: 
.. 	 Piloting of the interview schedule and SPMRT quick scan before data collection 
reduced bias due to instrumentation; 
.. 	 Prolonged engagement of the Key informants and electronic transcription of the 
responses made it possible to acquire diverse and accurate responses; 
.. 	 Approaching the research problem from different angles through the use of qualitative 
and quantitative research was an important technique to gain access to available 
information through the participation of knowledgeable health managers; and 
.. Ensuring trustworthiness of the findings by making comparisons with available 
conceptual literature; feedback from participants in the research; and 
comments/guidance by my research supervisor. 
4.8 ETHICS AND COMMUNICATION 
Authorization to conduct the study was granted by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Cape Town, South Africa (Appendix VI). In addition, the Zambian MoH, acting 











Members of the Health .....ar'Tnr Committee (HSC) as well as to extract information from 
various government documents (Appendix VII). Before commencement of each interview, 
each participant was adequately enlightened on the objectives of the study, interview 
procedure information that was being for. A written consent was 
obtained thereafter IV). All written and transcriptions that were obtained 
from the were treated with utmost the identities 
participants were not in any draft or final of the study. Additionally, no 
specific comments were attributed to any of the 
The anticipated of the study were fully to all the participants 
assurances were that they would be availed with a final report on the research findings. 
It was also that all key stakeholders in health sector as well as other 
interested would provided with the 
4.9 MAIN LIMITATIONS THE STUDY 
There were main limitations associated with Firstly, as is the case in most 
health it was hard to attribute in the 
directly to SWAp it was only possible to so indirectly through the use 
qualitative judgement. cannot be held entirely 
health outcomes since they are merely implemented as part of a 
outcome ,nn,,,,,,,,,, 
for 
set of health 
Secondly, was conducted a of the CPs were turning 
support and when implementing wing of the MoH, 
was on abolished. had slackened and was a 
crisis of in the health system. As it was possible to have 
as some of interviewees were negatively <:>tt<:,,,r'::,ri by decision. 
Thirdly, bias may have as all the interviews were conducted by 
one who was also an incumbent of the health SWAp in at the time 
of the 
Fourth, it was difficult to get baseline (before the SWAp) and between 1 and 1996 as 
HMIS were not yet in place. Relatedly, extraction of data from sources 
based surveys works of other authors might render some 
comparable 
Finally, are country specific are implemented according donor/government 
in respective countries. it was difficult to obtain triangulating 












CHAPTER FIVE: 	 FINDINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
chapter presents the findings of the research study is basis on which conclusions 
recommendations for further improving the performance of the health system in 
will made. In analysing the results, qualitative and quantitative research techniques were 
employed and the inquiry on the research and conceptual framework. 
Verification of some of was made by references to the literature review 
country profile. 
:jeIGtJG~n 5.1 presents in a manner, results from interviews and document on 
the Zambian health SWAp. In addition, the section looks at the perceptions on the SWAp 
coordination process and how the SWAp has enhanced decentralization process. 
5.2 examines in more detail the extent to of the individual of a 
has strengthened mechanisms for aid management, specificaUy as it to 
stakeholder participation 
'",;o,('ru".n 5.3 examines contributions of the SWAp mechanism as a whole improving 
health services delivery in The Section is divided in four sub-sections as follows: 
• 	 Sub-section 5.3.1 looks transparency and accountability; 
• 	 Sub-section extent to which SWAp mechanism as a whole has 
an O,.,..".OlnT use of resources. includes a review of 
funding and use of 
• 	 Sub-section a detailed look at in health care including 
predictability in Irc<:o.r"n,gnl'C and long term sustainability. 
• 	 Sub-section 5.3.4 explores the impact that SWAp has had on improving the health 
status of Zambians specifically if it has improved geographical (urban/rural) equity of 
access to health care resources. 
5.4 presents a 	 of the 
ZAMBIAN SWAP 
.1 Knowledge on the Health SWAp 
Key Informant Interviews revealed high levels knowledge on the Zambian Health SWAp, 
which were in agreement with the document undertaken for this In assessing 
knowledge, were asked of the health SWAp and the 












that the Zambian health SWAp commenced in 1993, way before the first SWAp guide for 
health development was presented in 1997 and prior to the adoption of SWAp as an 
important approach to sector investment lending by many development agencies. Most of the 
respondents noted that the Zambian Health SWAp process developed naturally having first 
been implemented at district level. The implication of this is that though the dialogue become 
sector-wide with time, the mechanisms for the SWAp were focused at district level. Indeed , 
the entire structure of the SWAp arrangement in Zambia is to a large extent still built around 
the districts . 
Several interviewees regarded the Zambian health SWAp as a process whose genesis was 
well-timed and which couldn't have been implemented at a better time . According to them , its 
adoption signified a strong and commonly shared sense of purpose and commitment to 
rebuilding the health sector after the turmoil of the second republic. Box 1 summarizes the 
main shared visions for the Zambian Health SWAp. 
Box 1: Basic Features of the Zambian Health Sector SWAp 
i. 	 A long term commitment to the health vision 
ii. 	 Articulation of a clear, practical medium term National Health Strategic Plan 
iii. 	 Support to a defined cost-effective Basic Health Care Package of interventions 
iv. 	 Support to a "Common Basket funding" 
v. 	 Commitment to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
vi. 	 Joint planning and review of strategic plans 
vii. 	 Joint procurement, disbursement, reporting, accounting and audit systems and 
procedures 
Source: Kalumba and Musowe, 1996; Phiri, 2003 
5.1.2 Coordination Process 
A close scrutiny of the Zambian health SWAp model reveals that it is a combination of 
modalities for sector dialogue, pooled funding arrangement, and joint planning and 
implementation. Thus, there are essentially four main structures that effectively coordinate the 
health SWAp process in Zambia. These are: 
i. 	 MoU (discussed in 5.2.1 .2) between the MoH and its CPs. It should be noted that 
the MoU actually governs the SWAp process as all the structures outlined below are 
enshrined in the MoU itself. 
ii. 	 SWAp coordination meetings (Minister's and Heads of Missions Policy Meeting; 
Annual Consultative Committee Meeting; Health Sector Advisory Committee 












Implementation Review Steering Committee Meetings; and various Technical 
Committee Meetings); 
iii. 	 Popular participatory structures at community, district and hospital levels which 
support decentralised authority to manage health services; and 
iv. 	 Health Sector Joint Review Missions. 
5.1.2.1 SWAp Coordination Meetings 
A pictorial view of the hierarchy and linkages between the various SWAp coordination 
committees is provided in Figure 5. At the helm of the SWAp collaborative process are three 
(3) core steering committees (Annual Consultative Committee Meeting, Health Sector 
Advisory Committee Meetings and Policy Meetings) which are chaired by either the Minister 
or Permanent Secretary. In order to spearhead the implementation process, three sub 
committees namely: the Hospital Sector Reform Steering committee, MoH/CBoH 
Implementation Review Steering Committee and the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee 
are in place. These sub committees are supported by several technical working groups 
whose existence is to enable technical level discussions between MoH, CPs and other 
stakeholders in the health sector. 
Figure 3: SWAp Coordination Meetings 
I ANNUAL CONSULTATIVE MEETING I 
Chairoerson - Minister of Health 
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I HEALTH SECTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
Chairperson - Permanent Secretary 
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of Planning (MoH) 
Observation of four different SWAp co-coordinating meetings revealed that there is a great 
deal of information sharing, priority setting, programming and policy making. However, some 
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the interviewees pointed out that SWAp in the health in was more of an 
approach to policy making and to a extent, to programming. In this case, policy 
making was regarded as a of analysis, decision making, implementation and 
evaluation. 
provides a full description and composition of of the SWAp coordination 
highlighted 
5. to Day Management the SWAp Coordination ,..r()CE~SS 
of handling day business in the SWAp, a coordinating secretariat 
was established in September a realisation that communication was a 
requisite for health dialogue. The establishment of SWAp coordinating 
came after on MoH staff to the additional administrative 
created by the SWAp Thus, the SWAp coordinating secretariat is housed 
MoH and its main is to ensure health SWAp is effectively 
through the four main structures that are enshrined in MoU". 
interviewees o.v,-.ra·C'C'e,rI C',~tiC"F", with the coordination for the SWAp in 
including the SWAp Several interviewees were questioned about 
management of the Zambian SWAp acknowledged that establishment of the 
SWAp coordinating secretariat had tremendously improved communication and dialogue in 
health sector. One such comment was made by a bilateral as follows: 'The SWAp 
a revolving better. With time been instrumental in 
up the capacity of MoH more so by putting in place a secretariat. I think 
way that SWAp meetings are now and even the way documentation is is 
a lot than the situation I found. This has helped to the decision-making 
:.... "."'.... " and one could happy to be associated with such". 
was also o.,...t,r.c.rI during the mid term review NHSP 2001-2005 where it 
was asserted that there is intensive dialogue and communication between and 
as a result effectiveness and of the SWAp coordinating 
(Ministry of However, even SWAp 













Figure . Day to Day Management of the SWAp Collaborative 
SECTOR 
Source: Author 
1.2.3 SWAp the Decentralisation Process 
It was established from Key Informant Interviews that popular participatory structures at 
district and community levels link the SWAp to the decentralisation The popular 
structures are run by both health and the general populace these include 
Health (DHBs), Management Boards (HMBs), Health Centre 
Committees and Neighbourhood Health (NHCs). descriptions of 
these structures are provided in Appendix II. 
Interviews with stakeholders on the synergy of the Zambian health SWAp with 
decentralisation ""1"\'-'0.<><, revealed it had to a extent greatly from. and 
complemented decentralisation process at district 
ANALYSIS INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF A SWAp 
five core of a SWAp as presented in the conceptual framework (Figure 2) are: 
• Government stewardship in a sustained with all 
• All significant funding support a shared. sector wide policy and strategy 
• A MTEF or budget which supports this policy 
reliance on government financial management and • Commitment to move to 
accountability systems 
• for the sector 
strategy & work programme 
It is understood that implementing each of the elements of a SWAp would strengthen 
mechanisms management. In assessing towards implementation of 
individual alan->o..ntc of the health SWAp. qualitative data more especially the Key Informant 












GRZ Stewardship and Sustained Partnership with all Stakeholders 
1.1 Sector-wide or sector-narrow 
.1 a Stakeholders Participation the SWAp 

discussed 
 MoH organises SWAp coordination which are ideally 
supposed to participation of all stakeholders directly involved in the health 
including MoH CPs, NGOs, consumers. Findings from 
pointed to the fact that Zambian Health SWAp had for a not 
widely inclusive. respondents observed that line ministries such as the Treasury, 
Education, Community Development and Social NGOs, the private sector and 
consumers were not involved in upper echelons SWAp consultative meetings where 
policy issues were discussed. A look at the lists in the minutes 
key SWAp from 2002 also that most of participants (100 in 
total) were CPs (both bilateral and multilateral), MoH and affiliated Statutory 
tertiary level hospital management boards in Lusaka. only NGOs that were 
involved at all were the Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) and three 
USAID affiliated NGOs/projects. to GFATM sent in its regional 
representative. 
Up until March 2005, the civil society was also not of the SWAp MoH felt that a 
audience would imply a public meeting, which may become political and futile. 
emphasis by MoH was on the to focused the SWAp even though it 
acknowledged importance of stakeholder participation (Key Informant lnTl:lnf":l'A'<> 
With increased from stakeholders in the SWAp, civil society was 
consequently into the SWAp consultative process even though their of 
participation in terms numbers contribution during the meetings are still very minimal. 
One meaningful observation can made relating respondents' answers on minimal 
stakeholder participation in the SWAp. Firstly, the inability to have all stakeholders on 
board raises questions on the ownership of the SWAp process impartiality in policy 
formulation resource allocation. The absence of key stakeholders means that they are 
not sufficiently acquainted health and as such there is inadequate 
participation. 
5.2.1.1 b Range of Activities Supported by Pooled Funding 
According to perspectives key informants, the Zambian health SWAp is 
narrow public within public sector to an extent 
people only equate it to pooled funding. The indication is that SWAp is not a full 












One of the key informants explained that the health SWAp has only satisfactorily operated 
half of the time that it has been in existence even though it been in implementation for 
over 10 It was that the build up to sector-wide was halted during the period 
1997 -1999 partnership problems were experienced. During this period, there was 
insufficient political support to an extent whereby the SWAp wasn't really being implemented 
with commitment by MoH. 
After the 1 999 period of stagnation, confidence was restored the SWAp was back 
in full swing. led to expansion basket to include other levels health 
care. However, even with the of the feeling is that the SWAp 
is still sector-narrow in range of activities supported by pooled funding and that it needs to 
further expanded, vertically and horizontally. Views the respondents on matter are 
outlined in Box 5.1 below. 
Box 5.1: Key Informants on Stakeholder Participation Range ofActivities 
Supported 
Bilateral CP: 'The health SWAp is evolving to be sector-wide but is not sector-wide at 
the moment. A number of stakeholders are not coordinated during planning 
due to low negotiation power by MoH". 
Bilateral "SWAp reinforces national systems tries to promote transparency and 
accountability. What is important is even if is transparency and accountability, 
VCiVIJICi who are actually the service voice out to indicate the type of service they are 
getting (good or bad). A system for tracking consumer perceptions is not in and 
consumers cannot out. vOlcmg is somewhat advocated for by calling for 
improved communication by Users, NGOs, popular structures but this is not enough. 
SWAp is not a one way ticket to get of corruption". 
Bilateral CP: The Zambian health SWAp is not a full SWAp. is need to have a full 
SWAp to all the key areas especially human resources. Until we start supporting 
all critical areas, we will nothing. A SWAp should support full sector - it's 
supposed to be sector-wide. What we have is a district and hospital SWAp and further 
within only a few items are addressed. not a full SWAp in terms of horizontal 
vertical dimension. Need to go a/l way if you expect to achieve more". 
MoH Official: SWAp supports all activities in annual action plans except 
for cost like personal emoluments. Further, ceilings are put on how much 
money is to be spent on drugs, allowances and so on. In this sense, the SWAp is 
not really a full SWAp more so critical things like human resources are not covered". 
Academia: "Involvement in SWAp implies supporting the health system is 
supporting SWAp because the health system adopts SWAp. this is a different 
definition for who are providing support in a way that is most to a 










5.2. Stakeholder Ownership of the SWAp process 
Ownership of a goes beyond mere participation and in this study, stakeholder 
ownership the SWAp process was by looking both of stakeholder 
participation in the SWAp consultative and the quality of the interaction. Thus, in 
of the level involvement, or probably the number of that were committed to the 
SWAp inception, an was to look how many had signed 1999 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) the total number of that were '""rf'lQ1tQri 
the number of contributing to UCl.:o,nr.l funding (pooling and those 
contributing basket funding (non-pooling but participating in the SWAp 
consultative process were looked at. The next step was to find out if non-pooling CPs are 
accorded an equal voice in the SWAp consultative prc)cess. 
The MoH successfully managed commit thirteen (13) to health SWAp out of 
(15) that were operating in health sector at the time of signing MoU in 1999. 
Though a legally binding document, commitment the MoU laid the for 
towards the attainment of the health vision. MoU on how 
SWAp should governed through common management arrangements and is a 
regulatory tool of how business in the SWAp should be conducted. A Code of Conduct (CoC) 
that was to regulate the way business is conducted in the SWAp was drafted in but it 
didn't come to fruition. 
In of with the MoU, this element is only partially accomplished. Though the 
MoU stipulates that the mode of financial support to the health sector is 
through funding, a review of the number of contributing to the basket indicated 
that the number only increased from five in 1 highest number the 
inception of the health SWAp) by 2003. implies that while the number of 
subscribing to the MoU was 13 in 1 only 9 of were pooling resources by 
2003. A further review of the situation in showed that the number of CPs contributing to 
basket actually dropped from nine (9) in to seven (7) in 2006. This can be attributed 
to the shift by some to Budget (DBS) withdrawal of mandate by 
certain While the transition to might not regarded as of confidence in the 
SWAp, the fairly depicts a loss of confidence in SWAp. 
6 below highlights the number of CPs that committed themselves to the MoU and 










Table Commitment to the MoU and Pooled Funding 
Number of CPs Number of Number of Highest number Number of pooling CPs 
in the CPs who of pooling CPspooling CPs at withdrawing from pooled 
health sector at actually the time of after the signing funding for any other 
the time of signed the of the MoU inthe reason other than shift 




 2003 estimate 2006 estimate 
15 13 out of 15 50utof15 90utof19 2 out of 19 
A number reasons can be given for the number of CPs that are pooling resources in 
Health SWAp. One of the overriding reasons was provided by a Multilateral CP 
who "Certain CPs are not pooling resources because the is not 
enough to attract all on board. The health SWAp process in 
in a project mode consider it to one of their many 
luck is on as some CPs would to 
while at same time programmes. 
through projects". Relatedly, it was that certain CPs do resou rces in 
neighbouring countries but don't do so in Zambia and this to some extent means that there is 
less in the Zambian health SWAp. One such CP is the World Bank which makes 
flexible contributions to the pooled funding arrangement in Malawi but only provides 
earmarked funding through projects in 
it is understood that a SWAp is not equal to pooled financing, is so much 
about pooling resources in health SWAp that if a pool 
resources, that CP is considered to not SWAp-minded. For respondents 
and USAID as not because they mainly their 
support through projects. This is programmes and drawn from 
the In addition, though some a modified way of providing the 
like USAID through the Programme Assistance they were still 
to be not SWAp-minded UCI",O\,j;:)C their contribution to the u .......,,,...,' was far less than 
support. This phenomenon is manifested in the health sector to an extent whereby 
the non-pooling CPs feel they are not part of the SWAp and this ultimately affects their 
commitment and ownership of the 
An of whether the n",'._n"rll were accorded an 
was 
in the SWAp 
non-pooling CPs 
were participants and not just mere observers like in other However, it was 
. pointed out that though the non-pooling CPs had an equal their voice was less 
as compared to pooling It was also advanced that pooling CPs were 












..., .... 'C4U.,;'" 
systems. 
MoH & 
much considered. If you only 
an 
Box 5.2: Key Informants on Stakeholder Ownership of the 
Bilateral 1 "Non-pooling are active participants and 
countries. They are able to speak on what they but its 
their comments vis-a-vis other comments in the meeting. In this sense they 
voice. But to what extent are the non-pooling influential with that equal voice. By and 
large the CPs who are more SWAp-minded (pooling CPs) to a more influential 
voice. is not because of the way they provide support; it is more because of the 
of what they By nature of assistance they are supporting the SWAp 
they are putting money into the basket and look at GRZ terms everything that 
they and do. They pay particular attention to GRZ reports and they have the i 
of incentives for to work as effectively as possible, for to be transparent as • 
possible, for GRZ capacity to be as high as possible. Their focus on development systems • 
is on GRZ. when they are in their they are thinking about when they are in 
meetings they are thinking SWAps, when they are discussion they are thinking about 
SWAp. When you are not pooling, your concern is the projects, you think of project 
accountability, project expenditure, impact, project M&E 
you focus inwards to the projects and not thinking day in day out about 
sector. So when you come to meeting, your comments won't be so 
time to read one report month it will probably be a 
about a project not a about a SWAp or the health sector". 
Bilateral CP 2 "CPs that pool resources are far closer as allies to MoH and they are far 
closer aligned in their thinking and in ideologies and in their problem solving capacity. 
such, the content of what they say tends to far much more considered and far more 
appropriate. of this, it a snowball effect. If senior MoH officials want to consult 
CPs on some health Whom they tum to first? They tum to those who are 
more in tune with their own thinking and whose content they far higher respect for. 
And 
5.2.1.3 Government Ownership of the SWAp process 
In a SWAp, government is to the SWAp coordination by providing 
leadership and being steward. of GRZ in the SWAp 
coordination process was as!:;e~;sea by looking at how the relations between MoH 
influence practice, specifically the to which MoH makes the decisions or is 
dictated to by CPs. Lastly, is a at the quality of the conSUltative 
that were interviewed about the adoption of SWAp in clearly 
indicated that the MoH had provided the requisite leadership and power took forward 
SWAp process. One of Multilateral CPs pointed out that the impetus health reforms 
and movement to health SWAp was in the MMD and the 
strategies that were developed encouraged to give up resources to government and 
to acUdo things that were sector wide. view was supported by a Bilateral who 
observed that adoption of the SWAp process was very much Zambian and that from 1991, all 












into. another informant, this a MoH official, indicated that MoH was well-ahead 
in the implementation of the health reforms the SWAp while the CPs followed 
But to what extent has sustained its leadership in practice? key informants 
provided no clear cut answer on this question pointed out that power 
MoH and have in practice been influenced by changes in both on the 
and sides. The reasoning behind this line of argument is key officials from MoH and 
CPs who championed the cause were moved at a very stage and this pushed the SWAp 
process backwards. It was explained that new entrants in the health sector failed to 
sufficiently push the health reform continuum forward. These comments can 
substantiated the fact the development of the health SWAp was conceptualized within 
the health sector reform agenda and as such, its implementation hinged on the 
willingness of office bearers (MoH and to push the process forward. In regard, 
can be clearly distinguished which varying of MoH/CPs 
since inception of the health SWAp and is in Appendix III. 
Despite various in MoH/CPs power relations during the SWAp implementation 
key informants indicated that the decision making improved in the 
prior the research. It was stated that the decisions that were adopted were more 
consultative and transparent. Several Informants were happy with the culture of minuting 
action points and decisions in SWAp meetings and following up on them. The 
indication was that 90% of times, decisi ns reached on consensus were adhered to. If 
not, least there was agreement on who was responsible. 
However, it was noted that even though the quality of consultative had improved, 
power relations were complex and that the relationship between MoH/CPs according 
to the matter at hand. As a even if MoH to driving the in most 
cases the had an hand when it came to major Respondents 
that some CPs' comments during SWAp coordination meetings brought far-reaching 
repercussions beyond which one could imagine and this greatly influenced power 
relations. In CPs make decisions without involving and other 
stakeholders in the SWAp. A case in point is the decision some to providing 
support through Direct Support through the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning (MoFNP). Non-participant observation of the 2005 Annual Consultative Meeting 
clearly demonstrated that the transition to DBS was not favoured by MoH. the in 
question to had no regard for MoH as they were merely executing 
of their missions which are keen to channel support through While it is appreciated that 
DBS gives absolute power to the recipient government to allocate resources and to take 













decisions that CPs implemented without regard to MoH. This reflects that MoH is not in 
complete control even though it is in leadership role. Box presents some of the 
comments on the by some CPs to transit to DBS. 
Box 5.3: Key Informants on Transition to Direct Budget Support 
"The shift from SWAp to is a natural progression but the way we move in Zambia is too 
fast. We always move too fast. not a bad idea but if you fail fail badly. We needed to 
improve sector SWAps, the SWAp, even we move to DBS because we 
the key ingredients of a SWAp to be to manage DBS. Not sure if we are ready. 
But the other of the argument is that you learn by doing. Thus, you to involved 
in the system you can actually an incredible impact. In a fashion you build 
systems as you work. But I am not comfortable with move to . Bilateral CPo 
"In reality, you have funders on one hand and a receiver in the other hand. Though 
government is in the seat sometimes it is pushed the. Multilateral CPo 
"In a climate of scarce resources, 
external sources, difficult for rtr.IUU·'" 
At several fora, the do emphasize the need to implement sound decisions. However, 
one wonders if the shift to DBS is a sound A recent review public expenditure 
and financial accountability in Zambia (World Bank, 2003) pOinted to the lack of well­
developed sector policies and coherent working arrangements in most of the line ministries as 
well as low public expenditure management at the Ministry of and National Planning 
(MoFNP). such, there is no justification in giving the full powers to MoFNP to allocate 
resources given low public expenditure management. In it seems that is no 
national ownership the decision to to DBS as even at MoFNP don't fully 
understand concept. 
Apart from making certain without involving GRZ, CPs been 
accused of not adhering to decisions during SWAp consultative meetings. was 
highlighted during Committee meeting of 30th 2004 the 
had flouted the been during the August 2004 Policy Committee 
(PCM) commence funding more eligible institutions as well as to funding 
to districts. The failure to the resolutions of the PCM undermined the authority vested 
on the PCM as the policy making body of SWAp. 
On other the informants argued that the of the was for to be 
more transparent in policy resource allocation in which instance would no need 
how the decisions were The is that when GRZ makes 
certain which are not in line with requirements of the SWAp. CPs naturally 
questioned process. One of the Bilateral was empathic on this issue observed 
that: 












"If you give money to GRZ, you reports so that plans are based on sound information. 
CPs are frequently down and disappointed on this one. In most cases CPs are not 
consulted on how resources are allocated. Often there is about 
events that significant basket support rely on. When GRZ 
't provide CPs are disappointed. It is difficult to approve additional resources to 
health and ironically, the that provide money to boast of how good the 
SWAp is in Zambia. Their judgment is questioned & when GRZ provide 
Thus, a lot is for support a SWAp when doesn't perform. 
Sometimes CPs to provide Technical Assistance but GRZ usually citing use of 
local capacity and systems. But what confidence does the have that will perform as 
agreed. whilst has demonstrated it has capacity limitations it is unwilling to 
strengthen its capacity which again undermines confidence and Though ownership 
is important that it shouldn't be undermined, a needs to struck. It seems 
that the reasons for MoH wanting to ownership is more important than progress". 
In summary, it is apparent that though government leadership in the SWAp process, 
it is not completely in control as it doesn't fully sanction some of the key decisions. This, to 
some ovront relatively government ownership process. CPs cnnnon 
dictate in the .nrc.!"oc; making sure that the set objectives are met or to 
meet the of missions. However, if one critically assesses this situation, it 
CPs do policy resource allocation, which is in fact what we 
want SWAp to do so that policies are put in only problem that comes 
is that pooling are the ones who are mainly influencing this policy in whilst 
the other stakeholders in health sector are not sufficiently doing so. This can to the 
implementation biased 
5.2.2 Support towards a shared sector wide policy and strategy 
According to from MoH, National Policies of 1992 set 
logical for on adoption the health SWAp. It 
was indicated that the actual development the document was done by MoH and presented 
for consensus building all stakeholders at a in Livingstone, Zambia in 1991. The 
understanding is that joined into development of the document at a stage 
pledged towards policy given positive nature of the document. 
What has followed since the adoption of the National Health Policies and Strategies been 
the development of National Health Plans (NHSPs). In entirety, four (4) 
NHSPs have been developed since the commencement of the Health Reforms in 1992. 












plan covered the 1998-2000; the third plan covered the period 2001-2005 and 
the recently developed plan to cover period 2006-2010. 
Responding to a question over commitment support towards sector policy and 
NHSPs, indicated all stakeholders operating in the health sector 
and activities from the National Health Policies and but not 
the NHSPs. It was explained that were not comfortable with most of the NHSPs 
that developed before 2001 and the I\IHSP 2001-2005 was the only one that 
comprehensively ae'ilelcJDE~a with consensus from most development of 
NHSP 2001 in benefit from the Joint Identification and Formulation Mission 
of 1999/2000. 
Thus, number CPs providing support to the NHSP increased with the development of 
the NHSP 2001-2005. However, as shall explained in section 5.2.5, certain CPs were still 
not providing support towards the One of the major reasons that was advanced by 
the was the of financing failure of to 
and align all significant funding the NHSP. The other reason that was put 
forward was the NHSP 2001-2005 not fully costed that it had no logical 
framework (master implementation plan). This made it difficult for stakeholders 
programme to translate and timely implement broad strategic objectives and 
The means of verification were not explicit enough for implementers to define and 
measure health outputs/outcomes. 
5.2.3 Medium Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
One of the prime elements of a SWAp is that there should be a comprehensive 
supporting the sector-wide policy and that it should focus on all aspects of health sector. 
Unfortunately, ten years (1993-2003) inception of the health SWAp in Zambia, there 
was no government MTEF that linked policy, planning and budgeting in all the line ministries, 
including MoH. As such, it was difficult to predict funding from one to the next and within 
one budget year. As one respondent observed, lack of an expenditure framework made it 
difficult to project the total resources that were available from all sources to allocate 
resources to "'~"'''~£>r"" priorities between within sectors. Lack of a medium term focus for 
resource planning made it hard to plan ahead for changes in policy and expenditure 
reallocations. 
Realising the NHSP (2001-2005) could not adequately implemented without a full 
picture of financial pledges and commitments, MoH and its developed a Joint Investment 
Plan ( ..liP) in 2001 with the of improving efficiency in the use budgeted resources. 












JIP was never used during the development of annual action plans and budgets as both 
the CPs and government were not disbursing monies as stipulated in the JIP. 
The government eventually introduced the MTEF in 2003, the first which was developed 
period 2004-2006. Subsequent were developed for the periods 2005-2007 and 
2006-2008. In Zambia, MTEF is a three-year framework within which available resources 
(both Government donor) are divided between sectors on the of achieving 
government objectives. The main aim was to address weaknesses in the planning and 
budget by ensuring that resources were efficiently allocated and managed; 
maintaining of fiscal discipline in planning and management public resources; and to 
improve predictability of resources. 
extent to which the MTEF has addressed weaknesses in planning and budgeting was 
discussed in the and interviews with key informants. Generally most of the 
responses felt that the budgeting process was still weak and that the total health 
resource envelope was not fully known. As not the planned expenditure 
are captured in and MoH is not fully able make informed about the 
allocation of resources to priority programmes existence three 
(3) financing as shall presented in Figure 5 below has not helped matters as 
most the funding sources are not aligned the and N Thus, in to 
is being in the conceptual framework, one can argue that MTEF as an 
element of the SWAp was not really effective in strengthening mechanisms aid 
management despite it being integrated with the policy process. 
Use of GRZ financial management and accountability systems 
It was clearly established from the FGD, key informants, non-participant observation and 
document reviews that the SWAp had strongly encouraged use of financial 
management and accounting mainly among the pooling resources. The extent 
to which this encouraged transparency and financial accountability is discussed in 
Section 5.3.1 
5.2.5 Common approach to implementation and management 
Institute for Health (2004) to above of a SWAp as 
the plumbing component is driven by all the other elements of SWAp and that the 
plumbing component itself should support all the other elements of a SWAp and not vice versa. 
Ideally, a common approach to implementation and management means the use of harmonised 










5.2.5.1 Financing Mechanisms 
Figure 5 below illustrates the prevailing financing mechanisms in the Zambian health SWAp 
as at March 2006. 
Figure 5: Financing Mechanisms in the Zambian Health SWAp 
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Three (3) modes of support were in existence namely; pooled basket funding, project funding 
and direct budget support. The number of pooling CPs (including MoH) was eight (8) during 
the year 2005. These were SIDA, DGIS, DANIDA, DFID, DCI, USAID, UNFPA and MoH. 
Most of the pooling bilateral CPs were also providing support to NGOs through projects in 
addition to the monies that they were providing to the basket. This includes DGIS, DCI and 
USAID. Certain bilateral CPs like JICA and CIDA were providing in-kind support through 
projects and all their activities were drawn from the NHSP. 
All the mUlti-lateral CPs (except UNFPA) were providing support through projects with all their 
programmes/activities drawn from the overall NHSP. On the other hand, global health 
initiatives (GFATM, PEPFAR, GAVI, BUSH Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
etc) were also providing support through several projects and NGOs but most of their 
programmes/activities were not drawn from the NHSP. In terms of Direct Budget Support 
through the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, the only CP that was using this mode 












The three (3) financing mechanisms as highlighted a lot of 
implications for efficiency as earlier explained. One of the bilateral was very emphatic 
on this and had this to "It must be appreciated that pooling has to do more with 
accounting the come in when some CPs don't share plans, 
budgeting and reporting Thus, lack of harmonization and alignment aid to the 
overall plan is contributing to inefficiency and loss of focus in the SWAp far more than money 
being in the pool. However, if a/l monies were pooled, it could have possible to 
use joint systems even though the ideal case would to plans and to funds to 
budget". 
The of 3 modes of financing in health SWAp points to commonly 
held view that if there are several financing mechanisms. then the focus of the SWAp is lost. 
5.2.5.2 Accounting, Auditing, Procurement and Reporting Mechanisms 
The adoption of the health SWAp necessitated the development of joint accounting and 
reporting systems that include the Financial and Administrative Management System (FAMS), 
District Integrated Logistic Self-Assessment Tool (DILSAT). Management 
Information System (HMIS) and SWAp coordination meetings. 
The establishment of the FAMS and HMIS has made it possible to routinely review 
implementation of activities in the Zambian health SWAp vis-a-vis fiscal discipline and service 
delivery. The FAMS and HMIS are operational in all the districts in Zambia and some of 
the tertiary hospitals. actual are done during SWAp coordination meetings 
(particularly the Health Sector Advisory Committee meeting) where a 'basket' report detailing 
financial flows, expenditure, audits, debt position and selected HMIS indicators are 
provided. 
In addition to the above, Joint Annual Reviews (JARs) were introduced in the Zambian health 
SWAp in October 2004. intention of JARs was to allow all in the health 
sector to experience field and to gain a understanding of progress regarding 
service delivery. The introduction of the JARs counteracts the commonly held view that 
SWAps reduce the need for fieldwork and missions' sense for work on the ground. 
expectation is that JARs would further harmonise supervisory visits in the health 
sector. 
Apart from the routine reviews and the JARs, the SWAp accommodates joint 
independent reviews and between 1992 and 2006, five (5) joint appraisals of 
sector reforms and Demographic and Health (DHS) have been conducted in 
Zambia. This includes the Independent Review of the Zambian Health Reforms (1996); Joint 












Mid Term of the NHSP 2001-2005 (2003), Institutional and Organisational 
of the Health "",,,,,,,.rv (2004); DHS (1992); (1996); DHS (2001/2002). At the 
the MoH and CPs were working out modalities for conducting the 2006. 
The DHS is a population survey on demographic and health ''''''''-''G'':> that is conducted 
every five years in conjunction with the central statistical office. 
Most of the interviewees appreciated that the use of joint to a extent 
strengthened mechanisms aid management but they aired their over the CPs 
that were using separate systems. It was pointed out that CPs like USAID, World 
Bank, GFATM, etc were using separate plans, budgets and reporting formats 
leading to administrative inefficiencies. 
In terms of procurement, respondents indicated that there were no synergies in the 
financing and procurement of drugs to an extent whereby the health sector could not take 
advantage bulk procurements through the International Competitive Bidding (ICB) 
and framework contracting. Framework contracting requires the prior selection, registration 
and classification capable firms that would undertake procurement of goods and 
given periods though a framework where the thresholds, quantification, 
selection, packaging quality the products are stipulated. Framework 
contacting can improve management of r.orn.o,'T cycle as it cuts down on 
procurement lead 
to lack synergies in the financing and procurement of drugs, the procurement of 
hasn't well and is Ideally, it was in the National Drug 
Policy (NDP) of 1997 that a "Drug Supply Fund" Uointly funded by and for the 
procurement of drugs would be established but by March 2006, this had not yet materialised. 
However, at the time the efforts to operationalise Drug Supply Fund were 
underway and in January 2006 a of fund was appointed. 
5.2.6 Summary 
6 below, summarises the extent to which the Zambian SWAp has achieved the 
five core common elements of a SWAp as outlined above. All characteristics of a SWAp 
in the Zambian SWAp but with varying of Furthermore, are 
certain innovative features that have been introduced like the SWAp coordinating 












policy and strategy 
Figure 6: Achievement of the five Core Common Elements of a SWAp 
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5.3 ANALYSIS OF THE SWAp MECHANISM AS A WHOLE 
As conceived in the conceptual framework (Figure 2), the mechanism as a whole should 
strengthen the health system leading to better health outcomes. In examining the 
effectiveness of the health SWAp as a whole, an effort was made to look at the contribution of 
the health SWAp to improved transparency and accountability; efficiency (administrative, 
technical and allocative); financial sustainability and geographical equity of access. 
5.3.1 Transparency and Accountability 
Good governance and accountability are key to economic growth and a health system that 
customarily addresses these issues can go a long way in providing the most for the people 
that it serves. As indicated in a report of the African Commission (cited by Kaufmann, 2005; 
p.81), "good governance is the key ... unless there are improvements in capacity, 
accountability, and reducing corruption .. .. other reforms will have only limited impact." The 
Zambian health sector is not an exception when it comes to meeting these key criteria. In this 
regard, during the adoption of the health SWAp, emphasis was placed on the formulation and 
implementation of robust joint administrative systems in planning and progress reporting, 












and This section in more detail, of these <::\I<:T""m<:! 
in transparency and 
5.3.1.1 Accountability 
This specifically assesses extent to which the health SWAp has enhanced 
financial management and accountability by looking at the adequacy of the accounting 
system including disbursement .....".,..."' .... , audit systems, and as reflected by 
the key informants and document a comparator, by 
ascertaining level of financial accountability nOT........£> the SWAp. 
Prior to 1992, of resources to the district (including procurement and 
expenditures was the responsibility of Provincial Accounting Control Unit 
(PACU) in all provinces at the Permanent office. This 
arrangement did make it possible for MoH properly account for all the resources due to 
improperly financial control systems and procedures. The accounting in 
place was manual and in most cases was low compliance to the L"JI"U<::a 
expenditures were incurred on budget were no resources. made it 
difficult to link budget execution to action plans and the 
Following the of health services, and commencement of basket funding in 
1993, the government through MoH started disbursing funds directly to the This 
development created a to build district capacity as well as to provide on the 
utilisation of resources. As such, the was developed and by 1 it was 
introduced in nearly all the districts in Zambia (Ministry Health, 1997a). is a 
tool that was to ensure efficiency and in the utilisation of resources 
the capturing for monitoring and financial all 
institutions benefiting from funding. 
FAMS to be operational, districts were equipped with and a rigorous and 
regular programme for training accountants was put in In particular, a tailor 
financial management course was institutionalized at the Centre for Accountancy 
'-'<"''''''>';;i~ (ZCAS) to cater for training of district In addition to 
providing capacity building courses for in procedures, several 
and handbooks have from to time been developed 
disseminated to all health statutory boards/bodies. 
about the effectiveness the FAMS. many respondents believed that it had greatly 
improved transparency and financial accountability. The basic understanding among all the 











enhanced by the adoption the MTEF by in 2004 (Key Informant 
Interviews Box 5.4). 
Box Key Informants on Financial Accountability 
Bilateral CP: "Good Activity Budgeting (ABB) and accounting system (FAMS) in place. 
FAMS financing to has adopted ABB through MTEF which 
financing to national health policy, NHSP and results". 
FGD: "Money from CPs to accounts and is then directly to recipient districts 
and facilities with a disbursement schedule to all recipients. ensures transparency". 
at health the disbursement schedules are actually stuck on notice 
boards and where there are fluctuations between the amount on schedule and 
actual money sent, reprimand action is taken. 
Multilateral "FAMS most systems. Most are happy with it though it 
requires a bit of strengthening. FAMS is a very good system especially at lower leve/s­
districts". 
Multilateral CP: SWAp has put in place good accounting systems. Management of 
services was at provincial level but now in all the 72 districts whereby the popular structures 
help to community participation. There is good planning and budgeting at central 
district 
Bilateral CP: "SWAp probably helped to curb corruption because it involves 
strengthening of systems. Corruption is more difficult to do there are more robust 
s stems". 
The feature that respondents commended (highlighted in Box above) was 
of disbursing money directly to recipient institutions with a schedule. It 
was pointed out that this the number of transactions (number of 
institutions handling money) in turn improved accountability. For example, by sending 
the monies directly to the districts, accompanied by a disbursement schedule, there are 
assurances that monies would reach the intended because the beneficiary 
institutions can monies allocated to them. This was not there hotnro the SWAp 
and a lot of money was misappropriated. It is also nT",no.", that even the non-pooling 
including GFATM, USAIO, Imperial College, World CIOA, UNOP to mention 
but a few, also disbursed their monies to MoH which in turn sends these monies to 
beneficiary institutions. Thus, there is some of confidence in the ,-,V,"',-,"" system 
partly due to a transparent financial mechanism. 
In terms of existing mechanisms for releasing funds, basket funds are released on the 
basis of progress against action plans and budgets outlined in financial reports. All 
from the basket are each quarter required to submit income and expenditure 
to CBoH for consolidation into a basket report which is later submitted to 
the Health Sector Advisory Committee. This committee holds two meetings in a year (March 











period are The approving next bi-annual period depends 
very much on how the beneficiary institution had performed in relation to the 
financial and annual plan. This system, according to the rvIE!We~es. has been 
instrumental in improving accountability. 
As the basket reports, debt and audit summary reports are provided. 
essence position is to strengthen control through 
compliance to the cash budgeting system as envisioned by the government in 1 
Suffice that since 1 Zambian government has remained committed to a 
budgeting system which means that government transactions cannot occur until 
funding is received As , I argue that encouraging health institutions to present their debt 
in SWAp is one way of encouraging discipline which is in line with 
njO>r'jO>r~1 government policy. one can that SWAp is to 
'""7""'''''' and fiscal as envisioned in a cash budgeting system. 
only drawback is that monitoring of the debt by the health sector advisory 
is quarterly and by institutions would have already large amounts of debt. 
external play a critical in maintaining on 
on compliance to financial procedures. internal 
(pre and post) are conducted and assessments are on expenditure 
component analysis identification of significant deviations from annual work plans. 
Notably, 67 reports were produced on between 2001 and 2004. 
from the were also to a in audit 
from (3) in year to one (1) in the At 
Public Accounts Committee. The only major problem is only financial audits are 
conducted while non-financial audits including value for money, forensic and electronic audits 
are not conducted. 
large, I that ~1""1("",ntl("\n of the health to a extent to 
contribute to improved financial management and control. Triangulating was cited 










Box 5.5: Triangulating Evidence on Financial Accountability 
"From a technical perspective, corruption is adequately dealt with within the health sector. 
Working with the framework of a SWAp, means that Sweden and other collaborating partners 
(CPs) have an overview of all resources including GRZ, to the health sector. This implies that 
Sweden may be more aware of mismanagement of funds and corruption than would 
otherwise be the case. Within a SWAp environment corruption can be better dealt with than 
in a traditional project environment and it is getting increasingly difficult for politicians and 
public servants to misuse funds, regardless of whether it is GRZ funds or CP funds". 
Kandimaa and Mattsson (2001; p.11) 
"By increasing the share of funding provided to districts and, even more importantly, 
improving the predictability of resource transfers, the basket made the Government's 
commitment to decentralization a reality. It also provided the impetus for the development of 
sound financial management and monitoring systems". Frantz et al (2004; p.1-2) 
The primary review and triangulating evidence from earlier authors therefore counteract the 
commonly held view that SWAps increase the chance of corruption when donor funds go into 
a basket in view of the fact that governments' scope and control is reduced. In actual fact, 
pooling can strengthen existing government systems through the implementation of sound 
financial management controls. 
5.3.1.2 Transparency and Accountability in Procurement 
The ability of the health system to procure goods and services transparently and accountably 
is one of the cornerstones of the health SWAp in Zambia. Assessment of the capacity of the 
current procurement services is a comprehensive undertaking which goes beyond the scope 
of this paper. This paper looked at the capability of the procurement services in the SWAp as 
perceived by the key informants. Perceptions on the capacity of the procurement units in the 
health sector was also made by looking at minutes of SWAp meetings and triangulating 
evidence from other assessments that have so far been conducted in Zambia. 
Responses from the interviews on the adequacy of the MoH procurement services were 
mixed. Whilst officials from MoH indicated that the current system was adequate, most of the 
CPs indicated otherwise. The argument from MoH officials was based on the current 
procurement systems and procedures that came with the adoption of the SWAp. It was 
stated that a number of procurement units and tender committees had been formulated in all 
provinces and districts as part of the decentralisation process leading to strengthened 
transparency and accountability in procurement. The reasoning behind this was that 
procurement guidelines were disseminated to procurement units and tender committees on 
an annual basis of which compliance was ascertained through regular monitoring and 
evaluation visits. At national level, the bone of contention was that in all bulk procurements 












stage of procurement i.e. during the closing and opening of tenders, and tender evaluation. 
Views of the respondents are presented in Box 5.6 below. 
Box 5.6: FGD and Key Informants on Transparency and Accountability in 
Procurement 
"There's been tremendous improvement in accountability for procurement. Let's look at it 
from this angle. The SWAp has come with its own rules. There must be a finance 
committee, a tender committee and so on. So in terms of transparency, its there. It has 
really helped in some areas for the Director of Health not to bulldoze the decisions on how 
the funds should be spent. But of course, there are still pockets here and there, where 
such practices are still there. In any system, as long as you are dealing with human 
beings, there is no perfect system that can eliminate these problems 100%". FGD 
"The tender committees are very effective and the composition is very wide. All the tender 
committees are now operating under the Zambia National Tender Board (ZNTB) Act. So, 
when making a major procurement the committee has to sit. The head of the institution has 
to be there, the departmental heads and members from the community (who are act as 
'whistle blowers') also have to be there. If members of the community are not happy and 
even though they are shy in that meeting, immediately they come out some of them 
immediately go to the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). They report to ACC citing cases 
of malpractices with the minutes of the previous tender committee meeting in their hands. 
ACC will then go to the particular district and investigate". FGD 
'The records of proceedings in all the tender committee meetings are actually there and 
one is able to go there and read". FGD 
Multilateral CP: "SWAp has general improved accountability. However, SWAp has not 
completely solved issues around procurement but improving". 
Bilateral CP: "Buying committees and tender committees at lower levels are involved in 
procurements in line with the Zambia National Tender Board (ZNTB) act. Large 
procurements requiring higher thresholds are done at the next level. Competence in 
procurement is good but more needs to be done". 
However, a review of the minutes of the Implementation Review Steering Committee (IRSC) 
as well as the Health Sector Committee (HSC) clearly revealed that the MoH procurement 
unit lacked the necessary capacity to undertake bulk procurements. For example, GFATM 
had opted to use the UNICEF procurement systems in the procurement of ARVs due to 
inadequate capacity in MoH. Importantly, the MoH procurement system was considered to 
be lengthy and that they didn't make use of framework contracting. The other key issue was 
that the health sector had been operating without a procurement plan until 2005 when the first 
plan was developed. 
As part of efforts to improve the capacity of procurement in the SWAp, MoH and its CPs 
engaged the World Bank to undertake a thorough assessment of the capacity of MoH to 
procure for the entire health sector. In general, the assessment indicated an average risk 












Table 7: Procurement Risk Rating 
Procurement ASDeIC1. 














o ­ No ...-f"rlrm"'"" 1 Least Important 
0.5 - Partially Achieved 2 Very Important 
1 ­ Fully Achieved 3 Important 
4 Essential: Must be achieved 
5.3.1.3 Accountability for Performance 
One of consequences of adopting a health SWAp has measurement 
impact of investments in terms of overall health sector performance as opposed to 
narrowly and easily measurable project type outcomes and outputs. As such, MoH 
to review the Health Management Information System (HMIS) in 1996 inand its 
order to it results oriented and responsive to the local dAIr:I~!I()n making process. 
was realisation that the C"C'YO'r'n that was in place was excessively 
resulted inthe large which was not for 
toThus, HMIS should local 
of the health in terms of impact of health 
delivery on disease incidence, availability drugs and other supplies. 
In terms sufficiency of the HM as a tool for monitoring and evaluation, various and 
concerns were raised by the key informants. argument was that the HMIS was not 
that the the data that was collected was It was felt 
that HMIS not provide a of 
level effort and that they were aligned to the Millennium Development (MDGs). 
other issue was that was very minimal analysis HMIS indicators during the SWAp 
consultative meetings. sentiments augment comments that were during 
the Health Sector Committee 
MoH should make significant 
consensus over 
of 29th April 2004. At that meeting. it was resolved that 
to improve assessment in the health sector 













incentives within the 
information available 
In addition to above, an institutional organisational appraisal of health sector that 
was conducted in June also pointed to the lack a performance management system 
in the health sector which made it difficult to e"........ \.1 ... , for performance and to achieve set 
Key informants were very on as in Box 
Box 5.7: Key Informants on Accountability for Performance in the SWAp 
Bilateral CP 1: "Although national systems are and have strengthened, a lot of 
reporting is satisfy At SWAp meetings, the idea is to check if all 
beneficiaries from the basket have reported accordingly. It's more about the cover and not 
whole sector is not performance oriented and are very little 
to actually provide the Incredible;s produced and 
good both financial and progress. But the move to improve 
Bilateral CP "Provincial assessments the need to the system rCHJnTr\rr>,c 
more performance focused but they are not dOing much. and beyond the sector not 
performance oriented at Need to scores to given on 
performance achieved. This will at help the sector to get away from reporting for the 
sake reporting to reporting for the of performance". 
Bilateral CP3: "Districts are not really funding the planned CPs argue 
that yes MoH its part disbursing money directly to districts but what the district 
managers do with the money when it them a lot to be desired. As a 
there no impact". 
is a improve accountability for performance HMIS 
indicators". 
MoH Official: 
Multilateral "Weak HMIS is but the indicators don't the 














In addition to the above, an institutional and organisational appraisal of the health sector that 
was conducted in June 2004 also pointed to the lack of a performance management system 
in the health sector which made it difficult to account for performance and to achieve set 
targets. Key informants were very emphatic on this issue as reflected in Box 5.7. 
Box 5.7: Key Informants on Accountability for Performance in the SWAp 
Bilateral CP 1: "Although national systems are used and have been strengthened, a lot of 
reporting is done to satisfy the CPs. At SWAp meetings, the idea is to check if all 
beneficiaries from the basket have reported accordingly. It's more about the cover and not 
the content. The whole sector is not ideally performance oriented and there are very little 
incentives within the system to actually provide the results . Incredible data is produced and 
information available is good both financial and progress. But the move to improve 
performance is limited". 
Bilateral CP 2: "Provincial assessments have tried to reinforce the need to make the system 
more performance focused but they are not doing much. Far and beyond the sector is not 
performance oriented at all. Need to define performance and scores to be given on certain 
performance achieved. This will at least help the sector to get away from reporting for the 
sake of reporting to reporting for the sake of performance". 
Bilateral CP3: "Districts are not really funding all the planned activities. Some CPs argue 
that yes MoH does its part by disbursing the money directly to districts but what the district 
managers do with the money when it reaches them leaves a lot to be desired. As a result 
there is no impact". 
MoH Official: "There is a need to improve accountability for performance and HMIS 
indicators". 
Multilateral CP: "Weak M&E. HMIS is good but the indicators don't provide the necessary 












5.3.2 OF RESOURCES 
1 Administrative Efficiency 
5.3.2.1a Time Spent in Meetings as an Indicator of High Transaction Costs 
It was observed that a considerable amount of time is attending SWAp coordination 
in the health SWAp. This is as a result of there being numerous meetings 
to attend in a in a month and subsequently in a This the Monitoring 
and committee meetings which are held every Wednesday; not than two 
Technical Working Group meetings each week; a Policy Consultative meeting every month; 
two Health Sector Advisory committee meetings six months; one Annual ConSUltative 
meeting every year. puts the cumulative number 
of at 3 in a 13 in a month; and 160 in a year. Members of also attend 
other separate technical meetings that are organized by multilateral (UNICEF and 
WHO), bilateral (USAID) and global health initiatives (GFATM). On top of this, key MoH 
also attend other government meetings more especially at Ministry Finance and 
National Planning on a regular basis. 
On the other hand, the SWAp meetings are so comprehensive that staff from the SWAp 
secretariat and other key MoH officials spend a lot of time these meetings. Action 
that are in each meeting have to be adequately followed up next 
meeting and consumes a lot of 
From the that transaction are very high in SWAp owing 
the number of as well as This is despite streamlining 
of SWAp meetings in 2004 (Minutes of the February 2004 Policy Consultative meeting) and 
the conviction by some of the key informants that the were gradually distancing 
themselves from implementation issues. 
5.3.2.1b Number of Using Separate Systems as an Indicator of High Transaction 
Costs 
Though number of fully participating in SWAp meetings is reasonably high (15 in 
a number of these their own planning, budgeting 
reporting formats. and PEPFAR are some of CPs using 
Additionally, some of the bilateral also run parallel projects despite pooling resources. 
The effect of of management arrangements on outstripping staff time cannot be 
Whilst and directly affect at MoH 
headquarters, staff based at lower levels are by the 
The Provincial Financial and Data Management Specialists were resounding on this 










During with Provincial 
of separate reporting formats, 
sends the money, 
Box 5.8: FGD on High Transaction Costs in the Zambian Health SWAp 
Financial and 	 Management over 
following was expressed. 
objective of a SWAp is to come up with a common report 
players in the SWAp. If I submit one financial it 
of everyone. But what is happening now is that the 
Global sends the money, WHO sends 
I have submitted my financial report which encompasses these funds and I 
explained how they were spent. Again, I get another letter saying that I should 
money. 
submit another report to one CPo Then it purpose of the SWAp 
because one report is supposed to answer questions for all these players. Ironically, the 
instructions to reports come from CBoH". 
"When we are reporting we do not more to the SWAp but we report with 
same impetus to vertical programmes as well. The complication is that if I don't submit 
rOrlt"ll1r~ to all the funders; the letters that come, they come with threats if you don't do 
this by that then your will never get from this particular CPo I 
mean we have the interest at of all the districts and hospitals in the province. we 
report in the particular format that particular wants for us continue benefiting. 
This is if we lose particular resource it wouldn't well to the districts and 
hospitals my province. the same way I will pay attention to the SWAp report is the 
same way I will pay attention to this report being for this other CPo is 
time constraining". 
"Once you agree that put money in the and to a set of rules and a 
format of report. We should to that. We don't want start seeing some more 
requests for reports in different formats. That's now not sticking to the SWAp guidelines. 
So, we to work on this one. We don't want to start submitting individual 
reports to particular within the same SWAp. It's defeating the whole purpose. 
People are being tossed here and there." 
! 	"Apart from the SWAp we do have a lot of smaller NGOs sponsored by USAID whose 
1'0/"/'\1'1,.,. we have to consolidate at provincial 
In order to augment the comments from the it is worth mentioning that there are over 15 
multilateral working on HIV/AI in at moment. All 
projects have their own implementation reporting formats even though some of them buy 
into the overall National HIV/AIDS strategic plan. This suggests high transaction and 
duplication of activities. example, by end of 2004, USAID alone was operating over 
24 on HIV/AI which were operational in 128 in 40 districts covering 8 
provinces. On the other hand, the World Bank approved a grant of $42 million support 
HIV/AI activities for a period of 5 years commencing in July 2003 under the Zambia 
National to HIV/AIDS (ZANARA) project. ZANARA covers 4 
including the Community Response to HIV/AI (CRAIDS), National AIDS 
CounCil, all line and a Programme Administrative Unit (PAU) at the Ministry of 
Finance and National Planning (MoFNP). the end of ZANARA was funding sub­












funds are not managed by MoH but MoFNP through the PAU. has made it difficult to 
integrate the ZANARA activities within the SWAp and as such, the project does not 
complement other HIV/AIDS programmes in the 
Analysis of the number of projects which were operational before the adoption the health 
SWAp in 1993 showed were about multilateral and bilateral projects covering a 
wide range of public health interventions and not only HIV/AI This to some extent can 
attributed to HIV/AIDS pandemic programmes/activities are being supported by a 
number of CPs the world over. The observation made from above is 
that the SWAp mechanism as a not administrative as 
transaction costs are still high and that there is a lot of duplication of (more so on 
HIV/AIDS) due to the use of funding and implementation 
Technical Fffi~il~nt::v 
5.3.2.2a Hospital Bed Occupancy Rate as an indicator of Technical Efficiency 
hospital bed occupancy is one of indicators that the MoH uses to assess the 
efficiency (in terms of productivity) of district hospitals. purpose of the indicator is to 
ascertain utilization of district hospitals for inpatient treatment and national annual 
target is 80% bed occupancy. in Table 8 below reveals that on the national 
occupancy rate between period 2001 and 2005 was 50%, the worst 
found in Southern, Western and Copperbelt provinces. the introduction of SWAp in 
1991, data indicate that the national occupancy rate was 71.2% (Ministry of 
Health. 1992). This means that during the last four years of the SWAp, district hospitals were 
being under utilised and this could due to either poor quality services (equipment, patient 
beds, food and/or of core staff and doctors). This line argument was 
and most the informants revealed that productivity the district 
had dropped as a result of human resources 
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5.3.2.2b Health Centre Staff Daily Contacts as an indicator of Technical Efficiency 
The health centre staff daily contact rate measures the average number of daily contacts for 
each qualified health worker in a health centre over a reporting period (year). It is calculated 
by dividing the total number of contacts during that period with the number of available 
qualified staff-days (8 hours per day for 6 days). The recommended staff workload is 15 
contacts per staff per day and if this number is higher, it means that there is low staffing and 
this may affect the quality of health care provided. 
Table 9 below, assesses the national average daily health centre staff contact rates during 
the SWAp implementation period 2001 to 2004 and the indication is that the figures had been 
rising. The national average daily client-staff contacts was 14.4 in 2001,15.9 in 2002,17.1 in 
2003 and 17.2 in 2004. The results are not affected by differences in utilization rates that 
could account for differences in workloads in health workers in rural and urban areas given 
that the users in urban areas have access to other service providers. This is because there 
was a general under utilization of health centres during the period 2001 to 2004 in both the 
rural and urban areas (CBoH, 2005). 
Table 9: Health Centre Staff Daily Contacts: Zambia 2001-2004 
Province 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average 
Lusaka 13.7 13.1 14.3 14.9 14.0 
Copperbelt 9.6 10.7 10.7 11 .9 10.7 
Central 14.2 15.8 15.6 22.5 17.0 
Southern 12.8 14.3 15.6 15.7 14.5 
Eastern 15.8 25.4 28 .1 26.2 23.8 
Luapula 23.3 25.4 25.6 27.4 25.4 
Northern 20.8 20.2 23.9 18.9 20.9 
North Western 20.6 21 .8 24.0 22.6 22.2 
Western 22.7 21.2 23.5 23.4 22.6 
Zambia 14.4 15.9 17.1 17.2 16.1 
Data Sources: Central Board of Health (2005) 
This above reflects inadequate staffing in health centres especially in rural areas. This is 
because a breakdown of the health centre staff contacts by provinces shows that rural 
provinces (Eastern, Luapula, Northern, North-Western and Western) recorded the highest 
workloads of above 20 in most cases, between 2001 and 2004. For example, in 2004, 71 % 
of all the districts recorded workloads above the target of 15 out of which 80% of these 
districts were rural. On the other hand, urban provinces like Central and Copperbelt had 
continually lower daily client contacts between 2002 and 2004 in that they are better staffed. 
The implication of these results is that though the SWAp has placed emphasis on the 
districts, evidence suggests that there has been inadequate support for human resources 












human resources. Thus, though the 2005 CBoH HMIS report shows that there was general 
under utilization of health centres in the country, the available health workers were 
inadequate to serve all the users. This has implications on the quality services of services 
provided especially in rural health centres. 
S.3.2.2c Trends in funding drugs as an indicator of Technical Efficiency 
Expenditure on drugs is one of the major cost drivers in most health system and the 
availability of essential drugs is considered to be a proxy indicator for the quality of health 
care provided. Henceforth, allocating sufficient monies towards the procurement of quality 
and affordable drugs ought to show how committed GRZ and its CPs are to providing quality 
health care. Table 10 shows the budgetary allocations for drugs as a percentage of the total 
health budget (GRZ & CPs) for the period 1990 to 2005. 
Table 10: Budgetary Allocations for Essential Drugs 1990 - 2005 
Total Health Budget 
GRZ Budget on Drugs 
CPs Budget on Drugs 
GRZ Budget on Drugs 
as %age of Total Health 
Budget 
CPs Budget on Drugs as 
%age of Total Health 
Budget 
Combined GRZ & CPs 
Budget on Drugs as 






ARVs, Malaria drugs) 
Estimated Drug 
Requirement as %age of 
Total Health Budget 
GRZ Budget on Drugs 
as %age of estimated 
Drug Requirement 
CPs budget on Drugs as 





















21 .1% 6.5% 3.1% 2.7% 
- 10.1% 3.2% 11.4% 
- 16.6% 6.2% 14.1% 
-
I 
- 21,000,000.00 21,000,000.00 
I 










- - 55% -33% 
Data Sources: CBoH Basket Reports, 2005; Daura & MU/lke/ela, 1998; GRZ Estimates of Revenue and 
Expenditure 1991; 1993; 1996; 1997; 1999; 2005; 2006; Ministry of Health 2001; 2003 
The above results show that the GRZ drug budget as a percentage of the total health budget 
averaged 21.1% between the period 1990 to 1992 (pre SWAp) but dropped to 6.5% between 











before the SWAp (1993) was not available, the combined GRZ and CPs drug budget as a 
percentage of the total health budget dropped from 16.6% over the period 1995 to 1998 to 
6.2% in 2004 and then increased to 14.1 % in 2005. 
The above results suggest that funding for drugs has reduced during the SWAp 
implementation period 1993 to 2005, specifically the GRZ allocation. Comparison of the 
budgetary allocations for drugs to the estimated annual requirement for essential drugs also 
shows that funding for drugs has not been sufficiently prioritized during the SWAp era . It has 
been estimated that the Zambian public health system requires $21 million per year in order 
to satisfactorily procure all the essential drugs (Ministry of Health, 2001; Ministry of Health, 
2003). However, as shown in the shaded region of Table 10, GRZ and its CPs were 
expected to allocate about 14% of the total health budget on drugs in 2004 but only allocated 
6.2%. In 2005, however, GRZ and its CPs were expected to allocate 11 % for drugs but the 
actual allocation was 14.1 %. This is mainly attributed to the sourcing of more money to cater 
for the procurement of ARVs, anti-malarial drugs and vaccines from the global health 
initiatives. This money, though reflected in the total annual health budget, is not part of the 
annual drug estimate of $ US 21 million. 
The general implication of the above results is that drug financing has not been adequately 
prioritized, especially by GRZ. Interviewees actually noted that insufficient budgetary 
allocations for drug have led to rampant drug shortages in most health facilities. A look at the 
MTEF projections for 2006 to 2008 as illustrated in Figure 7 further illustrates the inadequate 
budgetary allocations for drugs. 
Figure 7: Drug financing all sources: Zambia 2006 - 2008 
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5.3.2.3 Allocative Efficiency 
5.3.2.3a Budgetary Allocation of Funds by level of Health Care as an indicator of 
Allocative Efficiency 
According to the SWAp guidelines on the distribution of funds by level of health care (MoH, 
1999; MoH, 2000b), a minimum of 60% of the total resources coming from GRZ and CPs are 
supposed to be allocated to district health services; 20% to major referral and specialised 
hospitals, 10% to MoH headquarters and the remaining 10% to Statutory boardsrfraining 
Institutions. Figure 8 below explores the extent to which MoH has achieved this milestone, by 
looking at the budget allocation between 1981 and 2005. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
obtain isolated figures for district health services as available data tied the budgetary 
allocations to provinces. This was also the case for MoH headquarters whose allocations 
were tied to centralized procurements. 
The results show that GRZ has been fairing well in terms of budgetary allocations to 
provinces and districts. In the early 1990s (pre SWAp), less than 40% of the budgeted 
amounts were for provincial and district health services as compared to 2004 and 2005 when 
71 % and 64% of the budgeted amounts were for provincial and district health services, 
respectively. It should also be noted that these figures do not include personnel emoluments 
and bulk procurement of drugs as these expenses are incurred at central level. Conversely, it 
appears that the budgetary allocations for major referral and specialised hospitals have been 
declining (from 34% in 1981 to 2% in 2005) while the allocations for MoH headquarters and 
centralized procurements increased from 9% in 1981 to 24% in 2005. 
Figure 8: GRZ Budgetary allocations by level of Health Care: Zambia 1981-2005 
--+-- Headquaters & Centralised Procurerrents -4- Statutory Boards & Training Institutions 


















Data Sources: Ministry of Health (1992); Ministry of Health (1994); Ministry of Health (1998); 











Figure 8 also highlights the focus of the SWAp on increased budgetary allocations to the 
districts as evidenced by the large variations in centralised procurements and headquarters 
between 1994 and 1998. The underlying reason is that between the period 1994 to 1998 
when the SWAp was still in its infancy, the Zambian government was allocating more monies 
to the districts in order to demonstrate its commitment to the SWAp, particularly increased 
district level funding. This led to reduced allocations for centralised procurements and 
headquarters. However, after 1996 when the CBoH become operational, more allocations 
were made to centralised procurements and headquarters at the expense of major referral 
and specialist hospitals. 
Analysis of CPs budgetary allocations to different levels of the health sector during the SWAp 
era (2005 - 2006) also show that there is a shift towards more district funding as compared to 
the other levels of the Zambian health care delivery system. Whilst it was not possible to 
determine CPs budgetary allocations to the districts before the SWAp, Figure 9 below, 
presents the budgeted figures for 2005 and 2006 which only includes CPs contributions to the 
basket. The indication is that over 70% of the funds from the basket were budgeted for the 
districts while all the other levels were allocated less than 30%. 












• Districts. Level 2 Hospitals D Level 3 Hospitals D Training Institutions. Headquarters 
Data Source: eBoH Basket Reports, 2005 
From the foregoing, it is sufficient to conclude that the budgetary allocations are in line GRZ's 
vision of having more resources at the district level. Apart from GRZ and CPs' basket funds, 
it is worth noting that the districts also receive substantial amounts of money from global 
health initiatives and multilateral/bilateral CPs through disease-specific vertical programmes. 
However, even though government's intention is for districts to receive the bulk of the 
financial resources and that this is indeed indicative of a pro-poor approach, the budgetary 
allocations are not in line with the agreed minimum SWAp guidelines on the distribution of 












result this, the health system fails to provide health care in 
specialist which are supposed to complicated ...."" cases from lower..OT,C. 
The stopgap measure that is employed by most specialist is to increase the 
amount of user fees in to generate more resources to be able to provide some of the 
essential services. this subjects consumers to increased burden in terms of 
financing their health care leading reduced access and impoverishing effects of 
Budget Performance and Timing of disbursements 
Notwithstanding the importance of assessing the budgeted amounts by level of care, it 
is also important to find out if full allocations are disbursed to beneficiary institutions at the 
right time. This is programme managers and other of the 
care system regular predictable funding to be to work well. 
Henceforth, even if one that there is enough money in a which is 
according to budget, the money cannot be used effectively if it is irregularly 
Commitment to Budget 
Table 11 the of GRZ making to the as budgeted 
during the 1999 and 2005. The analysis excludes monies GRZ for 
emoluments, centralised procurements capital as these are not 
disbursed through basket. The show that only 20% of the funds that had 
disbursed to for onward disbursement to districts had the districts in 1999. In 
the MoH had disbursed 88% of the total budgeted basket funds to CBoH but only 19% 
of monies were eventually to the Conversely, 288% and 11 of 
the budgeted amounts had been disbursed to statutory boards (including CBoH 
headquarters) tertiary in 2003, implication of is 
that the CBoH was not making the disbursements in line with the budgets, 
district health which are the main focus of the health SWAp. 
for 
Level of Health Care 
Total Disbursed b 
11: Budgeted Vs Actual to Basket GRZ Funds ($ USD) 
Data Source: CBoH Accounts 1997-2005 
A closer examination of above phenomenon through a revealed that GRZ funding 













On the other it was pointed out that basket funds were being disbursed regularly 
and these funds were to the budget. This that CBoH was 
misappropriating GRZ funds while on the other hand committing itself to disbursing the full 
CPs' basket funding. trend must have been in existence for a considerable period of 
time as the financial specialists for over 4 years prior to GRZ 
funds were usually received in June and December. increasing high expenditure at the 
centre and other related prompted MoH abolish in April 2006. The intention 
at and to reallocate the savings to the periphery. 
The results can be linked to the results in sub-section where it was 
that budgetary allocations were not in line with the MoH guidelines on the 
distribution by of health care. Due to unrealistic budgetary allocations, it 
must been difficult for CBoH to effectively monies according to the budget. As 
that less was being disbursed to the districts in order to commit 
to hospitals other that were under budgeted. confirms and 
Musumali's (1999) observation that focus on one level of the health system could actually 
to inefficient resource allocation 
CPs Commitment to Budget 
between 1990 and 2005. Table 12 12 and 13 show CPs' commitment to 
includes all programmes projects that were being run in the health sector while Table 13 
only includes basket funds. The results in 12 show between 1990 and 1992 
(before SWAp) the had actually released close to 90% of budgeted amounts 
83% of the amounts between 1 and 1999 (after the SWAp). Table 13, on 
other hand shows to basket as a budgeted by 
some of major 1999 Apart SIDA that had on UCI"''''C;L 
average released 81% of budgeted amounts, most of the had released more than 
what they had budgeted for between the review period. 
Table 12: Bud eted Vs Actual Releases CPs 
Year Annual Budget Disbursed Disbursed as 
Bud et 
1990 13,000,000.00 105% 
1991 13,400,000.00 89% 
I 
1992 15 700,000.00 





1995 46,063,000 72% 
1996 44,736,000 94% 
1997 64,4-=6-=-3L.::.,0-,-0-,,-0-+-_~-"--"--"--"-=-+______-:-__~ __--j 
1998 53,611,000 57% 
1999 35,902,000 115% 
Total 1995-1999 244,775,000 83% 











Table 13: Disbursements to the JUJ"'''' ... ,'''. as a Percentage of Budgeted - Major CPs 
CP 
1999 2003 
SIDA 66% 92% 






implication of the above is the (all were than 
budgeted amounts after the SWAp than before SWAp (Table 12). However, if one looks 
at the to the basket (Table 13), there were fewer negative variations in budgeted 
amounts against the actual releases. This suggests that that are pooling resources were 
more committed to the health than those running vertical programmes projects. 
Put differently, this reveals that funding to the basket was more predictable than funding for 
vertical programmes. 
In terms regularity of releases to the basket, the CPs had 3 options releasing monies 
quarterly, biannually or annually. CPs like DGIS released their monies biannually 
on a balancing claim arrangement. Asked if the monies were on from 
the coffers to the accounts at MoH, the Specialists based at 
headquarters were affirmative. The same question was posed to Provincial Financial 
Specialists and the was to find out if CPs' basket funds were on from the 
accounts at MoH to beneficiary institutions' Again, the answer was 
positive. It was however, difficult to if the funds were timely from 
beneficiary institutions' (districts, hospitals, etc) accounts to health centres and health posts 
programme implementation. 
S.3.2.3c Basic Health Care Package (BHCP) 
Given a climate of limited resources, one of the most promising measures that are employed 
to identify priority interventions that should be provided at each level of health care at 
least cost is what is known as packaging. During the SWAp implementation period, MoH has 
made significant progress in costing the BHCP and by 2001, costed for primary 
and level amounted to US$11.69 per capita to cover primary level care 
(US$8.33); care (US$1.12); promotive care (US$2.1 
District Health Office costs (US$O.1 However, a evaluation of the available 










US$10.1 per It is also important to note that the cost of the BHCP 
the of tertiary care and top-level referral such as the cost new 
interventions that This the provision of as the 
line treatment for malaria; re-introduction of residual indoor for provision 
extensive voluntary counseling and testing (VCT); of free (including PMTCT); 
prophylaxis for HIV+ patients; and the introduction of new vaccines as DPT+ Hib. 
The abolition of user in all in April 2006 also means that more should 
provided to cover for the revenues. 
From above, it is clear that Zambian sector is still short required amount 
of resources for it to adequately quality care to people. 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
of financial sustainability in a system is in order for one to 
the long term growth of domestic resources over resources and further, the 
stability of a mix of health care financing sources. this section will look the growth of 
resources before and after the adoption of the health SWAp. key caveats will be 
variations and stability in funding. 
5.3.3.1 Growth rate of Health Care Financing from all sources 
10 below shows the main sources of health care financing in Zambia from 1990 to 
2002. Here, GRZ contribution includes all monies that are directed health sector 
through MoH (basket, emoluments, procurements, projects 
other ministries. diagram shows that contribution GRZ to Total Health 
Expenditure (THE) declined from 47% in 1990 (before the SWAp) to 38% in 2002. nine years 
after the adoption of the health SWAp. On the other hand, the contributions by CPs to THE 
had from in 1990 SWAp) to 26% in 2002 (after SWAp) while 
contribution of private employers/others (PVT) had also increased from 2% in 1990 to 15% in 
The contribution by households had been stable around 20% in 1990 as compared to 


























-+- Government _ ZCCM Households ~ CPs ---lIE- Pvt Employers & Others 
Data Sources: MoH (1992); MoH (1994); MoH (1998); MoH NHA Accounts 1998-2003 
The implication of the above is that the private sector and the CPs ventured more into the 
financing of the health sector after the implementation of the SWAp than before. GRZ's 
contribution to THE was, however, the highest between 1990 and 2002 if compared to the 
contributions from the CPs and private employers/others. The added role of CPs could be 
explained by the increased support through the SWAp and other vertical programmes. For 
example, a lot of support is being channelled to Zambia by global health initiatives in an 
attempt to assist Zambia override its huge disease burden due to HIV/AIDS and its 
opportunistic infections. Another possibility is that Zambia is attracting a lot of external 
support from several bilateral, multilateral and global health initiatives due to the good 
systems that the government has put in place through the health SWAp. 
5.3.3.2 GRZ Expenditure on Health as % of Total GRZ Discretionary Budget 
In most instances, examining government's contribution to the health sector by using THE 
blurs the actual amount of resources that the government has at its disposal and what it 
actually spends on health through the public health system. For this reason, the above 
assessment is made in Figure 11. The results show that government had increased its 
expenditure on health from 5.7% in 1991 (before SWAp) to 13.4% (when it started 
contributing resources to the district basket in 1994) but by the end of 2003, GRZ was only 
































1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Year 
Data Sources: MoH (1992); MoH (1994); MoH (1998); MoH NHA Accounts 1998-2003 
The figures throughout the review period are however, below 15%. This means that the 
Zambian government has not adequately prioritized health in accordance with the 
requirements of the Abuja declaration which calls for African governments to spend 15% of 
their discretionary budget on health. This is despite Zambia having a huge disease burden 
mainly due to Malaria, HIV/AIDS and its opportunistic infections. 
To understand the commitmentlsustainability of government financing during the SWAp, one 
has to look at the period 1997-1999 when there were partnership problems in the SWAp 
whereby some CPs had withheld funding to the sector as explained in sub-section 5.2.1 .1. 
The salient feature is that GRZ responded by increasing its expenditure on health from 11 .5% 
in 1997 to 14.4% in 1998 and then 13.9% in 1999. This to some extent shows that GRZ was 
committed to the health sector and that it actually owns the SWAp process. This suggest that 
GRZ can take up the responsibility of funding all programmes in the health sector if the CPs 
were to pull out though the level of sustenance (in terms of the scale and actual programmes 
taken over, level of financing, and longevity) could not be adequately gauged . 
However, with renewed partnerships and commitments by CPs, the government reduced its 
allocation from 14.4% in 1998 to 10% in 2003. The above is a classic case of fungibility in 
that GRZ re-prioritized the allocation of funding to line ministries with MoH which is regarded 
to be donor-congested progressively getting less money as compared to other social sectors. 
CPs have pointed out the inadequate commitment of GRZ to the health sector and one such 
occasion was during the 2004 Annual Consultative Meeting where it was observed that the 
GRZ contribution to the health sector was declining, both in nominal and real terms, as the 
















where the pledges for the corning year are renewed, the meeting decided not to renew the 
pledges for 2005 until the GRZ contribution was slightly increased. 
5.3.3.3 Growth rate of CPs expenditure on the Public Sector 
In this sub-section, an attempt is made to measure the growth rate of CPs financial resources 
passing through the public health system. As earlier stated, the Zambian health SWAp 
utilises 3 financing mechanisms one of which is pooled basket funding in support of districts, 
second level and tertiary hospitals, training institutions, MoH headquarters, Medical Stores 
Limited and the Zambian National Blood Transfusion Service (statutory board). Initially 
basket support only covered districts (from 1993 to 2002) but second level and tertiary 
hospitals and MoH headquarters were included in 2003, and training institutions, Medical 
Stores Limited and the Zambian National Blood Transfusion Service in 2004. In this regard, 
one can assume that the basket was expanded vertically to cover more health 
facilities/institutions and that more monies should have been allocated to the basket. 
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Data Source: eBoH Accounts 1997-2005 
The results in Figure 12 shows instability in the growth of all the funds that were passing 
through the MoH accounts between 1997 and 2005. Firstly, it is shown that the percentage 
of funds passing through the MoH accounts grew by 1 % between 2004 and 2005 as 
compared to 144% between 1997 and 1998. Computation of the average growth of funds 












planning and management of external aid for health in Zambia that done by Mtonga 
(n.d.) showed the in funding between 1990 and 1992 un<~Tr\.·~ the SWAp) 
was on average This means that before the SWAp were reducing their 
assistance to the health and that after the adoption of the SWAp, CPs funding to 
health sector been growing significantly. 
As ""0""""'< funding, was no ""'''''''''T funding ..... at,n.. a 1993 and only logical to 
assume that the change in 1993 over 1992 was 100%. However, between the 
period 1997 2005 the change in funding on 49% as compared 
to change in other funds which was 87% over the same period. means 
that basket funding growing at a rate than other funds 
programmes). A critical look at trend in the growth of basket funding also that the 
change in basket funding in 1998 and 1999 were two times less than changes in other 
funds. 
The above finding can be linked to the partnership problems were experienced between 
1997 and 1999 whereby the CPs were reluctant to submit all their monies to the basket and 
opted to use other funding arrangements through vertical programmes. the resolution 
the partnership problems in the SWAp in 2000, more monies must have been allocated the 
basket as between 1999 2000 was 108% while there was a 10% in 
funding in other On the hand, basket funding only by % in 2003 despite 
inclusion of hospitals MoH as beneficiaries as compared to a 
growth of 65% in 2002 when only the districts were benefiting from the basket. Relatedly, 
basket funding declined by 19% in 2004 even with addition more beneficiaries (Training 
Institutions, Medical Stores Limited and the Zambian National Blood Transfusion Service). A 
re-Iook at the in other funds in 2003 and 2004, shows that increments of 211 and 
115%, respectively, were recorded as a result of coming in of the Fund (GFATM) 
and other global initiatives which don't pool resources. 
Figure 13 below exemplifies the above by including GRZ funding. The Figure also 
shows instability in growth of funds even though funding source was sustained 
throughout review period. In relation to the problems that were experienced 
between 1997 and 1999 and when some C had withdrawn funding, it appears that 
had responded by increasing its allocation to the basket such that growth of basket 
funding in 1998 and 1999 surpassed the in other funds. However, increased 
growth in other funds as a result of global health initiatives is still dominant even jf GRZ 
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Data Source: CBoH Accounts 1997-2005 
The findings above demonstrate that a strong partnership is one of the key requisites of a 
successful SWAp. Further, supporting a set of common activities as envisioned through the 
SWAp can increase sustainability in programme funding owing to the fact that GRZ did take 
up the task of funding the programmes when the CPs reduced their support. The other issue 
is that funding to the basket has not increased despite the vertical expansion of the basket 
implying that pure re-shifting within the same cake is what has transpired. On the other hand, 
funding for programmes outside the basket continue growing far beyond that which goes to 
the basket implying that more and more programmes that are financially unsustainable are 
being funded. Some of the CPs interviewed that are involved in the funding of these 
programmes actually indicated that they were fully aware that the programmes which they 
were managing would not be sustained at the end of their tenure. One of the reasons that 
was mentioned was that the amount of money that was being used by vertical programmes 
was too enormous for GRZ and other pooling CPs to mobilise when the programmes ended. 
The other reason was that GRZ was unaware of the programmes and systems that were 
being implemented on the ground. 
5.3.3-4 Exit Strategy and short-term Sustainabi/ity 
The examination of the growth of funding above leads us to another important issue within 
the context of a SWAp. While it is imperative to examine the growth of resources over time, 
the quest for money should not overshadow critical policy decisions about how CPs should 
exit the health sector and availability of short-term mechanisms that could mitigate sudden 











In line with of the MoU, a CP that wishes to pullout of the health sector due 
to the any other reason is required to give 30 days written notice 
MoH and other in SWAp. This includes a de-briefing and preparation an exit 
strategy. In funds committed and deposited in the basket accounts should not be 
claimed This agreement ensures short-term sustain ability in funding of 
programmes it that agreement is adhered in the Zambian health SWAp. 
For DAN I DA which was one of the pioneers the Zambian health SWAp 
of its intention to exit health sector in December 2005 by de-briefing all 
members in health SWAp. DANIDA highlighted their main reasons to the health 
as completion of support their Health Programme Support (HSPS) 
of Harmonization in (HIP) informed, the CPs in 
the SWAp were willing to take up the funding of that DANIDA been funding 
through the 
other feature of Zambian SWAp is a six months buffer that takes care of short-
term variations in funding might due withdrawal of support. The buffer had 
been working well and it was disclosed by an official from MoH that by mid 2004, the money 
in the buffer actually grew to an extent whereby sudden shocks in funding for a period of nine 
months could be taken care of. However, buffer is not long-standing and cannot 
care of long term in funding. In addition, it also overlooks sudden but drastic changes 
in funding as the fluctuations in international exchange For example, an 
unanticipated 40% appreciation of the Zambian Kwacha against all major currencies in 
October 2005 led a drastic loss in funding to an extent whereby money from the buffer was 
depleted by 50%. This is close to $3 million was (since October 2005) to 
maintain the same Kwacha before disbursement were made to beneficiary 
institutions (observation January 2006 policy March 2006, MoH had 
predicted that there would a deficit $7 million in basket and that more monies had to 
be mobilised if the full March disbursement to basket beneficiaries was to sent. 
5.3.4 EQUITY OF ACCESS 
This section looks the contribution of the health SWAp to improving geographical access to 
health care resources. Focus was narrowed down to the supply side vis-a-vis the provision of 
more opportunities for rural areas so as geographical (urban/rural) equity. The 
indicators that were looked at include the use of resource allocation formulae, 
to Staff distribution of health Fully Immunisation Coverage and 












1 Use of needs-based Resource Allocation Formulae 
According to the draft health care financing policy (Ministry of Health, up until 2004 
resource allocation formulae were used to allocate resources to and these 
mainly applied district populations weighted for population density and the presence of a 
""e>I~r\r\r1 or third With time, more were added account for cost 
nrl"'1,ne>lne>c,"" to certain proximity to a bank a fuel service 
Despite the numerous adjustments. however, all the district resource allocation 
formulae that were did not adequately the equity and need. 
Specifically, the resource allocation criteria were criticised for not being enough to 
the varying of deprivation and vulnerability. the utilisation inputs such as 
human resources, number of health and disease burden. 
In view of the a Resource Allocation Committee (RAC) was as a 
committee of the coordination (specifically Financing 
committee) in 2002 to spearhead the development of objective for allocating 
resources for recurrent costs to districts, and third level The work of the 
committee culminated into the development application of a new resource allocation 
criterion for the in 2004. The new formula took into consideration 3 data sets (Living 
Conditions Monitoring 1998, of Housing of 2000) 
from which a Material Deprivation (MOl) that the 
poverty situation, burden and the population was 
The RAC only as far as developing a formula for the and as a result, 
resource allocation formula for districts is the only objectively resource allocation 
formula and all levels still use formulae. For second and third 
level population are as 
criteria for resources. For training institutions, the of graduates 
by each institution during the previous is used. 
However, even with the application of new resource allocation formula for the 
(from the centre to the districts), are no allocation within the 
the resources within districts is still on 
guidelines at MoH which specify proportions of resources to 
spent at office, district hospital, health and healthro.r">Trc,<:' 
implication of this is that although SWAp has encouraged an objective re-distribution 
resources from the centre to the the resources not been satisfactorily 
towards indigent and vulnerable groups at community Further, there are no 
formulae the centre to other meaning that resource allocation still a 











5.3.4.2 Population to Staff Ratio as an indicator of Equity ofAccess 
Table 14 below complements the arguments on inadequate human resources that were 
provided in sub-section 5.3.2.2. The Table shows the changes in core human resources 
engaged through the public health system between 1991 and 2005. The interpretation is that 
the population per staff ratio only reduced for Environmental Health Technicians (88%) and 
Paramedical Staff (42%) between 1991 (pre-SWAp) and 2005 (post-SWAp). On the other 
hand, the ratio increased by 58% for Clinical Officers; 36% for Nurses; 34% for Midwives; 31 % 
for Pharmacists/Pharmacy Technicians; 9% for Laboratory Staff; and 5% for Doctors. Between 
the two periods, the staffing levels were also above the WHO recommended ratios for Doctors, 
Clinical Officers, Nurses and Midwives. 
Table 14: Changes in Staffing Core Human Resources 1991 and 2005 


















Doctors 508 646 15,817 16,652 5,000 
Paramedical 
Staff 




90 92 89,281 116,926 
Environmental 
Health Tech. 
68 750 118,166 14,343 
Clinical Officers 1,372 1,161 5,857 9,265 2,700 
Nurses 6,335 6,244 1,268 1,723 700 
Midwives 2,281 2,273 3,523 4,733 2,000 
Laboratory Staff 339 417 23,703 25,797 
TOTAL 11,230 12,128 
Data Sources: Ministry of Health (1992); Ministry of Health (2005c) 
The implication of the above is that in 2005, there was one doctor for every 16,652 Zambian 
citizens and this is more than three times the WHO recommended workload. For clinical 
officers, nurses and midwives, the ratios were 3.4, 2.5 and 2.4 times more than the WHO 
recommended workloads, respectively. This suggests that Zambia has less than a third of 
the required Doctors and clinical officers. For nurses and midwives, Zambia has less than 
half of the required numbers. 
A critical analysis of the imbalance in staffing between rural and urban areas actually reveals 
that the situation is worse in rural area. The capital city Lusaka and the Copperbelt province 
had moderately high staffing levels and therefore, the national average was actually masking 
the deplorable situation in rural areas. The average population per doctor rises to 36,712 
against a target of 5,000 if Lusaka and the Copperbelt provinces are removed . This is 7.2 












It is clear from the that Zambia's current levels cannot guarantee quality health 
delivery that the adoption of the SWAp has done nothing to address the 
situation in fact, the situation has actually worsened. At the moment there are more core 
health workers in areas as opposed to rural areas where the people who need 
more health due to high poverty levels and greater of reside. As 
a matter of fact, interviewees pointed out that the lack of support for human resources 
was one the major shortcomings of Zambian health SWAp. argument is that 
the adoption of the SWAp, minimal for human resources has been provided 
the increased workload due to HIV/AI pandemic. Thus, and QVT£>rn 
are still rampant to an inequitable distribution human resources. 
5.3.4.3 Supply/distribution of health facilities as an indicator of improved access 
In order to improve the physical to facilities, especially in rural areas, the 
findings the government policy of providing health through 
the rehabilitation construction of health health there were 
796 government owned health centres in 1990 (Ministry of Health, 1 the number health 
centres by 32% to 1,052 in 2002 (Central Board of 2003). The MoH further 
'n ..... ',..,"'·ro,-, that 88% of the new constructions (137 new facilities) were built in rural areas 
(Ministry of Health, 2003). On CPs it was established that only 10% the annual 
basket was C81JDEla to be by districts for rehabilitation and expansion of existing 
infrastructure. 
The indication was that more money was provided for operational 
through SWAp pool and vertical programmes than for capital development. this effect, 
were interviewed indicated that the SWAp seriously de-capitalised the 
health system by focusing more on recurrent operational costs than on development. 
This is illustrated in 5.9. 
Box 5.9: Key Informant on Capital Development 
"Issues of equity have to more with capital people work is we 
transform money If a district has more facilities we have to it more money 
for operational costs as compared to the same type of district with fewer We 
to give district with fewer money capital development. is why the 
fund was initiated in to develop these districts. But there is a human resources crisis 
people won't go even if we build more facilities. you need to distinguish 
between equity efficiency. Given inadequate amount resources the disposal of • 
the desire is to incline more efficiency. But you need a 
between efficiency (providing more money for operational costs) and equity (capital 












above suggests that to improve geographical access to first r"n ...t<:>,f't 
health is still not fully realised. such, lack physical proximity to health 
still one of the major hindrances to health in Zambia. A recent 
survey by the Statistical (2004) showed that only were 
living within a of 5 km to a health facility 15). situation in rural areas 
was graver in urban areas in only 54% of the households were within 
proximity as compared to 99% in urban areas. This though the 
government built more health centres in the areas during SWAp implementation 
the to facilities in rural areas not have significantly 
Regrettably, there was no data as to what the situation was before Even so, 
according to World Health Organisation, all individuals reside within 5Km of a 
health facility. 
Table Percent Distribution of Households by Proximity to Health 
2002-2003 
Residence 0-5Km 6-15 Km 16+ Km Not 
Stated 




69 22 /j 0 100 2,005,677 
Rural 54 34 12 1 1,329,702 
Urban 99 1 a a Oi 675,975 
Source: Central Statistical Office, 2004 
It appeared that all stakeholders in the SWAp recognized there was minimal 
support for capital development of which a policy decision was passed during the August 
2004 policy committee to operationalise a capital development fund for 
then, US$ 200,000 per month was being for development and by 
March 2006 US$ 2,800,000 had At the of the the money was still 
lying idle as MoH had not come up with a capital development plan. 
Health Status' of Children as an indicator of improved access 
initiation of an response through vaccination is a widely public 
strategy the of infectious diseases (Central Statistical 
Office, 2004). The Zambian interpretation a fully immunised child is a child aged 
the age one should one dose of three of DPT polio 
and one of measles vaccine (ibid). Figure 14 shows the 
fully children has been going up and that in 2000 and 2001 
coverage was 86% coverage but the figure dropped to 80% in 2004. Whereas the figures 
the SWAp were below the national of 80% the figures the 
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Data Sources: Ministry of Health, 1992; CBoH HMIS Indicators 1996-2005 
Though it is difficult to draw a line on whether its purely SWAp and its benefits or the 
increased earmarked funding from vertical programmes such as GAVI/UNICEF, the 
interviewees specifically pointed out that the improvement can be attributed to the SWAp 
which had developed capacity at district level for micro-planning. One of the respondents 
(Bilateral CP) made reference to a Consultant that had been engaged to look at the transport 
management system in the health sector in 2003 and who had indicated that for 20 years that 
she had been working closely for districts across the African continent, the capacity of district 
planning that she had seen in Zambia was the best that she had ever come across. Under 
the SWAp, it had also been possible to improve the provision of routine immunisation in the 
facilities and this includes the procurement of more fridges and repairing of faulty equipment, 
capacity building for cold chain technicians and review of guidelines on the Expanded 
Programme on Immunisation (EPI). 
From the foregoing, it is acceptable to indicate that fully immunisation coverage had improved 
during the SWAp implementation period due to new systems and transport (procurement of 
motor bikes and eight-six (86) 4X4 vehicles district-wide for utility and outreach) services that 
have been provided. In terms of staff motivation, interviewees pointed out that a good 
package of incentives to health workers such as field allowances was in place and that this 
motivated health workers to work harder. However, the synergy of the SWAp with other 
vertical programmes cannot be underestimated. For example, routine immunization services 
are complemented by mass immunization campaigns and resources are drawn from a range 
of vertical programmes. This to some extent suggests that the SWAp works more effectively 
when there is some level of verticalisation i.e. synergy with vertical programmes. However, 
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Data Source: CBoH HMIS Indicators 1996-2005 
In order to find out if there has been geographical equity of access, a re-Iook at the national 
immunisation coverage levels by province was made. The revelation was that in essence, 
the national figure was blanketing differences in the immunisation coverage in respective 
provinces. Figure 15 above unmasks this. The results shows that rural provinces such as 
Eastern, Luapula, Northwestern and Western had been recording immunisation coverage 
levels of less than the targeted 80% between 2002 and 2004. This is in contrast to urban 
provinces such as Central, Copperbelt, Lusaka and Southern provinces which had coverage 
levels of more than 80% throughout the period 2001 and 2004. The problem of low 
immunisation coverage in rural provinces was explored and the reasons that were given were 
lack of access to health facilities due to distances and the non-availability of vaccines. 
Notwithstanding the effect of distance on access, the later seems to have been the case as 
several interviewees pointed to this fact. This implies that the SWAp had not really 
contributed to the correction of geographical (urban/rural) in the targeting of resources to rural 
areas towards the attainment of universal fully immunised children . 
5.3.4.5 Health Status' of Women as an indicator of improved access 
Through the SWAp and other vertical programmes, considerable attention has been given to 
reproductive health (RH) programmes. This includes erection of maternity wings in several 
provinces, establishment of centres to facilitate safe blood transfusion in all provinces and 
extension of 58 health centres to include maternal health services in Eastern, Lusaka and 
Copperbelt Provinces. A recent study by Dunlop et al (2005) that looked at the resource 












mechanisms also indicated that partial tracking of specific RH vertical programmes' 
expenditures for seven (7) CPs amounted to US$ 3 million to US$ 5 million per year (0.1 % of 
the share of the GOP going to health). On the other hand, an analysis of the flow of 
resources through the SWAp (basket funding) showed that 16-36% of all the essential drugs 
were for RH just as 79% of the drugs in the drug kits were RH related . It was also 
established that 34-50% of all the services that are provided at district level were RH related. 
Given the above interventions through the SWAp and other vertical programmes, the 
investments seem to have slightly paid off as the national antenatal coverage has been 
relatively high (94% on average) during the period 2002 to 2004. A review of the number of 
institutional, traditional and supervised deliveries between 2002 and 2004 (Table 16) also 
showed that the figures had been increasing steadily. The results show that the number of 
institutional deliveries at national level had increased slightly from 35.3% in 2002 to 43% in 
2004. However, if a comparison is made to baseline data (before the SWAp), there is really 
nothing much to talk about. This is because in 1992, the number of institutional deliveries 
was estimated at 50.7% (Central Statistical Office, 1993) as compared to 43% in 2004 (after 
the SWAp). 
Table 16: Percentage of Institutional (/nst.), Trained Traditional Birth Attendants 

(tTBAs) and Supervised Deliveries (incl. tTBA): Zambia 2002-2004 

Province Institutional Inst.) tTBAs Supervised (inst. & tTBAs) 
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Central 22 31 39 9 9 20 31 40 59 
Copperbelt 54 69 56 8 12 11 62 81 67 
Lusaka 49 47 53 1 1 2 50 48 56 
Southern 31 33 37 18 21 26 49 54 63 
Eastern 26 32 38 17 21 21 47 53 59 
Luapula 30 32 32 21 21 23 51 53 56 
Northern 28 30 31 16 21 26 44 53 57 
North Western 40 45 47 18 21 22 58 66 69 
Western 38 32 48 12 15 18 50 47 66 
Zambia 35.3 39 43 13.3 15.8 18 49.1 55 61 
Source: Central Board of Health, 2005 
In terms of urban/rural differentials for institutional deliveries, in 2002, only two out of the four 
urban provinces (Copperbelt and Lusaka) ranked first and second while Southern was fifth 
out of all the nine provinces and Central province the worst out of all the nine provinces. In 
2004, the situation still remained the same for Copperbelt and Lusaka while Central province 
improved to claim the fifth position with the situation in Southern province deteriorating from 
fifth to seventh. On the other hand, only Western and Northwestern provinces were doing 












of the finding is that the not notable contributions to 
geographical inequities among women. is were 
more institutional deliveries in urban provinces in to the rural 
some of the urban were also under 
during the SWAp implementation period seems to be inclined the 
of more trained Birth Attendants (tTBAs) to ease the human resources 
,.,rT<,nn of 
(Ministry Health, 1 
1996-2005). It is not that the t'"\o.cl"ont"",... ..... of deliveries by 
from 9.4% in 1992 (Central -..:t""t,C'l",,<> Office, 1993) 18% in 2004 (CBoH HMIS 
1996-2005). 
In a nutshell, contrary to that a SWAp not pay attention to priority health 
interventions, it appears massive investments through the SWAp and vertical 
programmes had to RH activities in even though been no 
meaningful improvement in maternal health. of a SWAp paying to 
priority health interventions might not hold in of the ,""","",""",".", ardently 
indicated that most of the priority public health ::>1:::0::>1:::::> such as Malaria, HIVIAIDS, Child 
Health and RH were receiving a lot of support from SWAp as well as other global health 
initiatives such as GFATM, UNFPA, GAVI, etc. 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
A analysis of the individual o'...........n, ..nC' the SWAp 
contribution to of health were provided in preceding 
Firstly, I the content and scope of the Zambian health SWAp and 
secondly, how the implementation each of the individual elements of a SWAp fostered 
working relationships and strengthened mechanisms for aid management. In terms of 
I found out that the five core of a SWAp were in the Zambian 
SWAp with on the degree of depth towards the implementation of each of 
individual element the level of and ownership. 
in evaluating the contribution the health SWAp as a whole to improved c-a'"llIr'o delivery, I 
at the impact of SWAp on accountability for finances and efficient 
allocation and use of resources, financial sustainability and promotion of geographical equity 
access to health care resources. The major were that the SWAp had significantly 
contributed to improved financial management and accountability but this was not the case in 
area of procurement accountability for Further, the SWAp mechanism 











technical and allocative efficiencies. Transaction costs were still high; were a number of 
using separate systems; the productivity district hospitals was below par; and the 
distribution of resources among competing users was sub-optimal both in of 
budgeting and execution. 
Instabilities in the growth of funds from all sources were and that basket funds were 
growing at a slower rate funding vertical Coupled with this was GRZ's 
inability to meet for funding the sector. However, it that 
implementation of the SWAp played a role in promoting equity in allocation of 
resources to districts through the use of a resource allocation formula but that 
formulae had to developed for the other levels. Lastly, it was noted that the SWAp had 
made minimal or no contributions in terms of correcting geographical inequities (urban/rural) 
in the targeting of resources towards the attainment of universal fully immunised children and 
institutional deliveries among women. Contextual/underlying that the 
attainment of geographical of access include the of human resources, of 
physical proximity health facilities, and shortage of vaccines for child immunisation to 












CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This provides concluding policy recommendations areas 
for future The conclusions covers all the thematic areas that the study intended 
to as well as other emerging Realising that implementation a 
health SWAp still remains a challenge to the government, a comprehensive list of 
policy recommendations have been suggested on study findings conclusions. 
The is to allow MoH through the SWAp coordination unit to on what implement, 
through prioritisation in the interim to long term although suggested priorities are presented. 
The study unveiled certain areas requiring future which are also presented in 
this chapter. 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1.1 Content and Scope of Health SWAp 
The Zambian health SWAp can regarded as a full SWAp whose implementation has 
developed gradually and consultatively. whole approach tries to maximise partnerships 
between and in the use national systems as much as possible. In terms of 
breadth, it was apparent from analysis of the results that all the five core elements of a 
SWAp were present in the Zambian health SWAp. An evaluation of individual elements of 
health SWAp, however, that varying degrees of successes and failures have 
been when it comes to the implementation of of individual of 
SWAp. Some the areas not much had achieved include the implementation 
a budget and use of implementation mechanisms procedures. 
Further, three (3) financing mechanisms were in existence most of which were not aligned to 
the budget. In addition, some of the vertical programmes were not in support of the 
save pooled which only a fraction of activities contained in NHSP. 
Further, there are no synergies in the financing and procurement of drugs making it difficult to 
procure drugs efficiently. 
Policy Recommendation 
III 	 There should continued strengthening of shared roc:es!;es and 
implementing and managing the strategy and work programme. This 
development of a of conduct refinement of the SWAp coordination 












III 	 It is vital that MoH immediately works out modalities aligning all forms of financing 
to the NHSP and in order to more efficient in provision services. 
includes the creation of synergies in the of and 
through the operationalisation of the proposed Drug Supply Fund. 
6.1.2 Ownership 
Evidence had that Zambian health SWAp was narrow in terms of 
stakeholder and consumer involvement as as the of programmes/activities that 
were being supported. From the stakeholders' perspective, Zambian health 
SWAp is sector narrow towards the public sector also within the public itself to an 
extent whereby only equate it to pooled funding and as a limited approach to 
increasing the administrative capacity of the districts. so, the SWAp appeared to have 
built on decentralisation and it adequately 	 decentralisation 
Though non-pooling CPs satisfactorily participate in SWAp coordination meetings, their 
voice was found to influential as compared to pooling CPs. In this regard, pooling 
were as to MoH the non-pooling CPs. Further, pooling CPs were to 
a greater extent more committed to the SWAp and development of health 
as a whole than the non-pooling CPs. 
Concerning government ownership of the SWAp process, it was apparent that though it 
provides in the SWAp it's not completely in control as it doesn't fully 
sanction all the key are heavily involved in making mainly in 
interest making sure that are met but in order to meet 
mandate of missions. 
Policy Recommendations 
III 	 Government should strive to pull all stakeholders on board and should show 
ownership by firm when it comes to making major policy decisions. entails 
gaining the confidence of stakeholders in the health through wider 
consultation and consensus building. 
II structures through which the SWAp at community levels 
should be strengthened so consumers of health can have a on the 
quality health services provided. can be done through routine consumer 
based quality assurance surveys. 
II range activities supported by the SWAp should increased in order 












6.1 Transparency and Accountability 
The adoption of the SWAp has a large contributed improved financial 
management and accountability even though more to be done in the area 
transparency and accountability in procurement. The other was accountability 
performance which was found to be lacking. health system as a whole was not 
performance oriented were modest incentives within system for to 
actually the 
Policy Recommendations 
III 	 Notwithstanding the improvements in financial management accountability, audit 
~\/(~tl'>lm~ need to strengthened so that they do not only compliance to 
financial management procedures but the of risk management and 
governance processes. As such, non-financial audits including value money, 
and audits also be 
II is a need to further strengthen the capacity the various procurement units 
and tender committees at levels of health care includes 
training of putting in good 




.. improve the performance the health sector, there is a great need to put in place 
a performance management system that would make it possible to C1\,A.,UUI for 
performance with a focus on delivery. starting would to 
priorities on what should achieved, timeframes and performance incentives to 
rewarded. establishment of a performance based incentive system would help in 
standards for work, compliance to work programmes getting away from 
reporting for the of reporting to reporting for sake of proving performance. 
6.1 Transaction (Administrative Efficiency) 
The SWAp had not much in improving administrative efficiency as transaction costs 
were found to very high owing to the number of and their 
and the number of CPs using separate systems. Instead moving towards harmonised 
the number of global, multilateral and projects that mainly 
cover HIV/AIDS not a public health interventions. 
Policy Recommendations 
II 	 MoH and should streamline the number SWAp meetings especially 
the monthly policy meetings which should held quarterly. With to the 












fortnightly. It is assumed with fewer there will be more in 
meetings that MoH officials will be allowed more to do their work. 
III 	 Related to the above, CPs separate should be from doing 
so by engaging them more in the SWAp consultative and change 
management processes harmonised support. 
6.1.5 Technical 
It was established that the SWAp as a had not done much in improving 
technical efficiency due to lack of for human resources and drugs. Specifically, the 
productivity of hospitals not been optimized while the health daily client 
contact were up. 
Policy Recommendations 
III 	 Human resources being a key requirement for delivery, more support should 
be provided through the SWAp to human resources in the form of performance based 
financial and staff housing, panels, 
transport existing retention Cf'rlOn'lOC extended to 
all health in hard to areas. This for other like drugs 
which are enormously under funded. 
6.1.6 Allocative Efficiency 
During the SWAp, distribution resources users was found to 
sub-optimal in of budgeting execution. In the GRZ was found 
be unrealistic as SWAp guidelines on resource allocation by level of care were not 
being followed that there was an inclination the allocation of more money to 
districts at of other especially '-'.C{'nrlfl tertiary hospitals. On the other 
hand, a critical at the execution budget actual from 
didn't match estimates and rOf',:>I,",! of the was unpredictable. The CPs on 
the other hand were performing expectation and in instances, disbursement were 
more than the budgeted amounts. Further, there were few negative variations in budgeted 
amounts against actual basket funds in comparison to vertical programmes. 
suggests CPs were more to health sector than those running 
vertical and projects. 
On the other hand, it was established priority resource was in 
with the of the Basic Health Package (BHCP) though the amount of resources 












III 	 MoH and should revise budgeting process by appropriately funding 
secondary and tertiary of care delivery in accordance with the 
set guidelines if quality health care is to provided. 
III 	 In to improvements in service delivery, national should 
be reinforced so that is regular and predictable funding. includes making 
close follow up as to when funds are disbursed from the Ministry Finance to MoH 
that the rightful amounts money are on time from MoH to beneficiary 
institutions. 
III should provide adequate resources to cover all the components of BHCP 
considering that provision basic and interventions through the BHCP 
would impact more on the poor. 
6.1.7 Financial Sustainability 
The private and CPs were found to have more into financing of the 
health sector during the SWAp implementation period than Funding from GRZ was 
found to not in accordance with requirements of Abuja Declaration 
which calls for African governments to spend 15% of their discretionary budget on health. 
GRZ, however, did adequately take up the responsibility of funding the health sector in times 
of partnership difficulties signifying that supporting a set common activities as envisioned 
through SWAp can increase sustainability in programme funding. However, with renewed 
partnerships and commitments by funding from the GRZ was found to be fungible. MoH 
was generally regarded by GRZ to donor-congested and over the last few years it had 
getting progressively money from as to social cOt'fr,,'c 
was instability in growth of funds from all sources even though funding source 
was sustained throughout the review period. However, it was found that before the SWAp the 
CPs (all sources) were reducing their to the health sector and that after the 
adoption the funding to been growing significantly. 
Nonetheless, pooled basket funding was found to growing a slower rate than funds for 
vertical programmes and projects despite vertical expansion of the The striking 
observation was that funding to the basket had not really despite the vertical 
expansion of the The continued growth of funding for vertical programmes meant 
more and more financially unsustainable were being funded. 
A very good meant to operations in the sector by way of a six-month 












particular, it was discovered that the buffer couldn't take care of sudden but drastic changes 
in funding resulting from international exchange fluctuations. 
Policy Recommendations 
II 	 GRZ should ensure that resource allocation matches agreed policies regional 
like the Abuja Declaration calls African governments to spend 
1 of their discretionary budget on health. funding would go a long 
way in improving financial sustainability and towards the attainment Millennium 
Development 
II 	 Much more to done in resource mobilisation, introduction of viable 
community and/or social health insurance schemes, if health care is to be 
provided to all. Given the abolition user fees at primary health care level in April 
2006, importance of coming up with alternative health care financing mechanisms 
that can cover the revenue from user fees cannot be overemphasised. 
II 	 It is reiterated that MoH should align all funding sources to the and NHSP in 
order to stabilize the mix of funding from all sources. 
III 	 MoH should ensure SWAp monies are protected against drastic foreign exchange 
fluctuations by tying the funds to a financial market through forward contracts and 
options. This is very most monies are provided in dollars 
in to avert of MoH should against risk by committing 
itself to a future transaction through a forward contract. In the case of an option, MoH 
would have right (but not the obligation) to buy/sell foreign currency at a 
price in future. 
6.1.8 Equity of Access 
The SWAp has notable contributions to promoting equity in the of resources 
through use of a needs-based resource allocation formula for the distribution of resources 
from the centre to the districts. However, lack of resource allocation criteria within 
districts still a challenge in the allocation of resources in the Zambian Health SWAp. It 
was noted the SWAp had corrected geographical distribution of human 
resources as more health workers were in urban areas as opposed to rural areas. This has 
implications on the quality services for provided in rural areas. 
It was established that physical proximity to health facilities, especially in rural areas, was still 
a problem despite GRZ's commitment to providing basic through the 
and construction more health centres health in the rural areas. 












by focusing more on recurrent operational costs on capital development. In 
addition, geographical equity of access to basic health care <::ll"n,">nn children the fully 
immunisation coverage had not improved during the SWAp implementation This is 
evidenced from rural such as Northwestern and Western which 
had low immunisation coverage partially due to lack of access to health facilities owing 
to and/or non-availability of vaccines. 
Through the SWAp and vertical programmes, considerable attention had paid to 
reproductive health (RH) programmes and results showed that the number of institutional 
at national level has started improving in the last 3 years prior to the research. 
However, national before the SWAp were better meaning that nothing 
much has achieved during the SWAp era. It was leant that geographical inequities 
in institutional had not been addressed since the urban provinces were generally 
doing rural The underlying reasons for the in institutional 
deliveries be due inadequate human resources midwives) though 
problem was partially being addressed through the training of more tTBAs during the SWAp 
implementation ",or',,·,(1 
Policy He.r:ot:nm 
III It is resource allocation within districts 
should developed so that the of investment in are 
equitably to areas of r"·c,,,t,.-.,,,t 
III 	 MoH should ensure that there is a coordinated effort of 
health sector through SWAp if physical proximity to facilities is to be 
reduced. starting point would the development of a capital development plan 
should issues related to health facilities, housing, transport and 
communication systems. capital development plan should also be in line with 
human resource recruitment and as envisioned in Human 
for Health plan 2006-2010. In the interim, should tackle the 
problem of lengthy to facilities through improved outreach 
programmes and transport through the of more motor 
III 	 MoH should strengthen the Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI), 
management common childhood as well as put in comprehensive 
maternal health services including Focused Antenatal (FAC) and family planning 
A rapid programme for training of more midwives should be put in place 












6.1 Emerging/overarching Issues 
Contrary to that a SWAp pay attention to priority health interventions, it 
that to RH activities in Zambia even 
had no meaningful health. The same can be 
for other priority public as Malaria, HIV/AIDS TB which were 
receiving a lot of support from the SWAp as well as global It was also 
noted that the Zambian Health appeared to be working well with vertical 
SUMMARY OF KEY AREAS AND PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS 
17 below are some of the areas and priority that 
MoH should immediately to in to improve the to 
health It should noted the feasibility of recommendations 
extra financial resources from both the government CPs, further harmonization 
and alignment aid and improvement management systems. 
Table 17: Matrix of Areas Priority Recommendations 
Financing MoH should immediately work out modalities for aligning all financing sources to • 
the NHSP and budget in order to be more efficient in the provision of services. 
This includes the creation of in the financing of drugs and medical 
sup lies throu h the 0 erationalisation of the ro osed Om I Fund 
Mechanisms 
Government should strive to pull all stakeholders on board and should show 
ownershi b bein firm when it comes to makin ma 'or o/ic decisions 
Ownership 
Transparency and MoH should further strengthen audit and procurement systems at all levels of the 
Accountability Zambian health care system 
MoH should put in place a viable performance system that would 
make it ossible to account for 
Administrative MoH should further streamline the number of SWAp 
Policy and Monitoring and Evaluation meetings . Efficiency 
MoH should discourage CPs using systems by engaging them more 
into the SWA consultative rocess 
Allocative MoH should revise its budgeting process and on budget execution in 
Efficienc accordance with the set uidelines 
GRZ should increase its share of allocation to the health sector while at the 
Sustainability 
• Financial 
same time introduce viable alternative health care financing mechanisms such 
as health insurance 
MoH should ensure that monies are drastic foreign 
erformance with a focus on service detive 
Equity of Access 
fluctuations by tying the funds to a financial market through forward 












6.3 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
study was concerned with the assessment of the individual elements of a SWAp 
SWAp mechanism as a whole on the provision of health care in In the course of the 
study, certain issues came to fore that require more research. These are 
highlighted 
III It was that health SWAp was working more effectively there was 
some level of verticalisation synergy of the SWAp with vertical programmes such 
as Reproductive Health. At same global initiatives were to be 
threatening the of SWAp, due to the use of systems and 
huge amount of monies being though the Zambian health In 
detailed research is needed to evaluate impact of global health initiatives 
on 	 the health system so as to solicit ways of integrating and strengthening the 
synergies towards a sustainable health care delivery 
III 	 It was understood that the shift from SWAp to Direct Budget Support (DBS) is a 
natural progression that demonstrates donor confidence in the use national 
systems. More is needed on potential gains and that will 
incurred by moving to DBS, ideally government's of preparedness 
particularly if the health sector was to transit. 
III A benefit incidence analysis through the use of asset indices and selection one key 
public health intervention, say HIV/AIDS or Malaria, has to be done to find out if the 
health SWAp was pro-poor. Results from this make it easy ascertain 
degree to which resource allocation matched agreed policies and impact of the 
SWAp on the poor. 
.. The other area of would to look the interrelationship of SWAp with 
decentralisation the impact of popular participatory 
structures on demand for and access to effective interventions. 
III Lastly, the lack of substantial evidence on health system performance, the other 
research would to do more evaluations of quality of care, user 














AfDB/OECD (2004). African Economic Outlook 200412005. Retrieved online from 
~:...!.!..:===:':"=!..!.!::.J=.!...:::1!..=~=='-L.:.!:=' on 18th March 
Annan J (1999). Health Sector Wide Programme: A Case Study Prepared for flCD 
Network & Policy .... r<>nr"n of CIDA. online from =~==.:...:.== 
Banda J.J (n.d). Change a System Level: The of A paper 
workshop on making the most of the private sector. London: Institute for 
Development. from .!.!..!.:...!.!..:==.:..!= 
D (2004). Alma-Ata Showed The Route Effective For 
Geneva: Bulletin of World Health Organisation 82(9}: 707-708 
Benson-von et al (2000). Wide Approaches: Still on Course of Heading for _-"Uf'Tnr 
Collapse?' of a Training (Zimbabwe), 1 7 November 2000. 
Cited Land T. & Hauck V (2003). 
Bosman (1998). Health Sector I-<U,nr,171 and Tuberculosis Control: The of Zambia. Royal 
Netherlands Association; Hague 
Integrating Vertical Programmes into Wide Approaches: 
2ndLondon: Institute for Health Development. Retrieved on 
K & G (1996). 'Aid Coordination for Health Sector Reform: A Conceptual Framework 
Assessment' Health Policy vol. 38: 1 87 
to the Health 
Sector: A Review'. Social Medicine vol. 45: 
K & Walt G (1997). 'An unruly melange? Coordinating External 
Cassels A (1997). A to Sector-Wide Approaches for Health Development: Concepts, 
Issues and Working Arrangements. World Health Organization; Document No. 
WHO/ARAl97.12 
Cassels A & Janovsky K (1998). 'BeUer Health in Developing Countries: Are Sector-Wide 
Way Future?' Lancet vol. (9142): 1 
of Health (2003). Institutions in Zambia: A listing of Health 
and location for 2002. Central Board of Health. 
Central Board of Health (2005). Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2004: A Presentation 
Selected Indicators on Burden and Delivery. Central Board 
Central Statistical Office (1 Zambia Demographic and Health Survey Retrieved 
www.zamstats.gov.zm on 23rd March 2005 
Central Ministry of & Marco International Inc (1997). Zambia 
Demographic and Health Survey 1996. Calverton, Maryland: Central Statistical Office and Marco 
International Inc. 
of Population and Housing. Central Statistical 
Office: Lusaka - Zambia. 
Central Statistical Office ). 2000 













Central Statistical Office (2004). Living Conditions Monitoring Report 11/ of 200212003. 
Lusaka: Government Printers 
Commission Africa (2005). 'Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for . Cited 
by Kaufmann D (2005). 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1 Summary of Consultations of the Joint Review and 
Appraisal Mission the DANISH support to the Zambian Health Reform 
Unpublished. 
Daura M. & Mulikelela (1998). 'Donor Expenditures 1 - 1998,' in Seshamani V, Mwikisa 
C.N, & Odegaard K (eds), Zambia's Reforms Papers 1995 2000. Department 
of Economics, University of Zambia & Swedish Institute for Health Economics. Printed in Sweden 
KFS AB. pp 43-52 
Department for International Development (2001a). An Overview SWAp Retrieved 
online from 
~~==~~==~~==~ 
Department for International Development (2001 b). Measuring health sector at 
country level. Report a DFID Workshop, July 20/21 2001 organized on behalf of by: DFID 
Institute for Health Sector Retrieved online www.healthsystemsrc.org 
Diamond I, Matthews Z & Stephenson R (2001) Assessing the poor: Towards a pro­
strategy. Health Systems Centre Retrieved 
Dunlop D.W., Siamwiza R., Syacumpi M.M and Derveeuw M (2005). Resource Flows to 
Reproductive Health in through Basket Funding Other Mechanisms. A Study funded 
by and UNFPA. Zambia 
Southern African of Accountants (2004). Guidelines on 
Governance of Parastatal Organisations: An Perspective. A paper prepared for 
by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA). Nairobi: Kenya 
Folscher A (2004). The and Achievements of Reduction 
Strategy Report for DIFD Zambia by Mokoro and Social Development 
UK. 
M (2000). New to Development What can we from 
experience with implementing Sector Wide Approaches? Working 140 Centre for Aid and 
Public Development Institute: UK 
.... ""C>Tar M, Brown A, Norton A & Naschold F (2000a). The Status of Wide 
Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure, Overseas Development Institute: UK 
Foster M, Brown A, Norton A & Conway T (2000b). Sector-Wide Approaches for Health 
Development: A review of experiences. Oversees Development Institute, London, UK. Strategies 
for Cooperation and Partnership, Global Programme on Evidence and Health Policy, World 
Health Organizsation (WHO/GPE/OO.1). Retrieved online from 
Frantz Mpuku H, & Wright J (2004). Supporting the Decentralized Delivery of Health :.... ,,>J,"u·.., 
USAID the District Basket in Zambia. Lusaka: USAID, Zambia 
W & Tang S (2000). "Sector-wide Approaches in Developing Countries: The Aid 












P & Schieber G (2006). Health World 
Washington Retrieved from .:..:...:..'-'-'-'..:...:...:::;..:...:.;:::.='-'-'-'.:.~ 
Gould, J. (1999). 'Assessing Sectoral Aid - a Governance (draft)'. Presentation to 
the Annual Meeting of DAC's Institutional and Development Network, Ottawa, May 
1999. Cited by Land T. & Hauck V 
Government of Republic of (1999). Restructuring of the Ministry 
Health. Management Development Division: 
Government of the Republic of Zambia (2002). Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002 
2004). Ministry Finance & National Planning 
Gwatkin D.R. Bhuiya A & Victoria (2004). 'Making Health Systems More Equitable'. 
vol. 364: 1273-80 
Health Reforms at Work: Experiences with the Sector Wide Approach in Zambia 2004, DVD 
Recording, A Rik Peeperkorn and Roeland Stekelenburg Video, the Hague: Netherlands. 
Hecht, R. M., and Shah (2006). 'Recent Trends and Innovations in Development Assistance for 
Health' in Jamison, , J. G. Breman, R. Measham, G. Alleyne, M. Claeson, B. Evans, 
Jha, A. Mills, and P. Musgrove, ed (2006). Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries, 2nd 
edition. New York: Oxford University 
Rhetoric of Sector-Wide Approaches for Health Development'. 
Me'OIeme vol. 54:1 737 
Hill P.S (2002b). 'Between Intent Achievement in Sector-Wide Approaches; Staking a 
Claim for Reproductive Health'. Reproductive Health Matters: Elsevier Science Ltd. vol. 
10(20}:29-37 
HLSP Institute (2004). IT""r'Ttv"" Development to AID Instruments, 
Recording, Institute, Old London 
Hutton G (2000). Indicators Monitoring and the Sector-Wide Approach. 
A at a Sector-Wide Approach in Conference "Moving from Policy to I-'r~II"TII""'--
Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, November 
Hutton G (2003). Is Sector-Wide Approach more effective implemented through a 
decentralised health system? A Paper presented at the Learning Network on Program-Based 
Approaches meeting in Berlin - (17 -19 November 2003) 
Hutton G & Tanner M (2004). The Sector-Wide Approach: A Blessing for Public Health? Bulletin of 
the World Health Organisation 82 (12): 893-894 
Institute for Health Sector Development (2001 a). Orientation and Training Seminars for Agency 
Sector-Wide Approaches Health in a Changing Environment. Seminar Handbook. Inter-
Agency Group on Sector-wide Approaches Health Development: IHSD- London. 
online from ':":"':';:"=':=;';:::';";:;..;...;;J. 
Health Development (2001 b). Measuring Sector 
A Report of a DFID Workshop, July 20/21 2001 organised on behalf 












Institute for Health (2004). UNICEF at Cross Roads: How to be a in 
Sector-Wide Approaches and Harmonization. A paper for by Institute for 
Health Development; London. online from .:..:...:..;:...:.:...!=== 
Monetary (2006). Zambia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. IMF 
Country Report No. 06/118. IMF: Washington Retrieved online from www.imf.org on 
March 2006 
Izard J & Dugue M (2003). Moving Toward a Sector-Wide in Papua New Guinea: 
Health Development Program Experience. Asian Development Bank. Manila: Philippines. 
h'Qj'rlQ'./Qrl online from -'-'-!..!:...:.!..:.:==.I:l. 
E, Walford V & M (2003). Mapping of Sector-Wide Approaches in Health. 
Institute for Health Development. Conducted for Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency. Retrieved online from .:.:...:..::..:..:...:=== 
Jeppsson (2002). "SWAp dynamics in a decentralized context: Experiences from Uganda". 
Social Science & vol. 55 2053-2060 
Johanson, R (2000). wide for education and in Africa. 
1: Synthesis'. Cited by Institute for Health Sector Development (op. cit, 2001). 
Jones S (1997). Sector Approach: Promise and Pitfall'. Oxford .....n.Clr'u Management. Review 
No.1, vol. 1 
Kalumba K & Musowe V (1996). coordination use donor funding in Zambia. 
Chapter 17 of proceedings of a Seminar on Sustainable Health Financing, Johannesburg, 
South June 1996). Pages: 1 
Kalumba K & Musowe V. (1 Sustainable Partnership for Health. A a 
Swedish conSUltative meeting on Sector Support Programmes. Kafue Gorge, Zambia. 
Unpublished 
Kandimaa A & Mattsson P (2001). Sector Programme Support to the Health ~e(:lOr 
2002-2005: Assessment Memorandum. SIDA 
Kasumba G & Land A (2003). Sector-Wide Approaches and Decentralisation: pulling 
in opposite directions? A Study from Uganda. A Study prepared in the context of a five-
country review on relationship between Sector-Wide Approaches 
coordinated by the European Centre for Development Policy Management Maastricht, The 
Kaufmann D (2005). Myths and Realities of Governance Corruption. Retrieved online from 
www.worldbank.orq/wbi/governance/pdf/ on 13th January 2005 
S & Musumali C (1999). The Role of Management in Visionary'. 
London: Health Policy and Planning; 14(3}: 254-263 
Lake S (2000). Zambia Country Health Briefing Paper. A Paper Produced for the Department 
International Development. Institute for Health Development. Retrieved online from 
www.ihsd.orq 
T. & Hauck V (2003). Building coherence between reforms and decentralisation: Do 
SWAps provide the missing link? Discussion Paper No. 49. European Centre for Development 












Lipsey R.G & Chrystal K.A (1995). An Introduction to Positive Economics Efh Oxford 
University Press. New York: USA 
McPake B & Kutzin J (1997). Methods for Evaluating Health System and the I-"",.,..t"" 
of Reform. Health Economics and Financing Programme, DFID 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2002). Transitional National Development (2002 
- 2005). Lusaka: Government Printers 
Ministry and National Planning (2003). Medium Expenditure Framework 2004 ­
2006. Lusaka, Zambia 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2004a). Poverty Reduction 
(2002 2004). Lusaka: Mipal Printers Limited 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2004b). Medium Expenditure Framework 2005 ­
2007. Lusaka. 
and National Planning (2005). Medium Term Framework 2006 ­
Zambia 
Ministry of Health (1 National Health Policies Ministry of Health. 
Zambia 
Ministry Health (1994). National Health Strategic Plan 1995 - 1998. Lusaka: Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of (1 Independent of Health Reforms: Volume 1 ­
Main Report. Lusaka: Ministry of Health, Zambia 
Ministry of Health (1997b). Independent Review of the Zambian Health Reforms: Volume 2 
Technical Lusaka: Ministry of 
Ministry of Health (1998). National Health Strategic 1998 - 2000. ~ ........... " .... Ministry of 
Zambia 
Ministry of Health (1999). Memorandum of Understanding concerning National Health 
Strategic Lusaka: Ministry of Health, Zambia 
Ministry of Health (2000a). Joint Identification & Formulation Mission: A proposed Health 
support Investment Programme (2001- 2005) Volumes 1 and 2. Unpublished 
Ministry of Health (2000b). National Health Strategic Plan 2001 2005. Lusaka: Ministry of 
Ministry of Health (2001). Joint ........''''"'' (pre) Appraisal Report. Lusaka: Ministry of Health, Zambia. 

Health (2002a). Brief on the Medical Stores Limited Contract. Lusaka: Ministry of 
Unpublished 
Ministry of Health (2002b). Zambia National Health Accounts 1995 - 1998. Lusaka: Ministry of 
Health, Zambia 
Ministry Health (2003). Mid Term Review the National Health 2001 ­











Ministry Health (2004a). Institutional and Organisational Appraisal. Lusaka: Ministry of Health, 
Zambia. Unpublished 
Ministry of .... ",,·".T.... Audit of the Health 2001 
- 2005. Zambia. Unpublished 
Ministry of Health (2004c). Position on the Re-organisation of the Health Lusaka: 
Ministry Health, Zambia. Unpublished 
Ministry Health (2005a). Draft National Care Financing Policy. Lusaka: Ministry of 
Health. Unpublished 
Ministry National Health Plan - 2010. Lusaka: Ministry of 
Health, 
Ministry of Health (2005c). Human Resources for Health Plan 2006 Lusaka: 
Health, Zambia 
Ministry of Health (2005d). Zambia Ministry of Health Procurement Capacity Assessment. 
Lusaka: Ministry of Health, Zambia 
Ministry of Health (2006a). Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2006 - 2008. Lusaka: Ministry 
of Health, Zambia 
Ministry Health (2006b). MoH Annual Action Plan. Ministry 
Mirzoev T (2004). Sector-Wide Approach in the Health .....or'Tn.- of the of Tajikistan: 
and Masters at the University of Leeds. Nuffield 
Institute for Health; University of Leeds - UK 
IIOCIea.aI S et al. (1 issues at local level: 
from selected African C(op.cit, 1999). 
Mooney G.H (1983) 'Equity in Health Confronting the Confusion', Journal of I-N">J"tll 
Health Care vol. 1 (4): 1 84 
Mooney G.H et al (1 ) 'Utilisation as a Measure of 
1-J"I'\fv,,,nu'",, vol. 1 Retrieved on March 
Mtonga B.S (n.d.). _'''''''n''~'£l for Management of v,.... ,-""" Aid for ,......""",.,, Zambia. 
Unpublished 
Musgrove P (2004). Ear-marking could be Beneficial: Cost-Effectiveness is not the only Criterion. 
Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 82(9): 706-707 
Musowe V. (1992). ......"".lInn for Quality Care. Zambia. Unpublished 
Nokkala Marko (2003). Health Programs and Well Being: Ensuring the poor can 
from a Sector-wide Approach. UNUIWIDER, Helsinki: Finland. Retrieved online from 
Policy Management (1997). 'Sector in and 
1999) 
IJ"",-""rc: D & Chao S (1998). The Approach in Health: What is it? Where is it 











Phiri F.V (2003). and the SWAp in the Health Sector in A Paper 
at Network on Approaches (LENPA) in Berlin ­
Germany (17-19 November 
Phiri F.V & Tien M (2004). National Health Accounts 2002: Main ...,n,""l'"u"I'" MD: 
The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt Inc. 
Preker AS, McKee M, Mitchell A & Wilbulpolprasert 
Measham, Alleyne, M. Claeson, D. B. 
Disease Control in Developing 
Press. 
(2006). in Jamison, 
Jha, A Mills, and 
2nd edition. New York: 
, J. Breman, A. 
Musgrove, ed (2006). 
Oxford University 
Rakner L, 
al (eds), Aid and 
). , in Shantayanan D 
World Bank 
pp.533-623 
Rhodes G, Toonen J & Vassall A (2000). Sector Wide Approaches in Health: 
Moving from theory to Practice. Medicus Mundi International Newsletter No 66, Winter 2001. 
Retrieved from 
~~~====~~~~~~= 
Royal Tropical Institute, KIT (2003). Wide Approaches in Retrieved from the KIT 
website on 8th August 2005 
Schieber C, Kress D, & Maier M (2006). in the 21st Century' 
in Jamison, J. Breman, A R. 1\1l"'~<:!rl~ Alleyne, M. B. Evans, 
Mills, and Musgrove, ed (2006). Control Priorities in Developing Countries, 
edition. New Oxford University 
Schleimann Enemark U & Byskov J (2003). Development to the Health A 
Danish . A Framework for Support to the Health Sector in a SWAp Context. Retrieved 
on 2nd from -'-'--'-''-'-'-'-=:.=...::..=.:..:.:...===:..:..=.:..:. 
in Practice. Netherlands 
S & Martfnez J (2001). An (SWAps) in 
they appropriate for aid-dependant Latin American countries? London: DFID Health .-""'''T"",n 
Resource Retrieved from ':":":":"':':"':':"':"=;=..:.:::0..<":::;':"::":":":':=':":::":";::1. 
Seshamani V, Masiye F, Cheelo Mphuka C & Odegaard K (2005). Health Financing In 
Zambia: A Study of the Possible Options for Implementation. Lusaka: UNZAlMinistry of 
Health. Unpublished 
sector SWAps - A Comparative 
and . Health 
Sunman H (2004). Ear-marked Funds and Approaches Can Encourage 
Geneva: Bulletin of the World Health 82(9): 707 
Millennium Development Goals will not be 












Egger 0, Davies P & Mechbal A (2002). Towards 1-<01'1'01'" Stewardship: Concepts & 
Critical Issues. Geneva: and Information for Policy, WHO 
P, Bennett S, A, Pang Bhutta Z, Hyder A, N, Mills A, Evans T (2004). 
'Overcoming health-systems to achieve the Millennium Development Goals'. Lancet 
900-06. 
United Report 
United Nations Development Programme (2005). Millennium Development Goals 
Status Report. 
United Nations Population Fund (2000). Report of Workshop on Sector-Wide 
Approaches (SWAps) New York, 12 - 13 October 2000. Support Division: UN 
New York 
Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (n.d.). Corruption in Health Sector Development 
Assistance and Retrieved online from www.u4.no/themes/health/bugetandoda.cfm 
on 9th December 
Waddington C Ear-Marked Donor 
Developing Countries Will Allocate Their Programmes 
Greatest Health Bulletin of the World Organisation 82(9): 
...,,,,,.,,,,,r forWalford V (1998). uevelODlrno Sector-Wide in th  Health Sector An 
DFID Advisors & Managers'. IHSD: UK. Retrieved from www.ihsd.org/swaps 
Walford V (2003). 'Defining and Evaluating SWAps'. A paper for the Inter-Agency Group on 
SWAps and Development Cooperation. IHSD: UK. Retrieved online from www.ihsd 
Walt G, Pavignani Gilson L & Buse K (1 'Health sector from aid 
to resource management'. Health Planning 14 (3): 207-218 
Walt G, Gilson L & Buse K (1 'Managing external resources: are there 
lessons . Health Policy and Planning 14 (3): 273-284 
World Bank Social Impact of Adjustment Operations: An Operations 
Evaluation n~r"Tm''''nT Report No. 14776' by Nokkala Marko (op. cit, 
Zambia Expenditure and Financial Accountability Review. 
UL-<-r\. Poverty Reduction and Management, African 
World Health Organisation (1996). World Report 1996: Fighting 
of the Director-General, WHO. Retrieved from .:..:...:..:..:..:..:...:;..;..;.;:.:::;.:..;:= 
of Experience from Sector-Wide Approaches in 
Aid and Public (CAPE), 
of the World Health on 
World Health Organization (2000). 2000 World Health Report: Health - Improving 
WHO. Retrieved www.who.org 
World Health Organization (2004). 2004 World Health Report, Health Finding New 











APPENDIX 1- DESCRIPTION OF SWAP COORDINATION MEETINGS 
(A) Minister of Health and Heads of Missions 
is a special held annually during the third of each year and is chaired by 
Minister of Health. All Heads of (both bilateral and multilateral) providing technical 
assistance to the health sector attend this meeting. The of the is two fold: 
" 	 It accords an opportunity to the Heads of M involved in health sector to 
convey to Honourable a joint statement on key policy areas of concern and 
priorities be during the following 
" 	 Conveyance of commitment from the Honourable Minister to on addressing 
identified areas of concern and priorities during the following year. 
MoH/CPs Annual Consultative Meeting 
An Annual Consultative MoH and first week 
every Honourable purpose of 
meeting is as follows: 
" 	 Review action plans, and budgets for the following year submitted by MoH including 
tentative financial commitments from all CPs; 
" 	 Review report from previous year MoH and CBoH and to assess overall 
sector performance; 
.. 	 Review counterpart funds from MoH; 
.. 	 Review from CPs towards the annual action plans/MTEF; and 
.. 	 Consider changes to the multi-year NHSP although not to be substantially 
revised. 
Composition 
- All Directors, Heads of Units, Policy Analysts and senior planners 
=.::::..:....:.-AII Head of Units and Specialists in category one, Provincial Health 
from: 
Chainama Hills Hospital, Zambia National Blood Transfusion Medical Council of 
Zambia, General Nursing Council of Zambia, Medical Stores National 
Council and National Malaria Control Centre 
.:::.:.:..;~:..:..:.!..!.== - Ministry of Finance & National Planning, Ministry of Government and 
Housing, Ministry Community and Services, Cabinet Office 
-,-="-'-=..:..=.:...:..:..:.=..:..=-=..:..====.:...= - Representatives from the Churches Health Association of 
Support Programme 
- Ambassadors, High 























(C) Health Sector Advisory Committee 
Health Sector Advisory Committee meetings are held each year and are presided by the 
Secretary, MoH with full sector-wide including the civil society and private 
first is held at the end of the second of September. 
purpose of the are as follows: 
March Health Sector Advisory Committee Meeting 
• 	 Review progress for quarter three and four for the year and approve 
disbursements for three and four for the current year; 
II Monitor selected number of performance indicators for quarter three and four for the 
previous year; 
II Monitor release of funds quarter three and the previous 
and 
.. 	 Review audit for quarter three and four for the previous 
September Health Sector Advisory Committee Meeting 
• 	 quarter one and two for the current year approve funding for 
.. 	 Monitor selected number of performance indicators for quarter one and two for the current 
year; 
.. 	 Monitor GRZ and Co-operating Partners' .... ,....,.."' .... of funds for one and two for 
current year; and 
• 	 Review audit .."',.,,...,.,,,, quarter one two for the current 
Composition 
All Directors, Units, Chief Policy and senior 
- All Directors, in category one, Provincial Health Directors, 
Provincial Financial Management 
Directors from: University Teaching Hospital, 
Transfusion Medical Council of 
Medical Stores National 
Line Ministries - Ministry of Finance & National Planning, Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing, Ministry of Community Development and Social Cabinet Central 
Office 
",-,-"'-'-'-=-,-='-'-'-'-=c..:.=::.....:::."-,-",===-=",,,",,, - Representatives from the Churches Health Association of 
Support PATH, UPLIFT 
Society. 
- Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Resident First 















(0) MoH/CPs Monthly Policy Meetings 
Policy meetings between MoH and its are held last Thursday of the month (except 
March, and December) and are chaired by the Director of Planning and Development. 
However, the end of quarter, meetings are chaired by the Permanent Secretary, 
MoH. The purpose of the policy meetings are: 
II 	 Review of quarterly Or-I.... ,·"",..,."r- report presented to the Ministry of Finance 
National Planning; 
II Review of action taken and in implementing areas of concern and priority and as 
identified and agreed during the Annual Consultative meeting; 
.. 	 Identify areas concern impede implementation of health services that require policy 
interventions of both MoH and CPs during course of implementing action plans; and 
.. on a course of action to be undertaken to re"",,,/e identified problems . 
Composition 
- Members of the MoH and Senior Management Team 
All and Second '",~r,,·t''' responsible for health, Heads Agencies supporting the 
health sector 
(E) Implementation Review Steering Committee (IRSC) Meetings 
are on Friday week are internal between MoH and 
These meetings discuss and review all technical issues as they relate to sector 
programming delivery CPs are not of the meetings but are 
welcome to sit in as observers. More so, all minutes and agenda of meetings are 
availed to CPs for information purposes. 
(F) Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Committee Meetings 
steering committee was formed in November 2002 and is by the of 
Planning and Development from MoH with and USAID as focal point The M&E 
steering committee membership professionals from MoH, and (DCI, DFID, 
JICA, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO) and meets Wednesday of the to monitor 
implementation of programmes as in the multi-year National Health Plans 
and annual action plans. In addition, committee reviews performance indicators, 
planning and mode of and areas of concern that impede 
implementation of health services. full of the sub-committee is: 
II the of health sector indicators; 
.. 	 Development and coordination of joint implementation mechanisms as well as 
schedules/timeframes conducting reviews, and d;:,~)t::;:';:'1 
II Facilitating health sector performance reporting and dissemination of annual performance 
.. 	 Providing an on data and management; 
II 	 Providing strategic on various data collection and analysis (routine, 
periodic, special surveys/research}. 
The is it works hand-in-hand with all the various 












development of a Performance Framework way 
of Direct Support. 
(G) Capital Fund Technical Working Group 
Capital Fund TWG is chaired by the Director of Planning and Development from MoH with 
JICA and DFID as focal point The reference group is constituted by DANIDA, DA, 
CBoH. The for the TWG are: 
II Suggesting modalities on the resource management and reporting 
for capital fund; 
II Development of an Institutional Development the health Sector. 
II Listing possible 	 constraints in the operationalistion of a 
II Suggesting the estimation of the for formulation of a 
health equipmenUtransport rehabilitation and plan; 
II Producing feedback for ongoing activities under capital fund including an account of 
frames on monitoring and evaluation; and 
II Production of the preventive maintenance policy for capital fund. 
TWG identified areas to encompass work on establishing a Capital fund 
equipment, infrastructure, communication. 
(H) Human Resources Working Group 
Human Resources TWG Tuesday afternoon and is chaired by the of 
Human Resources & Development from MoH with SIDA and USAID as the focal point It 
membership from both and MoH and the group from the D, 
JICA, RNE, UNFPA. WB and WHO. Terms of for the TWG are: 
II Collection and provision of information on the and operationalistion of a Human 
Fund (H 
II possible 	 constraints faced in operationalisation of a 
II Working out the of annual investments for the various 

on the Human Strategic Plan; and 

II Suggesting modalities for resource allocation, management and reporting of the 
(I) Expenditure and Budget Technical Working Group 
TWG is ideally be chaired by the Director - Health Planning & 
from MoH with as the focal point At time of the research, 
of when the met and work achieved thus far. However, the 
for the TWG are:­
II Collect data on financial reporting 

format, and determine its to CPs/MoH on expenditure information; 

.. 	 Scrutinize government financial regulations and their implications on MoH 
meeting and its to the MoU; 
.. 	 Study in depth, health sector documents available that are relevant to the budgeting and 
Expenditure formats as FAMS, NHA, JI I & IFM etc. 
II Development of a joint format; and 
II 	 Provision of on the implications the proposed format, what 











(J) Service Delivery Recurrent Fund (SDRF) TWG 
This TWG is to meet every on Thursdays at 10:00 hours. 
essentially understood to be by the General - CBoH with point 
At time of the there was no indication of the TWG last met work 
achieved it was not clear what Terms of Reference for the TWG are but 
progress of work reported was as follows: 
.. Development of a paper to give of 
operation the TWG; and 
.. Development a conceptual framework indicating the various sources of money into the 
how it will re-allocated to different It was indicated the 
framework provides a rough on how resources will be allocated to the different 
(K) Procurement Technical Working Group 
chairperson for the above TWG is Head of Procurement & Supplies 
DFID as point CPs. other members are drawn from MoH, CBoH, 
JICA, SIDA, UN USAID WB. TWG is active and meets every 
Thursday afternoon. 	 the are: 
.. 	 Collecting and providing an inventory of 

sector. This includes sorting out the procurement 





II FaCilitating formulation a Procurement Plan for the health 
II Listing possible challenges and constraints in operationalistion of a procurement 
plan; 
.. 	 Evaluating tenders all procurement Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) in 
health 
II Making recommendations for the adoption of suitable procurement systems if need to 
use an alternative procurement system 
II Making recommendations over establishment of procurement units as well as the 
strengthening of existing ones. includes building/rehabilitation infrastructure, 
recruitment/capacity building for of and identifying 
eligible for higher thresholds with the National Tender Board; and 













APPENDIX 11- POPULAR PARTICIPATORY STRUCTU 
DHBs serve as the principal management units in the decentralised and they govern the 
affairs of district health through District Health Management Teams (DHMTs). 
responsibility is to ensure that local .... r,,'"\rlT'QC are and addressed, planning for 
the district, bringing on board other key sectors (education, welfare, agriculture, local 
government) and monitoring the of health level one hospitals, Centre 
Committee and Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHC). 
The HCC is composed nominees from the Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHC). The 
health centre and representatives of sectors, participate in the It is with 
supporting the management of health care in catchment area. A major function of the is., 

to improve the accountability of the to the community. It is consulted on the 
and on related to performance the health centre staff. The HCC is and 
monitored by DHBs. 
the Neighbourhood Committee (NHC) on of and 
of adult men women live in area and are in 
a the development of activities in health or related 
sectors. The NHC are supported and strengthened in their monitoring role by the Committee 
the The NHCs can exist at the health post and the health centre level. At the health 












APPENDIX 111- DESCRIPTION OF MoH/CPs POWER RELATIONS IN SWAp 
can be clearly rI,,,,I~, .... ,... which varyingFive of MoH/CPs 
since inception of the health SWAp. 
Firstly, period 1991-1993 can be described as conceptualization of the SWAp 
and decentralisation of authority and responsibility from the centre to During this nor·' ....." 
political commitment, will confidence in the health reforms was high. 
Secondly, period 1993-1 was the era and it 
as work'. A lot of were among them 
constitution/restructuring of institutions; adoption new policies of 
and HMIS); de-linkage of health personnel to ; and new 
partnerships. The introduction pooled funding for districts was the other highlight of this period. 
Third, during the period 1 999, problems were the 
of the SWAp was ultimately A change in Ministers and key policy-makers 
at MoH led to imbalanced relations with While CPs pointed out the lack of transparency and 
accountability, MoH that the CPs were placing too much on it and that they were too 
for comfort. 
In period that followed (1999 to 2004), confidence of was in the 
of the Memorandum of Understanding in 1999, of joint planning and 
systems, and institutionalisation of the SWAp process within the MoH structure through 
establishment of secretariat in 
2004-2006 seen a number positive and developments in SWAp. 
Key informants indicated that the decision making process in SWAp further improved during 
in that the decisions that were adopted were more consultative and transparent. 
Informants were happy with culture of taking down action points and decisions 
in SWAp and following on these. indication was that of the times, 













APPENDIX IV - PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
1. Title of I"U~~e;:H Project 
A Critical Evaluation of the Sector Wide Approach Programming (SWAp) System in the Health 
Sector in 
2. Purpose of the research 
The study is being conducted as part of the rt>rr,.,:.nT~ for a in Public Health degree at 
the University of Cape Town, South Africa. study will look at impact that SWAp had 
on the provision of health care in Zambia and the attainment of national health and 
objectives. Assessment of will be done by looking at effectiveness resource 
efficiency in resources, level of support/financial and 
relational and collaborative processes. the study look to 
which SWAp has influenced in access utilisation of by level of It is 
anticipated that the study will draw out pertinent experiences that will be used to inform policy on 
how to further improve performance of the health system in 
3. Description of the project 
You purposively selected to in the study as a owing to your 
know-how and vast with the health In this regard, you will be asked 
specific questions on how you personally SWAps have impacted on the provision of health 
care in 
4. Confidentiality of information collected 
All written and electronic transcriptions that will obtained from you will be with utmost 
confidentiality and will only seen by me my Your identity will disclosed 
in any draft or final report of the study nor will any specific comments be attributed you. 
5. Risks and discomforts of the research 
are 	 no risks from participating in the and neither are there any 
Should you decide to discontinue with the interview and/or to answer 
please free to do so. 
6. 	Expected benefits 




to you as well as 




7. Contact person 
contact me on mobile 095-833178 (Zambia) I +27-72-431-514 











Consent of the participant 
I have read the information given above and I fully understand the meaning of it. I willingly offer to 
answer any questions concerning the study. By signing this form, I hereby consent to participate 
in the study and allow the researcher to interview me. I also understand that I am free to withdraw 
from the study at any time without penalty. 
Authentication of the consent 
Printed name of participant Signature 
Interviewer's name (Print) Signature 













APPENDIX V - INTERVIEW 
Preamble 
briefly explain what you understand by the Sector Wide Approach programming (SWAp) 
mechanism in the context MoH in Zambia. 
how long has the in existence? Who 




Governance and Management 

How is the SWAp there any structures in If so 

how are these implemented? 

How do you as an organisation relate with the in the implementation of SWAp? 

Power relations, who the show? 

Is there a legally binding document in place outlining how business should be conducted in the 





How many donors/stakeholders are currently involved in the SWAp? How 

expanded How many are merely active participants in the SWAp structures. 

How do you deal with members that are merely part of the decision making nl"f"1,I"'o'r:!C'} Do these 

have a lesser in the meetings? 

How effective is the decision making process in the SWAp? 

Scope of the expanded basket and resource allocation 

What of health are by the expanded What services 

are excluded? Why? 

How are the resources allocated? In is the allocation resources by level of 

health care adequate? 





Financing, Sustainability and Financial Management 

What are annual rate(s) of contribution by donor to the expanded basket? 

How are contributions made? this correspond to the amounts as stipulated in 

the Joint Investment Plan? 

of funding to How committed is the 
in meeting its What would you stability during 
SWAp? any mechanisms in to avoid disruption of r,;:,rnm,o implementation in 
the advent of disputes? 
Do you rer'QI\"e any financial or in-kind support from local nor"',,,,<;: apart from external 
the finances and what structures are in place to effectively manage 











Quality, Utilization and Access 

In you own view, has the SWAp led to improved quality of care? If so, how? 

What impact has it had on the level and pattern of utilization of health services? 

What impact has it had on access to health services? 

Constraints, failures and areas of improvement 

What do you think are the successful elements of a SWAp? 





If you had more money to give the Zambian government as a grant, at what level of care and 
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APPENDIX VII - WRITTEN CONSENT FROM THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH, ZAMBIA 

All r;Off.' S/XH'ld nco sl/ou d bf1 addrgsSI'd 10 lhi! In reply ple"s quot 
P rm.mf.'rl l SecrellJf}' 
NOT". _pllnl 2530 0'5 
rJ'" 253J4" 
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA 
MINI TRY OF H ALTH 
DEKE HOUSE 
PO Box 30205 
LUSAKA 
8th November 2005 
To Whom It May Concern 
RE: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE SECTOR WIDE APPROACH 
PROGRAMMING (SWAp) SYSTEM IN THE HEALTH SECTOR IN ZAMBIA 
This is to attest that Mr. Collins Chansa, SWAp Co-ordinating Officer - Ministry of Health, 
has been granted due permission to conduct the above-mentioned study. The study is 
being conducted as part of the requirements for the award of the degree of Masters in 
Public Health at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. The study will cover issues 
relating to fair financing and health systems governance particularly the impact that 
SWAp has had on the provision of health care in Zambia and the attainment of national 
health goals and objectives. It is anticipated that the results of the study will provide best 
available evidence on the operation of the Zambian health care delivery system and how to 
further improve upon it. 
Owing to your vast experience and know-how, Mr. Chansa has purposively selected you to 
participate in the study as a key informant. In this regard, I would really appreciate if you 
could aa::ad him with all the necessary support. A final report on the research findings 





Dr. Simon. K. Miti 
PERMANENT SECRETARY 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
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